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RECONSIDERING THE RELIANCE RULES: THE
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS AND PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL IN NORTH DAKOTA
THOMAS C. FOLSOM*
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Almost 60 years ago, the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of Contracts opined that the formation of a contract
required both a manifestation of assent by the parties and a suffi-
cient consideration.1 And yet it also advised that:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substan-
tial character on the part of the promisee and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.2
Some 50 years later, the American Law Institute published its
revision of the Restatement of Contracts.3 It reinforced its earlier
view that assent and consideration were necessary to the forma-
tion of a contract, adding that contract formation requires that
there be a bargain, 4 but retained the rule of § 90, with slight modi-
fications, so as to provide that:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the prom-
isee or a third person and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires' (emphasis
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1978; Associate Professor of Law,
University of North Dakota.
1. "The requirements of the law for the formation of an informal contract are: (b) A
manifestation of assent by the parties [and] (c) A sufficient consideration." RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1932) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The omitted passages in clauses
(b) and (c) of § 19 each admonish, 'except as otherwise stated.' Clauses (a) and (d) relate to
parties and to permissible transactions.
2. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
SECOND].
4. "[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of
mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration." RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3,
§ 17. Omitted language in § 17 provides that '[w]hether or not there is a bargain a contract
may be formed under the rules stated in §§ 82-94." RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3,
§ 17.
5. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 90. The portion of the 1981 version quoted
is identical to the 1932 version of § 90 except for the new language added (emphasized in
the text) and the deletion of the expression "of a definite and substantial character" which
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added).
For the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that the rule
of section 90 was, or is, a rule properly abstracted from the cases.
6
Further, it will be assumed that the interest such a rule protects is
the promisee's reliance interest (that is, having acted or having for-
borne from acting in reliance upon the promise, the promisee is
interested in seeking enforcement of the promise).7 Thus, we
had followed, and qualified, the expression "action or forbearance" in the 1932 version. See
supra note 1 and accompanying text.
6. This article could, of course, start from the beginning, and try to derive the rule of
section 90 from the cases. But that is what the American Law Institute has already
undertaken to do in the Restatements. If it be true that "pygmies sitting on the shoulders of
giants may see further than the giants," see C. BERNARD, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE (H.C. Greene trans., reprint 1927), Pt. I, Chap. II, Div. IV, at
42 ("[g]reat men have been compared to giants upon whose shoulders pygmies have
climbed, who nevertheless see further than they") accord Letter from Isaac Newton to
Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675), reprinted in 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ISAAC NEWTON 416
(H. Turnbull ed. 1959) ("[i]f I have seen further it is by standing on [the] shoulders of
Giants"), it is also true that we must start by climbing aboard, however provisionally. At the
very least, it saves time, paper and the reader's patience simply to accept some common
starting point for analysis.
7. The reliance interest is generally compared or contrasted to two other interests: the
expectation interest (by which, having entered into a profitable agreement, the promisee is
interested in enforcement of the other's promise in order to realize the expected gain), and
the restitution interest (by which, having rendered goods or services to the other person,
the promisee is interested in enforcement of the other's promise in order to avoid the
forfeit of the value of the benefits rendered). See Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
Examples of the three interests are as follows:
(a) If A and B should agree that A will paint B's house for $100, A's costs being $90
(assuming $20 for paint and $70 for labor), then, should B breach immediately after the
agreement is made, but before A does anything, A's expectation is $10, A's reliance is $0,
and A's restitution interest is $0. (A's interests have reference to B's promise; it is B who
promised to pay $100, it is B who has not performed, and it is now a matter of our
accounting for the various interests that A might have in seeking to enforce B's promise).
(b) Assume the facts are otherwise the same as in example (a), but B breaches after A
has bought $20 of paint and before A has applied any of it. A's expectation is $30 (the same
$10 profit, plus the $20 of costs incurred), A's reliance is $20 (simply the costs incurred), and
A's restitution interest is $0 (A has rendered no benefit to B; B is not enriched merely by A's
purchase of the paint).
(c) Assume the facts are otherwise the same as in example (b), but A not only buys the
$20 of paint, but also applies half of it, and incurs $35 of labor doing so prior to B's breach.
A's expectation is $65 (the same $10 profit, plus the $55 of costs incurred), A's reliance is $55
(simply the costs incurred, which now include the $20 for paint, and also $35 of labor), and
A's restitution interest will be whatever is the reasonable value of a half painted house (the
application of paint to B's house has now, finally, provided some arguable benefit to B for
which he can recompense A).
The examples illustrate that the expectation interest usually has the highest monetary
value (because it counts profits as well as costs), that the restitution interest is lowest in
value (because it counts neither profits nor so much of the costs as confer no benefit), and
that the reliance interest is somewhere between the other two (lower than expectation
because it does not include profit, but higher than restitution because it does include even
those costs that did not enrich the other party). It follows, then, that the interest most
promisees want to protect is the expectation interest. Since the ordinary measure of
recovery in a contract action protects the expectation interest, it may be said to be both
generous and somewhat subtle. It is a generous measure because it already gives A more
than the value of any benefit realized by B (no need, in example (b) above, to fret over
whether there might not be some way to conceive of A's mere purchase of the paint as
constituting some benefit to B so as to raise the restitution interest above $0), and more,
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have identified an interest which exists, and a rule that is designed
to protect it, but neither the scope nor the meaning of the rule is
clear from the text of section 90 itself. Indeed, section 90 goes
against the grain of rules elsewhere established which say that
promises are enforceable if bargained for, if accepted, if suffi-
ciently definite, if (for those promises that are within the statute of
frauds) in writing, and then only if all the conditions to the per-
formance contemplated by the promise have occurred or been
excused." All of those rules, based on something other than reli-
ance, have a reason and justice of their own which must be both
preserved and accounted for by any reliance theory.9
even, than any out of pocket loss suffered by A herself. It is a somewhat subtle measure
because, while restitution recovers an amount which is both a loss to A and a gain to B, and
while reliance recovers all that plus the additional increment which is a loss to A even
though not a gain to B, the expectation measure, instead, represents a 'recovery' by A of
something (anticipated profit) she either never 'had' at all, or had in an intangible way.
8. For the Restatement (Second) analysis of these, see RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra
note 3, §§ 71-81 (the requirement of consideration), §§ 17-70 (the formation of contracts and
mutual assent), §§ 110-150 (the statute of frauds), and §§ 224-230 (conditions and similar
events). See infra note 38 and accompanying text for a thumbnail guide to these rules'
place in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The absence of impediments (that is, the
absence of incapacity, fraud, duress, mistake, unconscionability, illegality and the like) is
assumed in this discussion of enforceability. Thus, if there is bargained for consideration,
assent (including offer and acceptance where called for, and including sufficient
definiteness), and satisfaction of the statute of frauds (if the promise is within the statute of
frauds), a promise will be referred to as being enforceable (that is, presumptively
enforceable, granting the absence of impediments); if any of those elements is absent, a
promise will be referred to as being presumptively unenforceable (that is, presumptively
unenforceable, unless something like section 90 serves to tip the scales). In thus isolating
the elements of bargained for consideration, assent, and satisfaction of the statue of frauds,
this article is concentrated on those elements, the absence of which would have rendered a
promise presumptively unenforceable, but whose absence has been excused by one or more
courts using analyses more or less closely patterned after section 90 in order to fashion a
recovery for the relying promisee. Of course, there are other doctrines, exceptions and
techniques (outside of promissory estoppel) by which recoveries may be fashioned for a
promisee to whom a presumptively unenforceable promise has been made; but, though this
article will deal with some of those other doctrines, its main scope is limited to promissory
estoppel and section 90.
9. Accounted for, that is, on the assumption that it was never the intention of the
drafters of the Restatement, nor of the courts which have adopted the section 90 analysis,
simply to reduce all of contract law to one exception destined to devour all the other rules.
For a not altogether fanciful exploration of a different set of assumptions, see G. GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 61 (1974) (treating the bargain theory of consideration, rather
than promissory estoppel, as the innovation of the Restatement, diagnosing the bargain
theory's coexistence with § 90 as evidence of the Restatement's "schizophrenia"). It was
then asked:
And what is that all about? We have become accustomed to the idea, without in
the least understanding it, that the universe includes both matter and
antimatter. Perhaps what we have here is Restatement and anti-Restatement or
Contract and anti-Contract. The one thing that is clear is that these two
contradictory propositions [section 90 reliance, and the notion of bargained for
consideration] cannot live comfortably together: in the end one must swallow
the other up.
Id. at 61. But see J. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES 3, 199-207 (1980), cited by E. FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS 98 n. 49 (1982) (for the proposition that Dawson disagrees with Gil-
more's 'exaggerated' account of the reabsorption of contract into tort), and C. FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE 30 n. 12 (1981) (for the proposition that Dawson disagrees with
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When might a promisor, under section 90's rule, have a 'rea-
sonable expectation' that some one else will rely upon a promise
that is not otherwise enforceable? How can there be an 'injustice'
when a promise that is not enforceable because of another rule
and, presumably, for good reason, is not enforced? These ques-
tions, when and as answered, can provide the basis for a theory of
reliance. This theory could be expected to go beyond a statement
of the interest to be protected and beyond a recital of a 'rule.' The
theory would explain the reason for the rule, the purpose it serves,
the harm that it relieves, and its relationship to other rules. In
short, a reliance theory would provide a basis for predicting when
and how the reliance interest will be protected.
If we can assume generally that the Restatement gives us rules
correctly abstracted from cases that have arisen in some one or
more jurisdictions, then the first particular order of business is to
determine whether there had been, in North Dakota, any corre-
sponding cases from which such rules could have been derived in
this state. The second task is to determine whether, with or with-
out any pre-Restatement promissory estoppel cases in this state,
North Dakota has adopted any of the various formulations of, and
suggested applications of, the several reliance-based rules of the
Restatement. After having read and analyzed every promissory
estoppel case decided in North Dakota, I conclude that there was
no pre-Restatement case support in this state for a rule like that of
section 90, and that the post-Restatement cases in this state do not
apply the rules set forth in the Restatement of Contracts. Further,
North Dakota has no independent history of promissory recoveries
based upon any determinate reliance rule, and, hence, no depend-
able material from which to construct any unique reliance theory
of its own. Instead, the North Dakota Supreme Court has decided
each of the cases on its own facts without articulating any general
set of rules, and without seeking to impose any theory. This leaves
the court with an extraordinary opportunity either to fashion
freely its own set of reliance-based rules or to refrain from doing so
at all. Since there has been more than 50 years of debate, trial and
error, and episodic development of a more or less elaborate set of
reliance-based rules outside of North Dakota, but none of it has left
much of a mark on the decisional law in this state, the North
Gilmore's 'surprising suggestion' that the bargain theory was invented by Holmes). As to
the actual state of affairs, let the reader take it one way or the other, but in any event, and
from either direction, there are a great number of cases for which some account must be
given.
[Vol. 66:317
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Dakota Supreme Court has all of the benefits of a clean slate cou-
pled with all of the benefits of vicarious wisdom and experience.
It is generally presumed that North Dakota is favorably
inclined to the Restatement's view of reliance-based recovery
under section 90.10 But there are three difficulties with that
supposition.
First, the North Dakota cases that seem to embrace a Restate-
ment style of reliance-based recovery sketch a line, and a support-
ing rationale, that is faint and wavering at best. The cases contain
a generous portion of obiter dicta; they waver between formula-
tions of a rule somewhat akin to that expressed in section 90 of the
original Restatement and somewhat like that expressed in section
90 of the Restatement (Second), though, in fact, materially differ-
ent from either; they often express no rationale for electing to pro-
tect the reliance interest at all, or for adopting any particular
formulation of a reliance rule; they fail to distinguish possible dif-
ferences in treatment of the several distinct transaction types that
present the questions of reliance; and they, far more often than
not, reach actual holdings by which the plaintiff promisee loses
rather than wins.' As a result, it is hard to determine where the
North Dakota Supreme Court actually stands on the question. The
most likely answer is that it is premature to say that the court has
embraced the Restatement. Though the court may be inclining
towards the Restatement, it has not yet decided cases on the basis
of the Restatement's formulation.
Second, North Dakota is a Field code state,' 2 and David Dud-
10. See, e.g., Smith, Recent Developments in North Dakota Contract Law, 60 N.D.L.
REV. 227-28 (1984) (asserting that contract law in North Dakota is becoming "increasingly
flexible," and that the "court has been increasingly willing to recognize promissory estoppel
or reliance, both as a substitute for consideration, and as a device to estop one party from
taking advantage of another in the contract context"). But cf. id. at 230-34 (discussing four
estoppel cases, in none of which the North Dakota Supreme Court actually enforced any
promise because of promissory estoppel); id. at 235 (noting that, among the issues
remaining for the North Dakota Supreme Court to address is "whether a party may raise
promissory estoppel as an independent action in North Dakota"). See also R. LORD, BASIC
NORTH DAKOTA CONTRACT LAW 12-13 (1979) (suggesting that North Dakota adheres to
section 90 of the Restatement).
11. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. These results are tabulated in
Chart 1 at A-1 (appendix to this article).
12. Muus, The Origin of the North Dakota Civil Code, 4 DAK. L. REV. 103 (1932). In
1865, the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Dakota (then including the present states
of North and South Dakota) enacted into law, effective on January 12, 1866, the codes of
substantive civil law known as the Field Code. The code itself had only been submitted to
the New York legislature in final form (the ninth and final report of David Dudley Field and
Alexander W. Bradford, Commissioners of the Code) on February 13, 1865. Field himself,
in a letter urging leaders of the California Bar to seek adoption of the code, recognized that
the "honor of being the first to enact a code of the common law of England belongs, not to
England nor to New York, but to Dakota, one of the youngest, but most vigorous, of our
Territories." D. Field, Codification of the Law, 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND
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ley Field's code may forbid adoption of section 90, or at least raise
serious questions about the necessity or legitimacy of section 90 in
North Dakota.' 3  Since the North Dakota Supreme Court has
never explicitly faced the question whether the code is a barrier to
adoption of the Restatement's view, it is hard to predict what it
would do if the issue were squarely raised by a litigant.'
4
Finally, the Field Code radically altered the common law of
contracts when it provided that promises are enforceable, not only
where supported by consideration, but also if supported by
"cause," a civil law term which Mr. Field imported from the Loui-
siana and Napoleonic Codes.' 5 Since it is hard to imagine any
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 349-50 (1884) [hereinafter SPEECHES
AND PAPERS] (letter from Mr. Field to the California Bar, November 28, 1870).
13. The Field Code is intended to be a comprehensive codification of the substantive
law. It contains a section which provides that "there is no common law in any case where
the law is declared by the [code]," and another which repeals "all statutes, laws and rules
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code." THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK REPORTED COMPLETE BY THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE (9th and Final Report
1865) [hereinafter FIELD CODE] §§ 6 and 2033. Section 6 of the Field Code is codified at
N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1987). A provision substantially equivalent to § 2033 of the
Field Code is codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-19 (1987) (codifying for general purposes
the repealer language, but deriving it from Field's code of civil procedure rather than from
his substantive civil code).
The Field Code states, as a matter of positive law, that "[i]t is essential to the existence
of a contract that there should be: (1) Parties capable of contracting; (2) Their consent; (3) A
lawful object; and, (4) A sufficient cause or consideration." FIELD CODE, § 745, codified at
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-01-02 (1987).
The Field Code contains nothing like section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts that
might excuse the absence of consent or that might excuse the absence of cause or
consideration. Although the code, as amended in several jurisdictions subsequent to Field's
work on it, does contain an equitable estoppel provision, there is still no promissory
estoppel provision. See infra note 354 and accompanying text for a discussion of the North
Dakota statutory provisions relating to equitable estoppel as elaborated by the North
Dakota Supreme Court.
It is doubtful whether the Field Code, as originally authored, or as amended, permits
any application of section 90, and arguable that, in light of its different orientation towards
the enforceability of promises, it does not need anything like section 90.
14. This is a situation for which we must all take some responsibility. At the threshold,
the Civil Field Code is not generally available, and copies of the Field Code containing the
Code Commissioner's annotations are rarer still. Moreover, it is likely that the Code is not
generally taught in the 'national law schools,' and that it is, by and large, neglected even in
the law schools situated in Code states. Cf J. Muus, The Influence of the Civil Code on the
Teaching of Law at the University of North Dakota, 4 DAK. L. REV. 175 (1932) (indicating
that, though the civil code "has made changes in the common law to an extent which is
greater than often assumed," the existence of the code has not caused the methods of
teaching at the University of North Dakota School of Law to deviate from those used in
common law jurisdictions).
If neither taught, nor readily available to those who would be inclined to teach
themselves, it should not be surprising that the Field Code is neither known nor generally
followed, except by accident.
15. FIELD CODE, supra note 13, § 745(4). Section 745 is set out in full at note 13, supra.
The annotations to § 745 of the Field Code prepared by the Commissioners of the Code
(and generally assumed to have been the work of Mr. Field himself) include references to
Art. 1772 of the 1825 Louisiana Code, and to Art. 1108 of the Code Napoleon. Id. Both the
Louisiana and French code provisions incorporate the concept of cause. LOUISIANA CIVIL
CODE, Compiled Edition (1972) (reconstructing the older Louisiana article 1772 and article
1108 of the Code Napoleon in the annotations following Art. 1779).
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deliberate promise as lacking sufficient cause,16 it is hard to resist
the conclusion that every deliberate promise is already enforcea-
ble in North Dakota, whether anyone has relied upon it or not.
But the North Dakota Supreme Court has not faced the question
at any time in one hundred years of statehood,' 7 and since there is
no record of anyone ever having asserted the right to enforce a
deliberate promise on the basis that it, though lacking considera-
tion, was made for sufficient cause, perhaps even this conclusion is
not free from doubt.
Of these three difficulties, this article is limited to the first.' 8
Section 90 of the original Restatement of Contracts probably did
not restate the law of North Dakota as it existed in 1932, and sec-
tion 90 and the various other reliance-based rules of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts did not restate the law of North
Dakota as it existed in 1981. There are, however, some cases in
North Dakota, many of them relatively recent, that contain dicta
about protecting the reliance interest, and a smaller number of
cases (both recent and older) that may actually protect the reliance
interest under some indeterminate set of circumstances. 19 These
are cases that seem to coexist uneasily within the Field Code, and
do not, as yet, suggest any particular reason for embracing reliance
rules that seem to be contrary to, or at least not obviously within,
the governing statutory law. Moreover, they do not contain any
considered rationale explaining what defect is to be remedied, or
what purpose is to be served, by sporadically granting ad hoc
recoveries on the basis of some sort of reliance.
This unsettled state of affairs is by no means a bad thing,
because it serves to provide the North Dakota Supreme Court
with an extraordinarily valuable amount of freedom to fashion the
reliance based rules, if any, which are appropriate to North
Dakota. In short, the North Dakota Supreme Court has not yet
articulated a reliance theory. If it were to elect to do so, it may
16. It appears that a promise was given for sufficient cause, within the meaning of the
Napoleonic Code, if it was made deliberately with a definite end in view. T. Plucknett, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 652-53 (5th ed. 1956). See also J. Domat, Les lois
civiles dans leur order naturel (1689) Part I, Bk. I, tit. I, Sec. I, Art. 5 and 6 (Nos. 148 and
149); R. Pothier, Obligations, (circa 1761) (Nos. 42 and 43). This result is explained at
somewhat greater length in e.g., J. Denson Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L.
REV. 2, 4 (1951).
17. This is a phenomena not limited to North Dakota. California also has acted as if its
version of the statute did not exist. See generally Keyes, Cause and Consideration in
California-a Re-Appraisal, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 74 (1959).
18. Future articles of mine may discuss the second and third problems as they exist, not
only in North Dakota, but in other states influenced by the Field Code (including California,
Montana, Oklahoma and South Dakota).
19. These results are tabulated in Chart 1 at A-1.
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benefit from a careful reading of its own cases in comparison to
those that influenced the Restatement, and freely fashion a theory
that adapts the best of each, in light of the special circumstances of
law, policy and social structures existing in this state. At least as
justifiably, the court might elect not to accept any reliance theory
at all because (a) the Field Code generally discourages it from
doing so, while, at the same time (by the concept of "cause,") both
rendering it unnecessary to do so, and providing the outlines of
another, and better theory,2" and (b) there are many barriers to
the articulation of a coherent reliance theory anywhere, and par-
ticularly on a case-by-case basis in a state like North Dakota in
which there are few cases. Moreover, the presence of the Field
Code allows the court to avoid importing alien, outmoded and
awkward reliance-based theories to explain its results.
This article also observes that promissory estoppel is not a uni-
tary rule, and is not, at least as practiced in this one particular
state, quite the same thing as is described in the Restatement of
Contracts.2' Finally, it is the purpose of this article, not only to
account for all of the promissory estoppel cases in North Dakota,
and to suggest a method for solving the problems presented by the
cases, but also to desynonymize the term "promissory estoppel,"
and to create a vocabulary of analysis by which it is possible to
discuss various promissory estoppels as they actually are in any
given jurisdiction, starting with this one.
II. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL ANALYSIS: FOUNDATIONS
AND FOLKLORE
A. MODERN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW: THE
RESTATEMENTS
The modern era of American contract law dates from 1932,
the year in which the Restatement of Contracts appeared.2 2 The
20. For the proposition that it is unnecessary to develop a reliance theory in a civil
code system which already incorporates the concept of cause as a basis for enforceability of
promises, see 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 196 (1963) (not distinguishing the
Roman 'causa' from the Napoleonic Code's 'cause.' Corbin made the following observation:
[it may well be, also, that "causa" includes so many antecedent reasons for
making a promise that it would make enforceable every promise on which it
would be reasonable to rely. If such is the case, it would be unnecessary for the
Roman and Continental jurists to develop a reliance doctrine.
Id.
For an outline of the Field Code's approach to consensual obligations, and an introduc-
tion to the concept of cause, see supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
21. These results are tabulated in Charts 2 and 3 at A-2 to A-6.
22. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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publication of this work, which had been in progress since 1923,
marked the completion by the American Law Institute of its work
on "the first of a series of volumes designed to cover the restate-
ment of the principal subjects of the law."' 23 In stating the object
and character of the Restatement, Professor William Draper
Lewis, Director of the Institute, observed that it was the function
of the courts to "decide controversies brought before them" and
that it was the function of the American Law Institute to "state
clearly and precisely in the light of the decisions the principles and
rules of the common law."'24 Professor Lewis both predicted that
"there is reason to expect" that the restatement would be
accepted by the courts and legal profession generally as "prima
facie a correct statement of what may be termed the general com-
mon law of the United States,"'25 and also cautioned that "there are
instances in which the law in one or more States may vary from
the law stated in a particular section."
26
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, Introduction, vii.
24. Id. at xi.
25. Id. at xiv. This confidence was probably based upon the quality of the persons who
participated in the project, coupled with the procedures observed. The reporter was
Professor Samuel Williston, "the foremost legal expert on the subject," and Professor Arthur
L. Corbin, another respected authority on contracts, was one of his five advisors. Id. at ix.
The Institute charged the reporter with primary responsibility for the preparation and
presentation to his advisors of preliminary drafts of the different chapters; for presentation
of these drafts to a Council of the ALl (in 1933, for example, the council was composed of
some 30 persons, including Benjamin Cardozo, Learned Hand, the Elihu Roots, junior and
senior, and John W. Davis); and for presentation to the annual ALl meetings of tentative
drafts and proposed final drafts. Id. at x. Thus, the procedure contemplated the
progression of work from the Reporter and advisors, first to the Council, and thence to the
ALI itself.
The successive preliminary drafts were the product of a committee consisting of Mr.
Williston and his advisors. Id. During the nine years of the project, there were 51 of these
preliminary drafts. Id. No "final" preliminary draft was presented to the Council until the
committee was satisfied with it, and so the committee presented to the Council only 17
"final" preliminary drafts. Id. The Council itself submitted ten "tentative" drafts of various
parts of the work to the ALl for consideration and discussion at eight of the ALI's annual
meetings between 1923 and 1932. Id. at ix-xi
26. Id. at xiv. The Institute contemplated that the Restatement of Contracts would be
supplemented by a set of annotations, one for each state, prepared by the several State Bar
Associations with the assistance of the faculties of local law schools. Id. The State
Annotations would, for each state, and for each section of the Restatement, indicate
whether the Restatement did or did not accord with actual state law, "set[ting] forth the
pertinent local decisions and statutes." Id. As of the June 30, 1932 date of his introduction
to the Restatement, Professor Lewis was able to announce what seemed to be the near-
completion of the annotation project, noting that, in a majority of the states, the state
annotations for the Restatement of Contracts "will be available soon after the publication of
[the Restatement of Contracts]" and that, in "practically all the remaining States," the state
annotation projects are "in progress, and publication should not be long delayed." Id. at xv.
Whatever may have happened to the State Annotations in the other states, the only
sections of the Restatement of Contracts that ever approached annotation in North Dakota
were those pertaining to the statute of frauds (the 1932 Restatement of Contracts consisted
of 609 sections, organized into 18 chapters; Chapter 8, §§ 178 to 225, treated the Statute of
Frauds). The University of North Dakota Law Review ran a series of articles between 1928
and 1930 which compared existing North Dakota authorities to the tentative drafts of
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In 1981, the American Law Institute published the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, which had been in preparation since
1962.27 In his forward to the Restatement (Second), Professor Her-
bert Wechsler, Director of the American Law Institute, said that it
is "implicit in the concept of restatement that the work should be
kept current by periodic reexamination and revision. '28 Observ-
ing that the original Restatement of Contracts had been a "legen-
dary success, exercising enormous influence," and that it had
become a "classic," which the new reporters, their advisors and
the Institute approached with "respect and tenderness, ' 29 Profes-
sor Wechsler nonetheless pointed to several changes. The work
now included commentary explaining and expounding the "black
letter" of the Restatement formulations, and included the
Reporter's Notes describing the authorities supporting the
Restatement formulations.3 0 Other changes involved the mode of
presentation: "matters of organization, where changes in the
ordering or scope of topics enhanced clarity or reduced redun-
dancy, and matters of drafting, where revision served the interest
of compression, simplification, precision or refinement of analy-
sis."'" The result is a revised Restatement which is "indeed, very
Chapter 8 of the Restatement, and so provided a local annotation to this portion of the
Restatement. The Statute of Frauds Restatement with North Dakota Annotations, Part
One, 2 DAK. L. REV. 373 (1928); The Statute of Frauds Restatement with North Dakota
Annotations, Part Two, 2 DAK. L. REV. 438 (1928); The Statute of Frauds Restatement with
North Dakota Annotations, Part Three, 3 DAK. L. REV. 373 (1930).
Despite a commitment to a full State Annotation project on the part of the North
Dakota Bar Association and the University of North Dakota School of Law, no further work
was ever completed. See generally N.D. STATE BAR ASSOCIATION BAR BRIEFS, Vol. 7, No.
1, 77-78 (Dec. 1930X"Resolved that the faculty of the University of North Dakota Law
School be officially recognized as the representative body of the North Dakota State Bar
Association to annotate the Restatements to the North Dakota Laws"); Id. Vol. 8, No. 1,105-
06 (Dec. 19 3 1X"In many states the Bar Associations have agreed to contribute from $1,000
to $5,000 a year for state annotations. In many schools the teaching load is reduced so as to
give the teachers an opportunity.... To aid them, one or more student assistants are often
provided.... This is a serious and big task"); Id. Vol. 10, No. 1, 15 (Dec. 1933X"Very little
can be performed on the problem of North Dakota annotations by the University law
faculty with its limited budget, reduced faculty, and heavier teaching load the committee
will have to wait until conditions are more favorable"). As a result, Professor Draper's
cautionary warning was never fully tested in North Dakota.
27. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
28. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, Forward, vii.
29. Id. at vii-viii. The work proceeded from 1962 through 1979. Id. at vii. The
reporter for approximately the first half of the Restatement (Second) was Professor Robert
Braucher of the Harvard Law School. Id. Professor Braucher resigned upon being
appointed a Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1971, and was
succeeded as reporter by Professor E. Allan Farnsworth of Columbia University. Id.
Professor Corbin served as Consultant until his death in 1967 and left "elaborate written
notes." Id. During the 17 years of the project, there were fourteen tentative drafts
presented to the American Law Institute. Id.
30. Id. at viii.
31. Id. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is reduced to 385 sections
(a substantial reduction of the 609 sections contained in the original Restatement). And,
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close to a new work."'3 2 The remainder of this introduction to the
Restatement is based upon the Restatement (Second).
Discourse begins with words, and the Restatement (Second)
begins with some observations on words and language. It is true
that the words significant to the law of contracts "often have differ-
ent meanings to the speaker and the hearer," and are "commonly
used in more than one sense .... - But this "persistent source of
difficulty in the law of contracts ' 34 might be avoided by attempt-
ing to give words a single definition and then using them only as
defined.35 Hence, when the reliance theory is discussed in this
article in the context of those promises that may be enforceable
because of reliance, the discussion will be with reference to basic
terms as defined in the Restatement (Second).36
Words serve as terms in propositions. And the propositions
relevant to the law of contracts can be constructed in more than
one fashion so as to afford more than one theory that accounts for
the reported cases and predicts the outcome of the as yet unde-
although there is no significant reduction in the number of chapters (16 chapters in the new
Restatement, 18 chapters in the original), there is such a substantial reordering,
recaptioning, and rearranging of the chapters as to make any numerical comparison
unhelpful. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 and RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3.
32. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, Forward, viii. Professor Wechsler did,
however, view the new Restatement as having proceeded on the basis that there was
"relatively little need for major substantive revision, in the sense of changing the positions
taken on important issues .... Id. This perhaps exemplifies the paradox that the two
Restatements of Contracts must be thought of, on the one hand, as being completely
different works, and yet, on the other hand, as being deeply related and similar to one
another. Thus, the reader of the two Restatements must be on notice of the necessity of
carefully comparing the two.
33. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, ch. 1, Introductory Note.
34. Id.
35. While there are many ways to define the words and concepts that have significance
to the law of contracts, it is helpful to choose one way and stick with it. To a North Dakota
lawyer, three choices of definition would be those given in the Field Code, in North Dakota
decisional law, or in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts offers the advantage of an internally unified set of definitions which is fairly
authoritative, fairly recent, and generally available to most practitioners. Accordingly, not
only in this discussion of the Restatement (Second) itself, but in the discussion of contract
law in general, either the definitions of the Restatement (Second) will be used or the reader
will be alerted to some other usage.
36. "A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a
specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has
been made." RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 2(1). Here, the Restatement (Second)
separates an act (the promise) from any resulting legal relationship. See RESTATEMENT
SECOND, supra note 3, § 2, comment a. The corresponding comment amplifies by
explaining that "[ijf by virtue of other operative facts there is a legal duty to perform, the
promise is a contract; but the word 'promise' is not limited to acts having legal effect." Id.
(emphasis added).
To say that a promise is "enforceable" is to say that there is a legal remedy for its
breach, which means that the promise is a contract under that branch of the Restatement's
definition of contract which provides that a contract is "a promise or set of promises for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy." Id. § 1. Therefore, if a promise is legally
enforceable against the promisor, then the promise is a contract.
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cided cases. Again, some difficulty may be avoided by fastening
upon a single theory and using it as our reference.3 7 Thus, when
the reliance theory is discussed in this article in the context of
those promises that may be enforceable because of reliance, the
discussion will be with reference to the common theory which
makes the discussion meaningful (that is, the Restatement's theory
that explains the enforceability of promises generally in terms of
bargain, and in light of which certain premises become
significant).38
While the defined terms of the Restatement (Second) can pro-
vide common ground for the beginning of analysis, they do not go
far enough to permit sustained analysis. Assuming the usage of the
Restatement (Second) succeeds in permitting discourse (including
disagreement as well as agreement) by pointing to clear and con-
sistent terms, and assuming that those terms can be used profitably
to compare and contrast the various reliance-based transaction
types exemplified in the Restatement (Second) with the North
Dakota cases, it does not follow that the same terms can be used to
build a theory that accounts for the cases that form the subject
matter of contract law, or can succeed in doing that which the
Restatement does not even attempt. It does not attempt to define
broader terms. There is no definition of such terms or concepts as
'law' or 'justice,' and, accordingly, no theory that explains the end
(or purpose) of law, no theory that explains the ideal (or goal) of
justice, and no theory that predicts whether (much less one that
accounts for why, or how) law and justice might come into conflict
with one another. If the Restatement were complete without such
terms or theories, their omission might be no loss; and if we could
fashion a reliance theory in North Dakota without reference to
37. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts presents a theory or set of theories which,
by apparent design, is intended to be comprehensive, and to account for the cases in a self-
consistent manner. Accordingly, I will either use the theory of the Restatement, or alert
the reader to some other usage.
38. In general, and with exceptions, the theory of the Restatement is that "the
formation of a contract requires [1] a bargain in which there is [2] a manifestation of mutual
assent to the exchange and [3] a consideration." RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 17
(emphasis added).
"A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a
performance or to exchange performances." Id. § 3.
A "[m]anifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each party either
make a promise or begin or render a performance" it "ordinarily takes the form of an offer
or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by the other party or parties." Id.
99 18, 22 (emphasis added).
Consideration consists in any performance or return promise which is "bargained for,"
and "[a] performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in
exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise." Id.§§ 71(l), 71(2).
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such terms or theories, we would not long lament their loss. But
the operation of the reliance-based rules of the Restatement do
require the use of such terms. In particular, they require us to
define, or else abandon, the word and the concept of "justice. 39
In these closing years of the 20th century, it seems common-
place to say that it is extremely unlikely that there is any agree-
ment on what "justice" means, and very likely that it means
different things to different readers.4 ° In the interest of brevity,
this article will not explore the several meanings that might attach
to the word.41 For now, in this part of the article, it will be suffi-
cient to list and categorize the various reliance-based transaction
types that are, in fact, set forth in the Restatement. The "theory,"
if any, can wait.
B. THE RELIANCE INTEREST AND THREE KINDS OF
RELIANCE
The reliance interest, has already been described.4 2 The reli-
ance interest, conceived of as a reason why a promisee might want
to urge a claim for enforcement, is a unitary interest. The original
Restatement contained one reliance-based rule, section 90, and
the drafters of the rule seemed to have contemplated the one par-
ticular kind of reliance which is reliance in the absence of consid-
eration.43 In contrast, the Restatement (Second) contains at least
39. Section 90 of the Restatement, the fountainhead of promissory estoppel, assumes
an understanding of the term "justice," since justice is an essential element to the recovery.
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires." RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note
3, § 90 (emphasis added).
40. In this regard, we seem to have an affinity with the Athenians whom Socrates,
perhaps ironically, characterized as differing markedly from the citizens of Thessaly in their
lack of wisdom. Cf. Plato, MENO, in which, at the outset, Socrates compliments Meno on
the fame for wisdom then possessed by the Thessalians, observes that any wisdom once
possessed in Athens must have emigrated to Thessaly, and then states that:
I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or
acquired, he would laugh in your face and say: 'Stranger, you have far too good
an opinion of me, if you think that I can answer your question. For I literally do
not know what virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or
not.'
Id.
Likewise, if any American lawyer were to be asked whether promissory estoppel pro-
motes justice, and, if so, how, he or she would first have to consider whether they know
what justice is, much less whether it is promoted by promissory estoppel or not.
41. Cf. infra note 50 and accompanying text (suggesting that justice may be related to
fairness, to human happiness, and to following the law). See generally Aristotle, Nico-
MACHEAN ETHICS, Bk V (justice as the fair and the lawful); Id. Bk I, Bk V, Bk X (universal
justice, and virtue in its entirety, as politically ordered activities directed towards human
happiness).
42. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
43. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 90. To be sure, one of the categories of
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seven additional sections containing reliance-based rules and at
least two other sections setting forth doctrines that are closely
related to the reliance based rules.44 Though the reliance interest
(considered as the promisee's, or society's, motive, reason, or
desire that the promise be enforced) is the same throughout, it no
longer serves to think exclusively of that one, single reliance inter-
est, but it becomes helpful, from time to time, to distinguish sev-
eral contexts, or kinds of reliance from the reliance interest itself.
This means that there are several contexts, and several kinds of
things that a promisee might do which create in that promisee a
desire that the reliance interest be protected. Broadly speaking,
there are three kinds of reliance contexts under one or another of
which all of the reliance-based rules can be clustered: (1) reliance
in the absence of consideration, (2) reliance in the absence of
mutual assent, and (3) reliance in the absence of a required
writing.
The several reliance-based rules can be conceived of as excep-
tions, or substitutes, for each of three presumptive rules of the
restatement, two of which are substantive rules, and one of which
is formal.45 The reliance-based rules can, thus, be thought of in
terms of transaction types that are outside of the presumptive
rules but which, nonetheless, raise some claim for recovery which
cases relied upon by the drafters may have to do, as well, with reliance in the absence of a
writing that satisfies the statute of frauds, and the examples given in illustration of section
90 of the original Restatement included one that has to do with reliance in the absence of
acceptance. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. However, the actual discussion
and defense of the provision in front of the American Law Institute was put almost
exclusively on the basis of cases (real and assumed) of reliance in the absence of
consideration. Id.
44. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3. In addition to § 90, the Restatement
(Second) contains these additional sections which set forth separate reliance-based rules:
§ 84(2Xc) (reliance upon a promise which takes the form of a waiver of conditions); § 87(2)
(reliance on a promise which takes the form of an offer); § 88(c) (reliance on a promise
which takes the form of a guaranty/suretyship arrangement); § 89(c) (reliance on a promise
which modifies an executory contract - one of the 'preexisting legal duty' complex of
problems); § 139 (reliance upon a promise which is within the statute of frauds, but is not
embodied in a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute); § 273(1) (reliance on a promise which
takes the form of a discharge of a duty - including discharges by substituted agreement,
accord, release, covenant not to sue, and the like); and § 332(4) (reliance on a promise which
takes the form of a gratuitous assignment of contract rights).
Among the sections which set forth related doctrines are: § 34(3) (reliance on a promise
which, having originally been too indefinite to enforce, becomes sufficiently definite by
virtue of performance); § 45(1) (a rule approaching reliance on a promise which takes the
form of an offer that must be accepted by performance - where the reliance consists in
beginning performance). See also, id. § 153 comment (d) (suggesting that reliance on a
promise which is unconscionable, because mistaken within the meaning of § 153(a), may be
a basis for enforcement) and § 158(2) (related provision, concerning relief in the case of
mistaken promises).
45. The Restatement (Second) proceeds generally on the basis that consideration and
mutual assent are substantive rules. See supra note 38 and accompanying text
(consideration and assent); infra note 102 and accompanying text (consideration).
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at least one court has answered (and so must be accounted for in
the Restatement's formulation), and which recur with such regu-
larity as to justify separate treatment. Those transaction types, in
turn, can be categorized in terms of the substantive or formal rule
whose observance would otherwise be required for the enforce-
ability of the promise in question.
Consideration and mutual assent, the two most general sub-
stantive rules set forth in the Restatement are both contained in
the section which provides that "the formation of a contract
requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual
assent to the exchange and a consideration."46 The most pervasive
formality is that which requires certain promises to be in writing.47
Thus, if B makes a promise to A which is part of a transaction in
which there is consideration for B's promise, in which A and B
manifest mutual assent (typically by way of an offer and accept-
ance),48 and in which, if the promise is within the statute of frauds,
the statute is satisfied, then B's promise is a contract. As such, B's
promise is binding upon him, and A may enforce it even if she has
not relied upon it (and especially without regard to whether she
has relied upon it - which is one of the principal points of con-
tract law).49
However, since A and B are human beings, and the law is a
human creation, it could be guessed that A and B can so contrive
their affairs as to fail to meet any, all, or some combination of the
requirements otherwise necessary to make B's promise to A
enforceable; and it could be imagined that the law, as it attempts
to make people happy,50 would find some means of enforcing at
46. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 17. Elaborations of consideration and of
mutual assent occupy some 60 additional sections in the Restatement (Second) (assent: §§ 18
to 70, and consideration: §§ 71 to 81).
47. The usage that will be followed in this article is as follows: If a promise, otherwise
enforceable, must be in writing in order to be enforced, it is said to be a promise "within"
the statute of frauds; if a promise is within the statute of frauds and is expressed in a
sufficient writing, the statute of frauds is said to be "satisfied." See E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 373 (1982).
48. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, §§ 18, 22.
49. A is awarded damages for B's breach, even if B breaches immediately and prior to
any reliance by A, and both A and B can know this prospectively. Further, the damages are
calculated against her expectation interest, which is, in the usual case, a more generous
recovery than an award that recompenses only to the extent of reliance. See supra note 7.
50. Cf. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 (1963) ("The underlying purpose of law
and government is human happiness") and e.g., T. Aquinas, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part I of
Second Part, Q. 90, Art. 2, Ans. ("the last end of human life is happiness. Consequently the
law must regard principally the relationship to happiness.") citing ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, Bk
V., Ch 1, 1129b17). Of course Aquinas follows Aristotle in conceiving of human happiness
as being both deontological (obligatory and categorical) and teleological (directed towards
an end and, thus, 'utilitarian'), while Corbin goes on to equate human happiness with mere
contentment, and supposes that contentment can be brought about by the "satisfaction of
1990]
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least some of the promises made in at least some of the failed trans-
actions between all of the A's and B's of this world. Hence, if B
makes a promise to A in which there is no consideration for B's
promise, or in which A or B do not manifest mutual assent (either
because A never accepts, or because B never actually gets around
to making an offer which A could accept; or because the promise
that B makes, even if offered and accepted, is not sufficiently defi-
nite enough to be intelligible), or in which, the promise being
within the statute of frauds, B never executes a writing sufficient to
satisfy the statute of frauds - then, in each event there is a trans-
action involving a promise (B's promise to A) which is, presump-
tively, unenforceable by A against B. Should A rely upon any such
promise, A will certainly stand to risk the loss of all of the expenses
incurred by her which did not confer any benefit upon B. 51
And so it is that A might have relied upon a promise (1) pre-
sumptively unenforceable because of the absence of consideration,
or (2) presumptively unenforceable because of the absence of
assent, or (3) presumptively unenforceable because of the absence
of formality (failure to satisfy the statute of frauds). Each of these
three possibilities frames a set of transaction types that may be
human desires to the highest practicable degree," CORBIN, Op. cit., but at least there is
nominal agreement that "happiness" (even though differently conceived) is the end or
purpose of law. Thus, the only remaining step is to determine what human happiness is
(not a difficult task, but one which is beyond the scope of this article).
51. As to those expenses suffered by A and which do confer a benefit upon B, there is
always the likelihood of a restitutionary recovery in favor of A, to the extent of the
reasonable value of the benefit rendered. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
However, this discussion is concerned with those expenses which are a loss to A and which,
being no gain to B, are expenses which A stands to forfeit.
Using the same hypothetical facts set forth in note 7, supra, and on the further
hypothesis that there is, for whatever reason, no presumptive contract, the stakes are these:
In example (b) in note 7, A has purchased paint which provides no benefit to B. A
stands to lose $20. A does not have a claim against B in restitution (no benefit). A does not
have a claim against B under presumptive rules of contract law (per hypothesis).
In example (c) in note 7, A has purchased paint, and applied half of it. A stands to lose
so much of A's expenses as provided no benefit to B. A does have a claim against B in
restitution (to the extent of the benefit, but probably less than the full extent of A's costs and
expenses). A does not have a claim against B under presumptive rules of contract law
(again, per hypothesis).
In either event supposed, and assuming that A and B have so ordered their affairs as to
be without a contract under presumptive rules of contract law, A has incurred a loss greater
than can be recompensed by principles of restitution. The question is: will there be a
recovery because of these losses suffered in reliance upon a promise not otherwise
enforceable? If so, the next question is: will the recovery be to the full extent of the
promise? or will the recovery be diminished? (If the recovery be to the full extent of the
promise, A would recover $30 in example (b) and $65 in example (c); but if the recovery be
diminished, A would recover only to the extent of the reliance interest which impelled us to
fashion a recovery in the first place, so that A would recover $20 in example (b) and $55 in
example (c) - it is for the sake of approving this lower recovery that the additional
sentence was appended to section 90 in the 1981 version of the Restatement).
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separately considered, and to which a separate response may be
required.
C. FIVE RESPONSES TO THE RELIANCE INTEREST
Five main responses to the reliance interest, as exemplified in
any of the three kinds of reliance, are possible. These responses
are as follows: (1) all relying promisees lose, in a direct reinforce-
ment of the presumptive rule (this response will be referred to as
"either/or"),52 (2) some relying promisees win, but only if it is pos-
sible to recharacterize the facts so that they fit within the pre-
sumptive rule (this response will be referred to as
"recharacterization"),53 (3) some relying promisees win, but only if
it is possible to reanalyze the law so that it embraces the case
within the presumptive rules ("reanalysis"),5 4 (4) some relying
promisees win, but only if they come within a reliance-based rule
which is an alternative to the presumptive rule ("promissory
estoppel"),55 and (5) all promisees win, whether they have relied
or not, in a direct overthrow of the presumptive rule ("over-
throw").56 While the first and last are mutually exclusive, repre-
senting terminus points of analysis, there are interesting possible
coexistences among the various intermediate responses. The coex-
52. Either, that is, the presumptive rule is met, or it is not. If not, then no recovery.
See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (Judge Learned
Hand observed that the promisees had 'a ready escape from their difficulty' by insisting
upon a contract prior to relying upon the promise, and stated that 'in commercial
transactions it does not in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of
those who do not protect themselves.')
53. This refers to recharacterization of the facts. See, e.g., Allegheny College v. Nat'l
Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927) (though the facts might
have been supposed to suggest a gift, Justice Cardozo was able to recharacterize them to
suggest a bargain, in addition to approving promissory estoppel by way of something like
dicta).
54. This refers to reanalysis of the law. See, e.g., the orthodox solution to the Brooklyn
Bridge hypothetical, discussed infra at notes 272-274 and accompanying text.
55. This desynonymization of the responses to the reliance interest, only one of which
is promissory estoppel, avoids the potential for confusion when recharacterization,
reanalysis and promissory estoppel are used interchangeably. The possibilities for confusion
are multiplied when the reliance interest and the several different kinds of reliance are also
used interchangeably (see text at notes 42-51, supra). Certainly I cannot compel usage, but I
am advising the reader my analysis distinguishes among (a) the one reliance interest, (b) the
three kinds of reliance, (c) all of the non-promissory estoppel responses to any of the kinds of
reliance, and (d) promissory estoppel. It will become apparent, further, that there are as
many different promissory estoppels as there are reliance-based alternatives to the
presumptive rules. That is, if there is a reliance-based recovery available to those who rely
upon a promise (in the form of an offer) prior to accepting it, that is one kind of promissory
estoppel; if there is a reliance-based recovery available to those who rely upon a promise
(otherwise enforceable) in the absence of a required writing, that is another kind of
promissory estoppel; and so on.
56. This refers to the overthrow of the presumptive rule itself. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-209
(1988) (an "agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be
binding").
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istence of more than one response in a single jurisdiction is one of
the many reasons why it is difficult enough to account for the
cases, let alone propose a theory that embraces them all.57
These five responses, ordered somewhat differently, can be
classed as those which amount to (1) a rejection of the reliance
interest altogether (the "either/or" response), or (2) a means of
indirectly protecting the reliance interest, but doing so without
any necessary invocation of promissory estoppel itself as a separate
or independent doctrine (the "recharacterization," "reanalysis,"
and "overthrow" responses, any of which can be considered as
responses to the reliance interest outside of promissory estoppel),
or (3) a means of protecting the reliance interest by direct applica-
tion of promissory estoppel.
In the analysis of cases in this article, discussion will be organ-
ized by reference to the kind of reliance involved, and by the vari-
ous responses to that kind of reliance. There will be a separate
discussion of those cases that dispose of the reliance problems
presented, but outside of promissory estoppel. Those cases that
address the reliance problems presented, using a promissory
estoppel rationale, will be distinguished from the former cases.
Cases outside of promissory estoppel can be difficult to spot, and
almost as difficult to analyze. They are either precursors to prom-
issory estoppel (for example, a case that purports to recharacterize
the facts may, to the extent the recharacterization seems too
strained for credulity, be subsequently read as one that actually
pointed the way to promissory estoppel), or not at all (that is, for
example, a case which reanalyzes the law might actually be a fresh
way of looking at the presumptive rules and have little or nothing
to do with promissory estoppel).58 Finally, the overthrow cases, if
not based upon statute, seem to point to some new direction, per-
haps not clearly seen, and, usually not fully articulated, which
present yet another obstacle in the way of analysis.
57. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text for the difficulties of accounting for
the cases. The more significant North Dakota formulations are tabulated in Charts 1, 2 and
3 at A-1 to A-6.
58. For purposes of discussion, and without yet being concerned about drawing any
line, it will be assumed that there is some point at which recharacterization is an honest
reading of the facts, another point at which recharacterization is a doubtful reading of the
facts over which reasonable persons may disagree, and yet another point at which
recharacterization is a deliberate distortion of the facts in order to skew the result. The
cases which approach or exceed the last point will be called "borderline" cases of
recharacterization. Further, it will be assumed that there is a set of reanalysis cases which
might be called "borderline" cases of reanalysis. At or near the borderline is the shadowy
place where a non-promissory estoppel's juris diction's process of becoming a promissory
estoppel jurisdiction often takes place, and "borderline" is a serviceable word which will be
used to refer to that domain.
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D. THE MANY KINDS OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
As indicated, there are five main responses to any of the kinds
of reliance, only one of which is promissory estoppel. The devel-
opment of promissory estoppel began with certain precursor cases
(all of which were generally understood as being confined to reli-
ance in the absence of consideration, and many of which involved
borderline recharacterizations) from which the drafters of the
Restatement deduced or rediscovered5 9 the principles included in
section 90 of the original Restatement. The revised section 90 and
the other reliance-based rules of the Restatement (Second) were
the result of developments over the next fifty years. 60 As a result,
in the mature stages of promissory estoppel there are many kinds
of promissory estoppel. These several kinds can and ought to be
distinguished for purposes of discussion.
Precursors to Section 90. It is commonly taught that, "even
during the nineteenth century, reliance on a gratuitous promise
came to be recognized as a basis for recovery in a few categories of
cases."' These categories are: gratuitous promises made within
the family, promises to make gifts to charitable institutions, gratui-
tous promises made by a bailee in possession, and promises relat-
ing to the conveyance of land which were followed by entry and
improvements upon the land.62 It is commonly supposed that
there were too many instances in which such promises had been
enforced, and that those instances were too forcibly urged upon
the reporter of the original restatement, for them to be ignored.6 3
Hence, section 90 of the original restatement was created. It
should be assumed, then, that section 90 of the original Restate-
ment was meant to account for those four categories of cases
which had spawned it.
In addition, it was clear that many promissory modifications of
contractual duties, waivers of conditions, and discharges of con-
59. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.19 (1982) and cf. id. at n. 5
(reliance rediscovered in the twentieth century, both as a basis for enforcing promises and
as an historical influence in the development of the doctrine of consideration, after having
"played no important role for some four centuries").
60. See supra notes 3 and 44 and accompanying text.
61. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.19 at 90 (1982).
62. Id., at 90-92 (reviewing the four categories). And see infra notes 64-66 and
accompanying text (discussing these four, and two other, categories).
63. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). But cf Professor
Williston's remarks made to the ALI during the debate on what was to become § 90 infra
notes 64-66 (by which time, at least, Williston appears to be advancing, rather than
resisting, the cause of § 90). Professor Linzer has noted this counterpoint to the common
perception of Professor Williston's role in the development of § 90. See P. LINZER, A
CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 221-22 (1989).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:317
tractual duties were enforced in the absence of consideration.
Indeed, if it should be supposed that the core cases that spawned
section 90 can be categorized, then to the four categories we have
already seen must be added a fifth category so that the basic list
reads as follows: (1) gratuitous promises made within the family, (2)
promises to make gifts to charitable institutions, (3) gratuitous
promises made by a bailee in possession, (4) gratuitous promises
relating to the conveyance of land which were followed by entry
and improvements upon the land, and (5) promises of modifica-
tion, waiver, and discharge. The fifth category rounds out, and
completes, the enumeration of the categories of cases in which
promissory estoppel was conventionally applied in the absence of
consideration, and prior to the original restatement.64
Of course, section 90 of the Restatement was not explicitly
limited to those five classes of cases, but was cast in terms of gen-
eral applicability.6 5 In addition, the illustrations to the original
section 90 were not put in terms of those five classes of cases.66 As
64. Categories 1 through 4 are explicitly enumerated by Professor Farnsworth, one of
the reporters of the second Restatement, in his 1982 treatise. See supra note 61.
In 1926, during the debate on section 90 (then numbered § 88), Professor Williston, the
reporter of the original restatement, gave examples of all five categories, as well as another
category, promises to make marriage settlements. The famous Johnnyandthecar
hypothetical, whereby, as Williston puts it, "Johnny says, 'I want to buy a Buick car.' Uncle
says, 'Well, I will give you $1,000'" illustrates category one (the gratuitous family promise).
See, Debate on Section 88 (Later Section 90) of the Restatement of Contracts, 4 AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS Appendix 85-114 (1926), reprinted in P. LINZER, A
CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 223 passim (1989) [hereinafter Debate on Section 90].
Professor Williston referred also to "the charitable subscription cases" as ones in which
"[t]here is no bargain, but there is recovery." Id. at 229 (category two as used in this
article). He referred also to the class of cases illustrated by one in which a "promise was
made by a gratuitous bailee to take out insurance on the bailed property" and where the
promise was enforced though there was no consideration. Id. (category three as used in
this article). Williston's further adventures of Johnny included the Johnny-and-Blackacre
hypothetical, whereby a "promisor promises Blackacre to Johnny and Johnny goes and
builds a house on it." Id. at 227-28 (a situation which illustrates our category four).
With respect to our fifth category (promises concerning waivers and the like), Professor
Williston said "A lot of cases that go under the name of waiver, are really cases of promises
falling within [the description of the rule of section 90]. They are promises to perform in
spite of some nonperformance of a condition or requirement of the contract. Relying on a
promise, the condition is not complied with, and yet the promisee recovers." Id. at 229.
And, reported Williston, "[p]romises to make marriage settlements form another class" in
which there is no bargain, just a promise, but a recovery nonetheless. Id.
65. Professor Williston explained: "You can enumerate all the classes of cases which I
have enumerated and have a number of special instances. The first thing that seemed
possible was to take these different sets of cases and say, simply grouping them together,
that [they] were exceptions to the rule and that a contract required consideration at the
time [the promise was made]." Debate on Section 90, supra note 64, at 229-30. But, he said,
the reporter and his advisors decided against that approach, concluding, instead, that "[i]f
the law is to be simplified and clarified, it can be done only by general rules, not by stating
empirically a succession of specific cases without any binding thread of principle." Id. at
230.
66. Illustration 1 to section 90 of the original Restatement involved a promise not to
foreclose a mortgage for a specified time, following which the promisee made
improvements on the land. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90. Illustration 2 involved an
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a result, the original section 90 became, itself, an engine for the
development of additional section 90 cases.
And so the story is set in motion, with a unity of theme (reli-
ance on a promise), and a forward thrust. The actual cases, the five
categories which were the precursors to section 90 were, first,
translated by the drafters into the general language of section 90.
Next, section 90 was, over the years, applied in contexts far
removed from the decided cases, as if it, rather than they, were
the law.17 As a result, and as derived from that kind of promissory
employer's promise to pay a lifetime annuity to an employee who resigns, "in the meantime
becoming disqualified from again obtaining good employment." Id. Illustration 3 involved
a promise to pay a sum of money if "B will go to college and complete his course," which
the promisor revoked after B had gone to college and "nearly completed his course." Id.
Each of the promises in those illustrations is said to be binding. Id.
Illustration 4 involved a promise to pay $5,000 "knowing that B desires that sum for the
purchase of Blackacre." Id. "Induced thereby," B secures a gratuitous option to purchase
Blackacre. The promise to pay $5,000 to B is said to be not binding. Id.
67. It is hard to resist the conclusion that the pre-Restatement cases rested upon earlier
cases (even when going beyond them), but that the post-Restatement cases rest upon the
Restatement, rather than upon any of the cases which spawned it. Compare Ricketts v.
Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898) (enforcing an unbargained-for family promise to make a
gift) (analyzing the issues in the following style):
The instrument in suit was nothing more than a promise to make a gift in the
future. Ordinarily, such promises are not enforceable. But it has often been
held that an action on a note given to a church, college, or other institution,
upon the faith of which money has been expended or obligations incurred, could
not be successfully defended on the ground of a want of consideration. In this
class of cases the decision is generally put on the ground that the expenditure of
money or the assumption of liability by the donee on the faith of the promise
constitutes a valuable and sufficient consideration. It seems to us that the true
reason is the preclusion of the defendant, under the doctrine of estoppel, to deny
the consideration.
Id. at 366 (emphasis added) with Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958)
(enforcing a subcontractor's offer to do paving work, even though the sub had revoked it
prior to the general's acceptance) (analyzing the issues in the following style):
Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts states [quoting section 90] This rule
applies in this state. It is true that in the case of unilateral contracts the Restate-
mentfinds consideration for the implied subsidiary promise [to leave the offer
open for a reasonable period of time in which the offeree might accept it] in the
part performance of the bargained-for exchange, but its reference to section 90
makes clear that consideration for such a promise is not always necessary. The
very purpose of section 90 is to make a promise binding even though there was
no consideration.
Id. at 760-61 (emphasis added).
This is illustrative of the different attitudes of those who were responsible for drafting
section 90 of the original Restatement. See generally supra notes 64-66 and accompanying
text (debates on the original section 90). Indeed, Professor Williston's attitude was a careful
one. During the debate on section 90 he said:
Now, there is no broad doctrine that wherever a man makes a promise, a gratui-
tous promise, and the other relies upon it, the promisee can recover on the
promise, and we do not dare in Section [90] make any such broad statement that
is going far beyond the law and far beyond what we should dare to say.
Debate on Section 90, supra note 64, at 226 (emphasis added). It is at least interesting that
many of the courts that applied the original section 90 have seemed prepared to do pre-
cisely what Professor Williston did not dare to do. Of course, Professor Williston was only
trying to state what the law was while modern judges, on the contrary, act as if they are free
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
estoppel which protects certain instances of reliance in the
absence of consideration, there developed a kind of promissory
estoppel that protects reliance generally in the absence of consid-
eration, a kind of promissory estoppel that protects reliance in the
absence of assent, and a kind of promissory estoppel that protects
reliance in the absence of satisfaction of the statute of frauds.68
This is the folklore of promissory estoppel.
The Many Kinds of Promissory Estoppel. As the scope of
promissory estoppel grows, so does the difficulty of dealing with it
as if it were a unitary concept (notice that "section 90" now covers
not one, but three, of the presumptive rules of enforceability -
consideration, assent, and satisfaction of the statute of frauds -
and since each of those three rules may serve different ends or
policies, so must the application of the promissory estoppel doc-
trine to each be appropriately adopted). 9 Indeed, even to dis-
tribute promissory estoppel among the three-fold reliance
interests seems inadequate as soon as each of those interests is seen
in its full dimensions.
To speak of reliance in the absence of consideration as if it
were a unitary concept is to ignore the real difference between
reliance based upon one of the enumerated, constrained classes of
cases which are at the core of section 90, and all of the other -
unrestricted, generalized - instances which are the synthetic
progeny of section 90 as it metastasizes. Likewise, to speak of reli-
ance in the absence of assent, simply, is to ignore the real differ-
ence between reliance based on a failure of assent caused by (a)
failure of the promisee to accept an offer before relying upon it, (b)
failure of negotiations between the parties, such that the "prom-
isee" would appear to be relying upon a "promise" that no one
ever made, or (c) failure of the promise to be sufficiently definite
that it is possible of intelligible enforcement. These are circum-
stances so different from one another as to compel a different
application of promissory estoppel notions to each. In a similar
manner, there is more than one way to rely upon a promise
against the statute of frauds.
to make it up as they go along and so may not even notice the constraints felt by Professor
Williston.
68. Accordingly, by the time of the Restatement (Second), the number of reliance-
based rules had multiplied so as to cover (at least) these categories. See supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
69. Assuming, that is, that section 90 and its brood of offspring were never intended
simply to set aside all of the presumptive rules indifferently, as if there were (for example)
no better reason for requiring the promisor's assent than for requiring her signature on a
written memorandum.
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In the remainder of this article, keeping in mind not only the
three kinds of reliance, but also their origin (as either one of the
enumerated, constrained forms that preceded the original
Restatement's formulation of section 90; or as one of the genera-
lized, free forms that come after the first Restatement's formula-
tion of section 90), the many kinds of promissory estoppel which
have built up by accretion will be summarized as follows:
1. Reliance in the absence of consideration...
a) Family promises; charitable subscriptions; gratui-
tous bailments; promises concerning land followed
by entry and valuable improvements; and marriage
settlements (precursors to generalized § 90, and
usually in the absence of an existing contractual
relationship between the parties);
b) Modifications, Waivers and Discharges (precursors
to generalized § 90, but against the background of
an existing contractual relationship between the
parties); and
c) Generalized section 90 promises (the original gener-
alized § 90 and its progeny, severed from their
more particular precursors).
2. Reliance in the Absence of Assent...
a) No acceptance - offeror wanted acceptance by
performance, and the promisee relies by commenc-
ing (but not yet completing) the performance;
b) No acceptance - offeror wanted acceptance by
promise, but the promisee relies by using the offer
in some way short of giving the return promise
requested; and
c) No assent; no promise (failed negotiations), or prom-
ise not sufficiently definite.
3. Reliance in the Absence of a Required Writing...
a) Statute of Frauds - reliance without a writing
where the promisor promised one;
b) Statute of Frauds - reliance without a writing
where the promisor promised none; and
c) Non-Statute of Frauds writings - reliance without a
writing where the writing serves a non-statute of
frauds purpose. The typical example is a writing
that cures some other substantive defect, such as
lack of consideration.
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It should be noted that the several transaction types enumer-
ated do not exhaust all of the possible bases for reliance-based
recoveries.7 0 They do, however, serve to illustrate my point that
"promissory estoppel" 71 is not a unitary concept; instead of signify-
ing one thing, it might signify any of nine somewhat different
things. These nine types also represent those that are most rele-
vant to this article's discussion of the North Dakota case law as it
has thus far developed.
E. GENERAL PROBLEMS OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Given the reliance interest, the different kinds of reliance,
and the possibility of a recovery because of reliance, it is necessary
for promisors (at least for those who care to plan the scope of their
liability ahead of time) to know when, exactly, promissory estoppel
is appropriate. Remembering that a promisee might try to protect
70. It is certainly possible to make the argument for a reliance-based recovery where
there has been reliance upon a promise which has been rendered unenforceable because of
a combination of force majeure and judicial dispensation, as in the case of promises
discharged by supervening impracticability of performance or frustration of purpose. So
also, there is an argument for a reliance-based recovery where the promise relied upon
might otherwise be voidable for mistake. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 153
comment (d) (suggesting that reliance on a promise which is excusable, because mistaken
within the meaning of § 153(a), may be a basis for enforcement). It is also possible to make
such an argument even in the case of promises voidable because of infancy or other lack of
capacity on the part of one of the parties, which lack of capacity was not reasonably
apparent to the other. See id. § 14 comment (c) (discussing various approaches, including by
way of estoppel, to an infant's misrepresentation of age and the other party's reasonable
reliance upon it). Others have argued that there may be a promissory estoppel argument in
the face of the parole evidence rule. See M. Metzger, The Parole Evidence Rule: Promissory
Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383 (1983). It might also be argued that a
promise, unen forceable because contrary to public policy as articulated by the legislature,
might nonetheless be rendered enforceable by virtue of reliance. See Dakota Bank & Trust
Co. v. Funfar, 443 N.W.2d 289, 293 (N.D. 1989) (rejecting such a reliance argument where
it would have the effect of rendering the promisor liable for a deficiency after foreclosure in
the face of specific statutes prohibiting deficiencies).
Although each of these cases presents room for comparison with the promissory
estoppel transaction types discussed in this article, they also raise special problems beyond
the scope of this article.
71. The term, said to have been coined by Williston (Boyer, Promissory Estoppel.
Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (1950), cited in E.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 92 n. 23 (1982)), is at once misleading, imprecise, and inelegant,
but hard to avoid. "Promissory estoppel" is inelegant because it signifies what? That A,
having made a promise to B is estopped from denying that A made the promise? In almost
every case of any real interest, A is, of course, fully prepared to admit that she made the
promise. A's point is that the admitted promise is unenforceable. What then? Shall A be
estopped from denying that there is no consideration, or no acceptance, or no writing?
Perhaps. The term is imprecise for the same reasons. And it is misleading because it doubly
oversimplifies: it oversimplifies once because it hints that all which is needed is a promise,
followed by reliance (rather than the constellation of additional factors that might make
reliance reasonably foreseeable, and that might make failure of enforcement unjust); and it
oversimplifies a second time because it suggests that there is one, single problem (instead of
at least nine different problems). And yet for all that, the term seems serviceable enough,
provided it be treated with a healthy skepticism. See generally Debate on Section 90, supra
note 64, at 224 (Professor Williston's confession that he uses the term himself in his treatise,
although steadfastly keeping it out of the Restatement).
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the reliance interest simply by forming a contract, and remember-
ing that section 90 enforcement follows where there is both no
presumptively binding promise, and also an injustice if the prom-
ise is treated as being not binding, it becomes necessary to identify
the reasons why justice should require the enforcement of a prom-
ise which the law declares to be unenforceable.
Obvious answers, given in support of the promissory estoppel
response, 72 might well be that, (a) where the defect is lack of bar-
gained-for consideration in the context of a family or an ongoing
business relationship, society wants to teach or encourage persons
not to bargain; or (b) where the defect is lack of bargain, because
there is nothing, in fact, over which the parties could bargain (as in
pure gratuities, or, perhaps, modifications or waivers of existing
contracts), we are able to identify certain promises which, either
because of necessity or otherwise, society wants to enforce. Like-
wise, where the defect is lack of acceptance, there should be, one
would imagine, some reason why the promise might be enforced;
where the defect is that the party to be bound has not agreed to be
bound until negotiations are completed, and the other party none-
theless desires to bind the 'promisor,' there ought to be some rea-
son before doing so. Where the defect is that, though the law
requires a writing, the parties have acted without one, it must be
fair to ask why, exactly, the law is prepared to enforce a promise
without a writing.
There are, no doubt, reasons to enforce promises in the fore-
going situations. The text of section 90 does not, however, state
those reasons explicitly. The remainder of this article will explore
the question whether the cases in an actual jurisdiction supply the
explicit rationale that may be implicit in section 90. If not, and if
section 90 is applied in a wooden manner, promissory estoppel
could well be converted into a talismanic device that hinders,
rather than advances the cause of justice. Hence, it seems, there is
a need to articulate some reason for protecting the reliance
interest.
Reliance in search of a reason can defy analysis.7 3 When that
72. Answers just as obvious, but given in support of the non-promissory estoppel
responses include these: justice never requires enforcement, or justice always requires
enforcement. With obvious, and reasonable, answers on both sides, it becomes apparent
that someone has to decide which to embrace and then needs to articulate a reason why.
Only by so doing will there be the possibility of finding neutral principles of contract law
against which men and women can plan their conduct in advance of judicial intervention.
73. Reliance in search of a reason, means the continuing effort to refute (or, if not to
refute, to explain why the absence of a refutation makes no difference) the supposition that
promissory estoppel has nothing to do with justice, or with anything else that can be
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happens in respect of any question, it usually signifies that there is
something wrong with the question - typically, that (1) some one
or more of the terms lack definition, (2) are laced with ambiguity,
(3) have been used in a metaphorical sense, or (4) are not far
enough removed from first principles for there to be any argu-
ment or discussion.74 All of these problems and their related
amplifications attend to promissory estoppel, but, since this is not a
theoretical paper, the actual cases in a particular jurisdiction will
be examined against the model of the Restatement and the well
known hypotheticals or leading cases. After doing so, the question
of what, exactly, the reason(s) might be for the promissory estoppel
rules can be addressed with a common basis of understanding,
both of the cases that have actually presented themselves in North
Dakota, and of the sort of cases that have formed the basis of the
Restatement's analysis. Thus a basis will be created to suggest how
to formulate a set of promissory estoppel rules that are practical
for this state and which solve the problems which have arisen
here. Those suggestions will appear in a companion piece to this
article, to be published separately.
III. THE RESTATEMENT COMPARED TO THE NORTH
DAKOTA CASES
In the following sections, the most important North Dakota
cases which present issues relating to a reliance-based recovery
will be discussed. The three main categories are: reliance in the
absence of consideration; reliance in the absence of assent; and
reliance in the absence of a required writing. 75
In each category, and in most of the subcategories, it may be
articulated. I also mean the effort to deal with either reliance or promissory estoppel when
either notion is put in the form of a question that looks for affirmation or denial. By way of
example: Is it good to protect the reliance interest? Has promissory estoppel been properly
applied? Do you approve of promissory estoppel? Don't you agree that promissory
estoppel lies at the heart of justice? The examples could be drawn out at greater length. If
one elects to answer any of these questions, or if one elects not to, and, in either case, seeks
to explain the reason behind the answer and finds it difficult to do so, then curiosity alone, if
not the need to have something to advise a client, might impel someone on a search for the
reason why this is so.
74. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VIII, Chap. 3, 158a31-1589a14. The questions in note 73,
supra, contain among them samples of at least one of each of the difficulties. On the other
hand, the difficulty of analysis could be caused, not by error, but by the nonexistence, self-
contradiction, or impossibility of the things being talked about, cf. T. Hobbes, LEVIATHAN,
Part One, ch. 5, (giving examples of "insignificant speech"), or by the indeterminacy of the
matter, cf. Neitzche, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (suggesting that the desire for truth is the
last value to fall in the revaluation of all values - "it is not improbable that I am not
unmistaken, but what of that"). This article will assume that the difficulties lie where
Aristotle places them, and will explore what follows from that supposition.
75. For an overview of these categories and the subcategories under each, see Chart 1
in the appendix of this article.
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helpful .to understand certain assumptions concerning the pre-
sumptive rules and promissory estoppel that seem implicit in the
Restatement. Accordingly, the presumptive rule (as embodied in
the Restatement) which underlies the particular kind of promis-
sory estoppel in issue will be introduced. Further, examples from
the Restatement or well known cases or hypotheticals will be
introduced to illustrate the situations that test the presumptive
rules. These cases (sometimes referred to herein as "school cases"
because they are so commonly included in current casebooks)
have an importance to the folklore of promissory estoppel pre-
cisely because many law students (and, hence, lawyers) take them
as having established the limits of promissory estoppel. There is a
certain predisposition to see the actual cases decided in any one
jurisdiction against the expectations raised by these school cases.
Therefore, it is crucial to include an explicit reference to them as
an aid to understanding the expectations raised by promissory
estoppel 7 6
A. RELIANCE IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION
General. There are three subcategories of reliance in the
absence of consideration: (1) generalized reliance, of the sort rec-
ognized by the general rule of section 90 of the Restatement, (2)
reliance upon promises enumerated as family promises, charitable
subscriptions, gratuitous bailments, land promises followed by
entry and improvement, and marriage settlements (precursors to
the generalized section 90), and (3) reliance upon promises enu-
merated as modifications of duties, waivers of conditions, and dis-
charges of duties (precursors to the generalized section 90, but
against the background of existing contractual relationships).77
There is only one case in which the North Dakota Supreme
Court has awarded a recovery because of reliance upon a promise
in any of these categories, and that case involved a modification of
duties in the face of a statute which permitted a modification with-
76. The following sections account for many cases, divided into categories and
subcategories, accompanied by commentary and examples. In addition to the overview
already given supra at notes 67-71 and accompanying text, the reader may also find it
helpful to refer to the appendix which follows this article and which includes three tables.
Chart 1 presents the cases by result (recovery/no recovery). Chart 2 presents those
cases which contain the "standard" formulation of the North Dakota version of the
elements of promissory estoppel. Chart 3 presents cases containing "non-standard" North
Dakota formulations, glosses and other apparatus. Each of the cases included in the tables is
discussed in the following sections.
77. See generally supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. See also text preceding
note 70.
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out consideration if there were a writing or if the party relying
upon the modification has "incurred a detriment [which he was]
not obligated by the original contract to incur."s7 In several other
cases, the North Dakota Supreme Court has denied recovery while
assuming that a reliance-based rule might apply.79
Before discussing reliance in the absence of consideration, it
would be instructive to review the implications of the Restate-
ment's position that consideration must be bargained.
Formulation of the Rule (Consideration). The Restatement
provides, subject to special rules, including the rule set forth in
section 90, that the formation of a contract requires a considera-
tion, that consideration is a bargain, and a bargain consists of an
exchange.8 0 Since those transaction types in which there is reli-
ance on a promise in the absence of consideration are to be dis-
cussed next, instances at the boundaries of bargained for
consideration will be discussed first.
Observations and School Cases (Consideration). In order to
make the discussion more concrete, two famous hypotheticals and
two well known cases will be used as illustrations. The hypotheti-
cals are Williston's "the benevo lent man and the tramp, ' ' and
Farnsworth's "the estranged father and daughter. '8 2 The cases
are those of Antillico Kirksey83 and Anna Feinberg. 4
Williston put his problem this way:
If a benevolent man says to a tramp, - 'if you go around
the corner to the clothing shop there, you may purchase
an overcoat on my credit,' no reasonable person would
understand that the short walk was requested as consider-
ation for the promise, but that in the event of the tramp
going to the shop, the promisor would make him a gift.
Yet the walk to the shop is in its nature capable of being
consideration. It is a legal detriment to the tramp to take
the walk, and the only reason why the walk is not consid-
eration is because on a reasonable interpretation, it must
be held that the walk was not requested as the price of
78. Mitchell v. Barnes, 354 N.W.2d 680, 682 (1984). Because there was, in fact, no
written modification, the case also stands as a reliance-based recovery in the absence of a
required writing, and is discussed in a later section of this article as well.
79. See Chart 1 of Appendix.
80. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, §§ 17(1), 17(2), 71(1), 71(2).
81. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 112, at 445-46 (3rd ed. 1957).
82. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.9 at 62 n. 7 (1982).
83. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
84. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. 1959).
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the promise, but was merely a condition of a gratuitous
promise 5 (emphasis added).
As a matter of reasonable interpretation of intention, this is not a
bargain, but only a gift put in the form of a conditional promise,
and the promise is not enforceable. Farnsworth, after reviewing
the case of Williston's tramp, put this contrasting case:
Compare this promise by a father to his daughter: 'If you
will meet me at Tiffany's next Monday at noon, I will buy
you the emerald ring advertised in this week's New
Yorker.' If one supposes that the father and daughter are
estranged and that the daughter had refused to see the
father, it is possi ble to make the case for bargain. 86
Here is, quite possibly, a bargain. Perhaps the price is a tad steep,
but that is another difficulty, and quite possibly irrelevant to
enforcement.
Between the poles of the tramp's walk for the coat and the
daughter's meeting for the diamond, consider the case of Antillico
Kirksey, who received this letter from her brother-in-law:
Dear Sister Antillico - Much to my mortification, I heard
that brother Henry was dead, and one of his children. I
know that your situation is one of grief and difficulty. You
had a bad chance before, but a great deal worse now. If
you will come down and see me, I will let you have a
place to raise your family, and I have more open land
than I can tend; and on account of your situation, and that
of your family, I feel like I want you and the children to
do well.8 7
She abandoned her homestead, moved the sixty or seventy
miles to her brother-in-law's residence, and lived there for two
years "in comfortable houses" with land to cultivate; but then the
brother in law put her in a house "not comfortable, in the woods,"
and finally required her to leave. 8 Although a judgment of $200
had entered for Ms. Kirksey upon a jury verdict, the Alabama
Supreme Court reversed, on the grounds that "the promise on the
part of [Mr. Kirksey] was a mere gratuity, and that an action will
not lie for its breach. 8 9
85. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 112, at 44546 (3rd ed.1957).
86. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.9 at 62 n. 7 (1982).
87. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
88. Id.
89. Id. Despite (or, perhaps because of) the fact that the opinion of the court was
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In this light, consider also the case of Anna Feinberg, who had
begun working for a pharmaceutical company in 1910, when she
was 17 years old.9 ° Thirty-seven years later, the company resolved
to pay her an annuity for life, to commence whenever she might
chose to retire. 91 A resolution adopted by the board of directors
expressed these sentiments:
.. .Mrs. Anna Sacks Feinberg, has given the corporation
many years of long and faithful service . . . all of the
officers and directors sincerely hoped and desired that
Mrs. Feinberg would continue in her present position for
as long as she felt able, nevertheless, in view of the length
of service which she has contributed provision should be
made to afford her retirement privileges and benefits
which should become a firm obligation of the corporation
to be available to her whenever she should see fit to retire
from active duty, however many years in the future such
retirement may become effective . . . Mrs. Feinberg
would be given the privilege of retiring from active duty
at any time she may see fit so to do ... with the distinct
understanding that the retirement plan is being adopted
at the present time in order to afford Mrs. Feinberg secur-
ity for the future and in the hope that her active services
will continue . . . for many years to come.9 2
There had, however, been no bargaining over the resolution.93
Mrs. Feinberg later testified that she had had no prior information
that any pension plan was contemplated, that it came as a surprise
to her, and that she would have continued working for the com-
pany with or without any pension plan.94 She had never
threatened to leave, nor had she ever contemplated leaving the
employ of the company." The court found that she had neither
promised to work for any particular period of time after the reso-
lution, nor had the company asked her to stay and work for any
particular period of time after the resolution, but that she was, and
delivered by a judge who said that he disagreed (or, that it was his "inclination" to disagree)
with the result reached, the opinion adds little beyond the grounds quoted in the text.
90. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Mo. App. 1959).
91. Id. at 164-65.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 16465, 167. The testimony made it clear that there was nothing exchanged
by Mrs. Feinberg in order to induce the company's promise to her, nor was the company
seeking anything from Mrs. Feinberg.
94. Id. at 165.
95. Id.
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always remained, an employee at will.9 6 She did, in fact, work for
another 18 months and then she retired. 7 The company paid the
pension for almost seven years, but then, under new management,
and on the advice of a new accounting firm which questioned the
validity of the payments, it decided to reduce the amount, and a
lawsuit resulted.98 The court concluded that there was no bar-
gained for consideration on the ground that the company had
asked nothing of Mrs. Feinberg in exchange for its promise to pay
the pension.99
These cases illustrate two propositions concerning bargained
for consideration. In the first place, one of its intended effects is to
render gift promises unenforceable. 100 In the second place, the
difference between a gift and a bargain is more than one of
form,'01 but is one of substance,10 2 and the substance is deter-
mined by evident intention. In addition, those cases suggest the
available leeway within which consideration might be found in a
doubtful situation. 10 3 For our purposes, however, it is time to
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Although not explicitly stated in the opinion, it is not unlikely that the
accountant raised the issue that gratuitous payments to Mrs. Feinberg might constitute a
waste of corporate assets.
99. Id. at 167. It should be noted, however, that the court did enforce the promise.
But it did so on the grounds of section 90 reliance in the absence of consideration.
100. This is a consequence of affirming that consideration is bargain, and bargain is an
exchange. If a gift is that which is given freely and is not exchanged for anything, then a
gift is no bargain. Therefore, gift promises will be lacking consideration and will be
unenforceable. Since this result concerning gift promises is a consequence of the premises
deliberately adopted concerning consideration, it must be presumed that the
unenforceability of gift promises is an intended effect of the doctrine of bargained for
consideration.
101. Bargain takes the form of condition, that is, "I will pay you $100 if you will paint
my house." The problem is that many gifts can take the same form, that is "I will pay you
$100 if you will reach out your hand so as to take the money as I give it to you." In the
second case, it is possible that I might have bargained for your holding out your hand (just as
Williston's benevolent man could possibly have been bargaining for the tramp's taking a
walk), but highly unlikely. So, I suppose, her brother-in-law could have been bargaining
with sister Antillico, but the court found otherwise.
102. The Restatement itself shows signs of a struggle over this. But by the time of the
Restatement (Second), the drafters endorsed the notion that consideration is a substantial
requirement, rather than a formal one. Compare RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3,
§ 71, illustration 4 (A desires to make a binding promise to give $1,000 to his son. Being
advised that a gratuitous promise is not binding, A writes out a false recital of consideration
- not binding) and Id. § 71, illustration 5 (A desires to make a binding promise to give
$1,000 to his son. Being advised that a gratuitous promise is not binding, A offers to
purchase for $1,000 from his son, as a pretense and with both father and son knowing it to
be a pretense, a book worth less than $1.00 - not binding) with RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, § 84, illustration 1 (A wishes to make a binding promise to convey Blackacre to his son.
Being advised that a gratuitous promise is not binding, the father writes an offer to sell
Blackacre for $1.00, which his son accepts - A's promise is binding).
103. True enough, the promises made to Ms. Kirksey and to Mrs. Feinberg were held
to be without consideration, but it is not beyond the realm of imagination to suppose that a
different interpretation of the exact facts of those cases could be made such as to support a
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assume that there is no bargain, and address those transaction
types, such as the ones just illustrated, in which this is so.
1. Generalized Section 90 Promises
Generalized Promissory Estoppel in the Restatement.
Although section 90 was justified, and was originally justifiable
only, on the basis of certain classes of cases in which there was no
consideration: (1) gratuitous promises made within the family, (2)
promises to make gifts to charitable institutions, (3) gratuitous
promises made by a bailee in possession, (4) promises relating to
the conveyance of land which were followed by entry and
improvements upon the land, and (5) promises of modification,
waiver, and discharge, the formulation of section 90 was not so
limited. °4 Thus, under section 90, there might be recovery for
the hypothetical tramp, and for Mrs. Feinberg'0 5 (neither of whom
are within any of the classes alluded to), as well as for the hypo-
thetical daughter, assuming she hasn't already recovered on the
basis of consideration, and for sister Antillico (both of whom are
within the class of gratuitous promises made within the family). 0 6
Section 90 of the original Restatement was positioned, and
finding of consideration, and it is even more clear that it would take only the slightest
additional facts to support a solid finding of consideration.
104. See supra notes 6167 and accompanying text. While it was not limited to any
particularly enumerated class of cases, it was still limited by its own terms.
105. In fact, Mrs. Feinberg did recover on this basis, and the court expressly based the
recovery upon § 90 of the original Restatement. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 16769. Indeed,
her recovery was closely anticipated by illustration 2 to section 90 of the original
Restatement ("A promises B to pay him an annuity during B's life. B thereupon resigns a
profitable employment as A expected that he might. B receives the annuity for some years,
in the meantime becoming disqualified from again obtaining good employment. A's
promise is binding."). RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 90, illustration 2. In Mrs.
Feinberg's case, the disqualifications pressed upon the court were the twin facts of her
advancing age, and her supervening diagnosis of cancer. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 16869. In
turn, Mrs. Feinberg's case became the model for the new illustration 4 to section 90 of the
Restatement (Second) ("A has been employed by B for 40 years. B promises to pay A a
pension of $200 per month when A retires. A retires and forbears to work elsewhere for
several years while B pays the pension. B's promise is binding"). RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 90, illustration 4. The new illustration 4 to section 90 of the Restatement (Second)
makes no reference to any supervening disqualification suffered by the retired employee.
RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 90, illustration 4.
Illustration 2 to the original section 90, in turn, seems to have been patterned
somewhat loosely upon the case of Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 366 (Neb. 1898) (Ms.
Katie Scothorn's grandfather had promised her $2,000 so that she would not have to work
any more and because 'none of my grandchildren work'; the court held that the promise
had not been bargained for, but enforced it against the executor of the grandfather's estate
'under the doctrine of estoppel.') Unlike the version set forth in illustration 2 to the original
section 90, there was, in Scothorn, no showing that Ms. Scothorn had become disqualified
from obtaining good employment - in fact, though she did quit her bookkeeping job upon
her grandfather's promise and remained unemployed for about a year afterward, she later
found employment as a bookkeeper with her grandfather's help, and was working at the
time of his death, and as of the time the executor refused to pay. Id. at 367.
106. For the hypotheticals and cases, see supra notes 8199 and accompanying text.
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section 90 of the Restatement (Second) is positioned after the sec-
tions relating to consideration, and is quite clearly meant to cover
at least the situations in which a party has relied upon a promise in
the absence of consideration. The structure of the Restatement
(Second) makes this plain. 10 7 From the 1920's on, the general ver-
sion of section 90 has been used to spin-off new and additional
applications to any number of new transaction types, outside of
the enumerated and constrained categories that had first existed.
This generalized, or free reliance is the subject of this portion of
the article.
Section 90 of the original Restatement, and section 90 of the
Restatement (Second), contain the general formulations of reli-
ance-based recovery in the Restatement. Since the two section
90's are different, but continue to have substantial language in
common, an edited version of the original section 90, marked to
show changes, will be helpful to an understanding of both versions
(underscored text signifies language added in the 1981 revision;
crossed-out text signifies language that was deleted in the 1981
revision).
Section 90 of the Restatement provides as follows:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite And
substa n ti-Al character on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce such action or for-
bearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires.
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is
binding under Subsection (1) without proof that the
promise induced action or forbearance. 108
Analysis of the the first paragraph of section 90 leads to its division
into four separate elements, common to both versions of the
Restatement. Thus, (1) there must be a promise, (2) the promisor
107. Consideration is treated in RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, §§ 71-81 (Topic
1. the Requirement of Consideration'). Specific instances of reliance are suggested in §§ 87-
89, and the general case of reliance is provided for in § 90; all of these reliance provisions
are included in a larger set of provisions, §§ 82-94 (Topic 2. Contracts without
Consideration'), that are meant as exceptions to the requirement of consideration. See also
Id. § 17(2) ("Whether or not there is a bargain a contract may be formed under the rules
stated in §§ 82-94").
108. Compare RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). The two versions of the main paragraph of section 90
are set forth sequentially at the text accompanying notes 1 & 4, supra.
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must reasonably expect that the promise will induce action or for-
bearance, (3) the promise must have induced the expected action
or forbearance, and (4) injustice must result if the promise is not
enforced.
Beyond those four common elements, there are two other fac-
tors that act as counterweights to one another, and which are
adjusted differently in the two Restatements. The two factors are
(a) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbear-
ance, and (b) the quantum of recovery. The original Restatement
set the second factor (quantum of recovery) high, and, accordingly,
required that the first factor (definite and substantial action or for-
bearance) be present as a counterbalance. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) allows the quantum of recovery to be set lower, and,
therefore, dispenses with the necessity of definite and substantial
action or forbearance.
The case of the benevolent man and the tramp'0 9 can serve to
illustrate both those common elements of a section 90 analysis, and
also the manner in which the Restatement (Second) differs from
the original Restatement. The tramp hypothetical presents three
of the four elements to recovery that are common to both versions
of section 90.110 There is: (1) a promise (I'll buy you an overcoat),
(2) the benevolent man should reasonably expect that the promise
would induce the tramp to take the action of walking around the
corner (he had said to the tramp, "if you go around the corner to
the clothing shop . . ."), and (3) the tramp, if he went around the
corner to the clothing store in order to get the coat, has been
induced by the promise to take the expected action. The only
remaining question concerns the fourth element common to both
versions, and that question is whether justice requires that the
promise to buy the overcoat be enforced. The answer to that last
question might depend upon whether we are using the
counterbalances of the original Restatement or of the Restatement
(Second), and might be expected to differ, depending on our
choice.
Assume that the value of the overcoat to the tramp is $25.00;
the "cost" to the tramp of walking around the corner is $0.25; and
that this is not an action which either the tramp or the promisor
would consider to be a "substantial" action on the part of the
tramp.
109. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
110. Id.
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The original Restatement was drafted in contemplation that
there is either a contract, or there is not.'11 If there is a contract,
then there is a contractual measure of recovery. Accordingly, if
there is any recovery at all for the tramp under section 90 of the
original Restatement, it ought to be a recovery in the amount of
$25.112 Hence, when the putative remedy is high (as it is in the
original Restatement), it seems that the threshold to recovery
should be correspondingly high (as it is in the original Restate-
ment's requirement that the reliance be "substantial") before the
remedy will lie. Viewed from the perspective of the supposed
sense of the rule, it would appear that, when the value of the
promised performance is comparatively high, yet the reliance has
been quite insubstantial, there is no injustice (an element common
to both the original and the second Restatement) that can only be
avoided by enforcement of the promise. It would appear that the
tramp has no relief under the reliance rule of the first
Restatement.
Not so under the Restatement (Second). The Restatement
(Second) supposed a power on the part of a court to create a float-
ing remedy to ride the ebb and flow of the justice or injustice of
the situation. Because the new section 90 remedy can be adjusted
in the interest of justice, it is now possible to hold that the tramp's
recovery can be limited to the $.25 necessary to recompense him
for his cost of relying upon the promise. 1 3 Hence, when the rem-
edy is adjustable downward (as it would be under the Restatement
(Second)), it is no longer so necessary to require that the reliance
111. Professor Williston stated:
Either the promise is binding or it is not. If the promise is binding it has to be
enforced as it is made.... [Instead of section 90, some other provision, perhaps
in quasi contract, could have been drafted] so that the promisee under those
circumstances shall never recover on the promise but he shall recover such an
amount as will fairly compensate him for any injury incurred; but it seems to me
you have to take one leg or the other. You have either to say the promise is
binding or you have to go on the theory of restoring the status quo."
Debate on Section 90, supra note 64-66, at 228.
For a discussion of the difference between a contractual remedy (one that recompenses
to the extent of the expectation interest) and a quasi-contractual remedy (one that recom-
penses to the extent of the restitution interest) see supra note 7.
112. This result is indicated by the following example used by Professor Williston: if A
promises to convey Blackacre to B, and, the other conditions to section 90 being met, B
builds a house on the land, then B is entitled to enforce the promise. Accordingly, B gets,
not the value of the house, but Blackacre itself, even if the land is "worth four or five times
as much as the house." Debate on Section 90, supra note 64, at 227-28.
113. This recovery protects the reliance interest and threads the needle between the
expectation interest remedy usually associated with contractual damages (which, at $25 in
this example, might be objectionable as being too high) and the restitution interest remedy
often associated with quasi contract (which, at $0 in this example - the benevolent man
gets no benefit from the tramp's walk - might be objectionable as being too low).
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be substantial, or even definite (thus the second Restatement dis-
penses with the requirements of substantiality and definiteness).
Accordingly, when the remedy can be flexibly tailored to fit the
circumstances, the failure to enforce a promise, at least as so modi-
fied in respect of remedy, may be considered an injustice which
can only be avoided by the "enforcement" of the promise, if only
to the extent of the adjusted remedy.
In conclusion, section 90 requires, in both versions, that: (1)
there must be a promise, (2) the promisor must reasonably expect
that the promise will induce action or forbearance, (3) the promise
must have induced the expected action or forbearance, and (4)
injustice must result if the promise is not enforced. Then, if the
court can fashion a flexible remedy and adheres to the Restate-
ment (Second),' 14 it need insist on nothing more, and in particu-
lar, it need not insist that the expected action or forbearance be
definite and substantial. But, on the contrary, if the court is not
free to fashion a flexible remedy, or if it adheres to the original
Restatement, then there must be a showing that the expected
action or forbearance was definite and substantial.
Responses Outside of Promissory Estoppel. Recharacteriza-
tion is a response commonly available, outside of promissory estop-
pel, whereby the promisee can recover. As has already been
suggested in this article, if either sister Antillico or the daughter
can be characterized as having bargained for the promise, the
promise loses the nature of gratuity and takes on the aspect of bar-
gained-for-consideration. 11 If such a recharacterization can be
accomplished, then each recovers under the presumptive rule,
114. A recent commentator notes that the North Dakota Supreme Court has not
answered the question "whether section 90 is an independent cause of action in this state?"
Smith, supra note 10, at 235. Since the same commentator had already asserted that North
Dakota has adopted section 90, perhaps the question can be understood as suggesting
simply that the court is prepared to accept section 90 of the original Restatement, but has
not indicated whether it is prepared to shift to the 'flexible remedy/no need to show
definite and substantial reliance' approach of the second Restatement. Id. at 228. That is, if
the flexible remedy amounts to a noncontractual recovery (of $0.25, in the example of the
tramp) instead of a contractual recovery (of $25.00) then, perhaps, it could be said that
section 90 of the Restatement (Second) creates an "independent" cause of action -
independent, that is, of contract. At the same time, because the remedy of the original
section 90 is contractual, it could be said that section 90 of the original restatement created
no new or "independent" cause of action - nothing new or independent, that is, of
contract.
On this interpretation, it would be consistent to say both that the North Dakota
Supreme Court has adopted section 90 of the original Restatement and that the North
Dakota Supreme Court has reserved the question "whether [the flexible remedy of] section
90 [of the second Restatement] is an independent cause of action in this state." Id.
115. See supra notes 38 and 103 and accompanying text.
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because there is bargained for consideration, rather than under
any doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Murphy v. Hanna, 16 an older case which predates the origi-
nal Restatement of Contracts, is one of the more interesting North
Dakota recharacterization cases.
Murphy arose in the context of a demurrer to the com-
plaint." 7 The plaintiff, Murphy, was receiver of the Medina State
Bank. ' 8 Murphy alleged that the defendants, including Hanna
and the First National Bank of Fargo, had promised to loan the
Medina bank sufficient cash (upwards of $20,000) to meet all its
obligations and enable it to continue its banking business." 9 The
Medina bank, however, had not made any return promise to bor-
row any money from the defendants.' 20 This led the trial court to
sustain the demurrers, dismissing the complaint for lack of consid-
eration.12 ' The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, raising
the possibility of a recovery after trial on the merits, even though
it was compelled to conclude that "as a wholly executory, bilateral
contract [the promise] was not enforceable, by reason of a lack of
mutuality of obligations,"'' 22 and to say of the complaint that it
states no fact from which it can reasonably be inferred
that the State Bank of Medina became bound to borrow
any money from the defendants, and in so far as it is
sought to hold the defendants liable for the repudiation of
an obligation to loan money, resting upon a counter obli-
gation to borrow, we find no such corresponding promise
or obligation on the part of the plaintiff; nor is there any
allegation from which it can be reasonably inferred that
any other detriment was suffered, or consideration fur-
nished by the defendants.' 23
The North Dakota Supreme Court found it significant, how-
ever, that the Medina Bank alleged it had selected and turned
over to the defendants, as collateral for the loan that defendants
had promised, some unpaid bills receivable in the aggregate face
amount of "about $20,000" and that these unpaid bills "consti-
tuted the assets" of the Medina Bank which were liquid and could
116. Murphy v. Hanna, 164 N.W. 32 (N.D. 1917).
117. Id. at 34.
118. Id. at 33.
119. Id. at 33-34.
120. Id. at 34.
121. Id. at 35.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 34-35.
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have enabled the Medina Bank "to continue in business.' 24 The
court held that the allegations were sufficient to establish that a
contractual relationship "sprang into existence by reason of the
selection and acceptance by the defendants of the collateral secur-
ity. '125 After recharacterizing the facts, the court reasoned that
there was consideration pleaded in the complaint.12 6 So read, the
case becomes nothing more than a garden variety offer and
acceptance case, of little interest to the question of promissory
estoppel.
However, Murphy may be significant to the question of prom-
issory estoppel in North Dakota because, in it, the court did
enforce a promise notwithstanding the apparent absence (prior to
recharacterization) of consideration, because the rationale did deal
with reliance, and because there is some language in the decision
that might be construed as being somewhat suggestive of the
rationale of a reliance-based recovery.' 27 The strength of any
potential teaching in respect of reliance is diminished, however,
by the holding that, after recharacterization, there was
consideration.
Ultimately, Murphy is a recharacterization case and cannot be
treated as good authority for a native, and pre-Restatement prom-
124. Id. at 37-38.
125. Id. at 37.
126. Id. at 37. The court's analysis can be understood as treating the defendants'
promise to lend as a continuing, unrevoked offer that Medina Bank accepted by tendering
collateral security, thereby obligating the defendants to loan "such a sum of money as
would ordinarily be loaned by one bank or individual to another upon such collateral
security, under all the circumstances then existing and contemplated by the parties." Id.
Williston and Corbin agree in suggesting that there is class of cases in which an
attempted bilateral contract, invalid at the time it was sought to be created, becomes (upon
some later acceptance) a valid contract. See 1 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 106, at 427-28 (3d ed. 1958) ("[t]he other party to the bargain must be regarded as
continuously assenting to receive such performance in return for his own promise, and a
valid unilateral contract arises on receipt of such performance"); 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 143, at 616 (1963) (a continuing offer to sell goods at a stated price and an order
for a specific quantity consummates a bilateral contract). So viewed, Murphy v. Hanna is a
rather unexceptional situation in which a promise, unenforceable when made
(unenforceable because the desired return promise was missing, hence there was no
consideration) becomes enforceable (as a containing a continuing, unrevoked offer which
becomes binding when accepted) because of subsequent acceptance.
127. The court reasoned that "[a] contract may fail wholly as an executory agreement,
carrying mutual obligations of the parties from the time it is made, and yet result in
contractual obligations depending upon what is done in pursuance of it." Murphy v.
Hanna, 164 N.W. at 35 (emphasis added).
That is to say, the result might be said to rest upon an estoppel. At least one court has
noted that, despite general agreement on the result in a case such as this, and despite the
effort by Professors Williston and Corbin to explain the result by saying that "a binding
unilateral contract is forged out of a former, invalid bilateral contract," what has actually
occurred is an estoppel. Hoyt v. Hoyt, 372 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tenn. 1963) (referring to the
sections of Williston's and Corbin's treatises set forth supra in note 126, and then holding
that the promisor was estopped from denying the validity of the promise).
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issory estoppel doctrine in North Dakota. 2 '
In addition to general recharacterization, 129 North Dakota has
several other specific approaches available which increase the
number of promises that are enforceable, outside of promissory
estoppel. The Field Code, as enacted in North Dakota, expressly
provides a reanalysis response, for it provides that an "existing
legal obligation resting upon the promisor, or a moral obligation,
originating in some benefit conferred upon the promisor or preju-
dice suffered by the promisee, also is good consideration....
By recognizing moral obligation as sufficient to sustain a promise,
the commissioners of the Field Code intended to change the com-
mon law.' 3 ' Moreover, by opening up consideration to include
preexisting moral obligations, the Code thereby increased the
number of promises that are supported by consideration and cor-
respondingly reduced the number of promises which would other-
wise be unenforceable under the presumptive rule. Thus, the
Code provides an avenue for recovery outside of promis sory
estoppel. 32
128. As to a native, pre-Restatement promissory estoppel doctrine, see Kenmare Hard
Coal & Brick v. Riley, 126 N.W. 241 (N.D. 1910). Kenmare involved a promise to extend
the period of redemption in exchange for a promise to pay a preexisting debt (no
consideration). Id. In Kenmare the promise was not enforced, but the court observed that
it might have enforced the promise if (a) actually relied upon in good faith, (b) the promisee
was influenced thereby, and (c) the promisee offers clear and convincing evidence of the
promise. Id. at 244.
129. See, e.g., 1 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 140, at 610 n. 6 (3rd
ed. 1957) ("Not infrequently, courts allow juries to find an intent to make a bargain in cases
where it is difficult to believe that there was more than detrimental reliance on the
gratuitous promise") (citing Lechler v. Montana Life Ins. Co., 186 N.W. 271 (N.D. 1921)).
130. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-05-02 (1987), FIELD CODE, supra note 13, § 781.
131. In their introduction to the Code, the commissioners explicitly draw attention to
§ 781 as being one that contains changes from the common law. FIELD CODE, supra note
13, Introduction, xxxi. The comments to § 781 of the Field Code state that:
The common law does not recognize moral obligations, except in a few cases, as
sufficient to sustain a promise. The authorities, however, entirely fail to establish
any satisfactory principle upon which to distinguish between the different
species of moral obligations. The rule stated in [§ 781] seems to the
commissioners to be just and to be, on the whole, as easily reconcilable with the
authorities in this state as any other that can be devised.
Id. Most of the Field Code states that have had occasion to consider the question of moral
obligation have, apparently, either concluded that § 781, as enacted in their codes, was not
intended to change the common law or else have ignored the existence of the section alto-
gether. See S. Henderson, Promises Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrichment
and the Law of Contracts, 57 VA.L.REV. 1115, 1129-32 (1971) (collecting cases from Califor-
nia, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota). It seems clear that the courts so holding
were not advised of the significance of the code provision, nor of the annotations to it.
132. In addition, North Dakota recognizes "promissory fraud," in more than one
context. The Field Code provides that a promise made without any intent to perform it is a
species of actual fraud and of deceit, both for purposes of rescinding a contract and for
purposes of setting up an independent action. FIELD CODE, supra note 13, §§ 757 (actual
fraud, as a basis for rescinding a contract for failure of assent), and § 849 (deceit, as a basis
for an action in tort). The corresponding N.D. Century Code provisions are §§ 9-03-08, and
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No Consideration: Generalized Promissory Estoppel in North
Dakota. There are no generalized promissory estoppel cases in
North Dakota in which a promisee has recovered because of reli-
ance in the absence of consideration. Indeed, except for two cases
touching on the category of modifications, waivers and discharges,
there are not even any of the enumerated, pattern cases in North
Dakota in which a relying promisee has recovered. 133 Because the
North Dakota cases touching on the category of modifications,
waivers and discharges all deal with promises between persons
who are already in an existing contractual relationship, there is no
case at all in which the North Dakota Supreme Court has enforced
a promise in the absence of consideration where there is no
existing contractual relationship between the parties.' 34
A recent case in which the North Dakota Supreme Court
declined to enforce a promise accompanied by a claim of reliance
in the absence of consideration is O'Connell v. Entertainment
Enterprises, Inc.135
O'Connell was before the North Dakota Supreme Court on
O'Connell's appeal from a summary judgment entered against
him.136 The plaintiff, O'Connell, was attempting to recover his
past due salary.' 37 Three sets of parties were involved in the case:
(a) Larry O'Connell, the manager of Crown Colony Entertainment
Center, (b) Entertainment Enterprises, the owner of Crown Col-
ony Entertainment Center, and (c) First Federal Savings and
Loan, and Erin Hotels, which assumed management of Crown
Colony for a time. 3 ' On April 16, 1980, First Federal assumed
from Entertainment Enterprises the management of Crown Col-
ony, which had fallen upon "financial hard times.' 1 39 On April 19,
9-10-02. Cf infra note 340 and accompanying text (relating to the fraudulent withholding
of a writing in respect of a promise within the statute of frauds).
133. That is, not only are there no generalized section 90 cases, but there are also none
of the precursor cases involving gratuitous promises made within the family, promises to
make charitable subscriptions, promises made by bailees in possession, or promises made by
a landowner to one who thereafter enters and makes improvements on the land. The
North Dakota modification cases are discussed, infra at notes 205 to 245 and accompanying
text.
134. There are no cases of garden variety § 90 promissory estoppel between parties
who are not already contractually bound to one another. Therefore, the North Dakota
cases could be explained narrowly, on the grounds of rejection of the preexisting duty rule.
135. 317 N.W.2d 385 (N.D. 1982).
136. O'Connell v. Entertainment Enterprises, Inc., 317 N.W.2d 385, 386 (N.D. 1982).
137. Id.
138. Id. The locus of the dispute was the liability for debts incurred by Crown Colony
to O'Connell, an employee, in respect of wages earned but unpaid. Entertainment
Enterprises, the owner of Crown Colony, appeared to be unable to pay. The issue was
whether First Federal or Erin Hotels could be held liable to O'Connell. Id.
139. Id.
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Erin agreed to assume active management of Crown Colony,
under First Financial's supervision. 140 On May 28, First Federal
and Erin terminated their agreement, and active management of
Crown Colony reverted to Entertainment Enterprises on June 30,
1980. 141
Meanwhile, O'Connell, to whom Entertainment Enterprises
owed almost $15,000 in unpaid salary pursuant to an oral employ-
ment agreement, was placed on a 30 day leave of absence some-
time after April 19.142 He contended that shortly thereafter, First
Federal and Erin assured him that if he would return as manager
at a slightly reduced salary, all of his unpaid back salary would be
paid. 143 When no payments were forthcoming, he demanded pay-
ment and initiated an action against all three operators of Crown
Colony (Entertainment Enterprises, First Federal, and Erin
Hotels). 14 4 After winning a summary judgment against Entertain-
ment Enterprises which he was unable to execute, O'Connell con-
tinued the action against the remaining defendants.
145
O'Connell argued that he was a third party beneficiary of con-
tracts between First Federal and Entertainment Enterprises, and
between First Federal and Erin Hotels; or that First Federal and
Erin Hotels were estopped from denying liability for O'Connell's
unpaid salary. 146 After deciding against O'Connell on the third
party beneficiary theory, 147 the court turned to his estoppel argu-
ments, dealing separately with (a) equitable estoppel, as O'Connell
had alleged that he relied upon the defendants' statements to him
that their management agreements with Entertainment Enter-
prises included an assumption by them of the back salary, and (b)
promissory estoppel, as O'Connell had alleged that he relied upon
the defendants' promise to him that they would pay the back
salary. 148
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected O'Connell's equi-
table estoppel and promissory estoppel arguments. 149 The court
140. Id.
141. Id. at 387.
142. Id. at 386.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 387.
145. Id.
146. Id. The court subsequently noted that O'Connell did not allege that the
agreement to pay his back salary was supported by consideration. Id. at 389. It would have
seemed that the alleged agreement was supported by consideration, but, apparently
because O'Connell did not raise the issue, the court declined to address it. Id.
147. Id. at 387-89.
148. Id. at 389.
149. Id. at 389-90.
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said that O'Connell must show the following elements to invoke
promissory estoppel:
(1) a promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect will cause the promisee to change his position, (2) a
substantial change of the promisee's position through
action or forbearance, (3) justifiable reliance on the prom-
ise, and (4) injustice which can only be avoided by enforc-
ing the promise. 150
The court was willing to assume the existence of a promise, but
found that the promise did not induce any action or forbearance
on O'Connell's part.' 5 1 The reasoning is somewhat cryptic. For if
the defendants had promised O'Connell that they would pay his
back wages if he returned to work at a reduced salary, as
O'Connell alleged they did; and if, as seems to be the case, he did
return to work, then it would seem that there was a clear action
taken by O'Connell which was induced by the promise.15 2
Instead, the court appears to have concentrated its attention on
O'Connell's own argument that O'Connell 'acted to his detriment
by remaining an employee at the Crown Colony,"5 3 and decided,
quite properly, that this does not demonstrate any action in reli-
ance on the alleged promise.154 Thus, the plaintiff appears to have
150. Id. at 390 (citing Union Nat'l Bank in Minot v. Schimke, 210 N.W.2d 176, 181
(N.D. 1973)). Schimke is discussed, infra at notes 306-18 and accompanying text. The
O'Connell court's formulation has four elements (instead of Schimke's five, see infra note
317 and accompanying text) because it combines Schimke's elements 1 and 2 into a single
element. While otherwise improving the Schimke phraseology, O'Connell remains faithful
to its substance, retaining Schimke's adherence to the original Restatement standard
("substantial" action or forbearance) as well as the variant element there introduced (the
item numbered three in the O'Connell list: "justifiable reliance"). This is an element that
recurs in other North Dakota cases. See Chart 2, at A2 to A4 infra (repetition of the
formulation in North Dakota cases), and see note 182, infra (comparison of the North
Dakota factors to those of the Restatement, and a discussion of the reasons why it is wrong
to say that § 90 requires "justifiable reliance").
151. O'Connell, 317 N.W.2d 385, 390 (N.D. 1982).
152. Moreover, if this is a correct reading of the facts as alleged, the case becomes
extraordinarily baffling. These facts, construed for purposes of summary judgment in the
manner most favorable to O'Connell, the party opposing summary judgment, seem to make
out a prima facie case of bargained-for consideration. That being the case, and since the
very concept of bargained-for consideration imports the core idea that the consideration
(here, the action on O'Connell's part - 'if you will return to work at a reduced salary') is
sought by the promisor (here, First Federal and Erin, who promised 'we will pay your back
wages') as the price of the promise, and is given by the promisee (O'Connell) in order to
obtain the promise, it follows that the action requested must have been induced by the
promise. This is what 'mutual conventional inducement' means. In short, while it may be
understandable for the court to refrain from deciding the consideration claim which
plaintiff never advanced, it is not at all clear how the plaintiff could have refrained from
advising the court of the relevance of the underlying facts to the claims that plaintiff did
advance.
153. Id. at 390. (emphasis added).
154. Id.
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been understood to be arguing that, simply by doing what he had
already been doing quite apart from the promise, he somehow
acted in reliance on the promise. Therefore, O'Connell lost his
promissory estoppel argument for failure to show that he was
induced to act because of the promise.
O'Connell is important for what it says by implication about
the type of action or forbearance necessary to constitute conduct
induced by a promise. If O'Connell is limited to plaintiff's argu-
ment as understood by the court, the result is unexceptional. But
if the case be read in light of all the allegations that were
presented to the court, and if it be read to stand for the proposi-
tion that even these facts are insufficient to make out a 'substantial
change of position', the result is profoundly important to an under-
standing of the meaning of promissory estoppel in this state.
O'Connell may further define promissory estoppel in North
Dakota because the court's treatment of the elements of equitable
estoppel might shed some light on what the variant element ("jus-
tifiable reliance") in the promissory estoppel formulation is
intended to mean.155 One element necessary to an equitable
estoppel is that the person to whom the statement is directed must
lack both knowledge and the means of obtaining knowledge of the
truth as to the facts in question.15 6 Since the court determined
that O'Connell could have read the management agreements, and
thus, could have ascertained that neither of the defendants did, in
fact, assume any obligation to pay, it followed that O'Connell was
not entitled to rely upon any false statements'5 7 made to him by
the defendants.
The foregoing equitable estoppel analysis might be important
to promissory estoppel by interpreting the otherwise baffling ele-
ment of the court's formulation of promissory estoppel. Perhaps,
under the same rationale, it could have been said that O'Connell
would have had to prove, not only that he had relied upon the
155. Justifiable reliance is a phrase more likely to be associated with equitable estoppel
than with promissory estoppel. The text of section 90 of the Restatement (Second) never
uses the expression 'justifiable reliance,' but the North Dakota cases do use the expression.
For further discussion of the potential effect of the variant language, see infra note 354 and
accompanying text ('justifiable reliance' for purposes of equitable estoppel, as set forth in
the North Dakota Century Code, and as elaborated by the North Dakota Supreme Court)
and cf., infra note 179 (for the specialized context in which "justifiable reliance" is used in
comment (c) to § 90 of the Restatement).
156. O'Connell, 317 N.W.2d at 389.
157. It should be noted here that the case was before the North Dakota Supreme Court
on an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
and so the plaintiff, O'Connell, was entitled to all the inferences "in a light most favorable to
him." Id. at 389.
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promise, but that he had done so neither knowing nor having the
means to know that he was relying upon an unenforceable prom-
ise. As the lack of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in ques-
tion is necessary to successful equitable estoppel, so lack of
knowledge of the legal consequence of the promise in question
might be necessary to promissory estoppel. In this framework,
reliance on a promise might be "justifiable" only if the person rely-
ing neither knows nor has the means of knowing that the promise
is unenforceable and ought not to be relied upon.' 51
Finally, O'Connell is important because of the court's gloss
explaining the purpose of the development' of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. The court noted that the doctrine developed
to "prevent inequities that may result when an agreement is void
or unenforceable because of inadequate consideration or the stat-
ute of frauds and one of the parties has acted to his detriment
because of a promise made by the other person."' 9 Thus
O'Connell represents an attempt to articulate a purpose for the
doctrine of promissory estoppel, and it is possible that this purpose
may be considered by the North Dakota Supreme Court in future
cases. 160
158. Cf. infra note 354 (the equitable estoppel side of "justifiable reliance"). But see
infra note 179 for a context in which a different meaning could be attached to the term
"justifiable" reliance on the promissory estoppel side.
To be sure, these seem to be bizarre meanings to attach to the expression, but they are
no more bizarre than the adoption of the expression itself, which might not signify anything
at all. Conceivably, the North Dakota Court did not intend to mean anything whatsoever
by its use of the term "justifiable reliance" which it seems to have picked up in the first
place by chance. In an early North Dakota promissory estoppel case, the North Dakota
Court quoted language from a decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington,
picking up at the same time the Washington Court's apparently inadvertent
misparaphrasing of § 90 of the the original Restatement of Contracts. This unfortunate
expression has recurred in successive North Dakota cases as each requotes the other. See
infra note 317 for the genesis of "justifiable reliance," as used in North Dakota, and see
infra, Table 2 at A2, for the successive requotations of the expression in subsequent North
Dakota cases.
159. O'Connell, 317 N.W.2d at 389 (without further specifying what "inequities" it had
in mind, and thereby suggesting that, if only O'Connell had acted to his detriment,
O'Connell would have recovered). Perhaps the court does not intend to let its gloss swallow
its own rule and means to say simply that promissory estoppel developed because,
whenever the other conditions to the availability of section 90 are present, "inequity"
would result if the promise were not enforced. If this is all, then the gloss is probably only
redundant, though not helpful (unless there is somehow some distinction to be made
between those situations in which "injustice can only be avoided" by enforcement of a
promise and those situations in which "inequities ... may result" if the promise is not
enforced).
160. This generalized notion of the purpose of the doctrine is over broad, and so may
not be particularly helpful as a guide to future decisions, which may explain why it has, in
fact, not been repeated in the North Dakota cases subsequent to O'Connell. Further, aside
from O'Connell, and possibly Kennare Coal, it appears that there have been in North
Dakota (either pre-Restatement or post-Restatement) none of the cases that typically come
to mind when one thinks of generalized section 90, and so there would appear to be no
basis in fact to say that the doctrine ever developed at all in North Dakota, nor that it was
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Russell v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza,' 6 1 another generalized sec-
tion 90 promissory estoppel case in which the party claiming to
have relied upon a promise failed to recover, adds another twist to
the "justifiable reliance" element which the North Dakota
Supreme Court has added to section 90.162 In Russell, a third
party interested in a loan commitment alleged that the Bank had
breached its promise to loan money to another.'6 3 The Bank had
refused to fund the loan because not all of the conditions to its
obligation had occurred or could ever occur, 16 4 but it did so prior
to the expiration of the loan commitment, and was subsequently
found to have breached its loan commitment by anticipatory
repudiation.' 6 5
transplanted here for any particular reason, much less generally to "prevent inequities that
may result when an agreement is void or unenforceable because of inadequate
consideration."
Perhaps, since relying promisees almost invariably lose in North Dakota, the court is
speaking of hypothetical inequities associated with the absence of consideration as it
surmises how the doctrine would have developed here, had there been any inequities to
remedy. Maybe the doctrine will, in the future, develop in North Dakota so as to solve
some fundamental "inequity" created by the doctrine of consideration yet to be identified
by the court (though, with the existence of "cause" in the Field Code, there would appear
to be a more powerful alternative to consideration already available, see supra notes 16 and
20); and perhaps the doctrine has developed or is developing elsewhere to prevent such
openended "inequities"; but, given the conventional present understanding of the
development of section 90 in the Restatement, see supra notes 61-68, it seems to have had a
more specific, and modest, purpose which the court might also find to be relevant in
deciding future cases.
161. Russell v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 386 N.W.2d 892 (N.D. 1986).
162. See infra notes 306-18 and accompanying text (discussing Union State Bank v.
Schimke, 210 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1973), the fountainhead North Dakota promissory estoppel
case, and the one which first introduced the notion of "justifiable reliance" as an additional
element). For a table showing the 'genealogy' of Schimke, tracing "justifiable reliance" to
its ultimate source, and following its influence on successive North Dakota formulations of
the promissory estoppel "rule," see Chart 2, at A-2.
163. Id. at 893-94. Kirkwood Bank's loan commitment was made to a partnership, East
Plaza, which had already recovered against the bank because of the bank's anticipatory
repudiation of the loan commitment. Glatt v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 383 N.W.2d 473 at
477, 479 (N.D. 1986). Russell's interest in the loan commitment was based upon his status as
a partner in another partnership, KRGS, which, in turn, had an indirect interest in the
Kirkwood BankEast Plaza loan commitment because of KRGS' relation to the transaction
contemplated by the KirkwoodEast Plaza loan. Russell, 386 N.W.2d at 89394.
The Bank of Kirkwood had committed to lend $1.7 million to the East Plaza
partnership in order to develop a project known as Metro Business Park, contingent upon
some 23 conditions. Id. at 893. One of those conditions was that the KRGS partnership
obtain a loan which would allow KRGS to complete a related project which, apparently,
would add some value to the contemplated Metro Business Park development. Id.
Subsequently, KRGS did obtain a loan commitment from another bank (United Bank) in
order to develop its project, but KRGS' loan commitment from United Bank was contingent
on the reciprocal condition that the other loan (the one between Kirkwood Bank and East
Plaza related to the Metro Business Park project) be funded. Id. When Kirkwood Bank
refused to fund the loan to East Plaza, United Bank refused to fund the loan to KRGS. Id.
Thus, Russell, through KRGS, was asserting an interest in the loan commitment between
the East Plaza partnership and the Bank of Kirkwood.
164. Glatt v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 383 N.W.2d at 475 (discussing the issue
concerning who had the burden of proving "that the developers could not have met the
conditions precedent contained in the commitment letter").
165. Id. The loan commitment was made in a letter dated July 16, 1982, and was
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The Bank had made no express promise directly to Russell,16
but Russell asserted that he was entitled to rely upon the Bank's
loan commitment. 167 After finding that there was no third-party
beneficiary basis for recovery, 68 the court turned to Russell's
estoppel theory.'69 As a threshold matter, the court had to deter-
mine whether it was possible for there to be an estoppel in favor of
a third party,17 0 and the court held that while third party reliance
might be protected in certain circumstances, those circumstances
were not present in this case.' 7 ' The North Dakota Supreme
Court next enumerated the elements of promissory estoppel, stat-
ing that:
The elements which must be established before the doc-
trine can be invoked are: (1) a promise which the prom-
stated to be binding on the Bank for six months. Id. After a series of meetings, letters and
phone conversations between August 10 and September 8, 1982, it became clear that the
Bank had refused to fund the loan. Id. (recounting those communications, which
culminated in a letter from the Bank to East Plaza's attorney saying that "your ... clients
may sue [us] if they so .. .desire our answer is final that your clients have not met the
[conditions of the loan commitment letter] nor does it appear that they are able to ... ").
East Plaza filed its complaint against the bank on September 20, 1982. Id. at 475. The
court held that the bank had breached by anticipatory repudiation. Id. at 479.
166. See supra note 163. Neither had the bank made any express promise directly to
the KRGS Partnership. Id.
167. Russell will be referred to as if he were properly suing in his own name to enforce
the alleged liability owed by the bank to the KRGS Partnership. See Russell, 386 N.W.2d at
893 n. 2.
168. Id. at 895-96. The court had also rejected Russell's claim that because Russell and
other partners were partners in both KRGS and East Plaza, that Russell / KRGS was a direct
beneficiary of the Kirkwood BankEast Plaza loan commitment in the sense of being a party
to whom the Bank made a direct promise. Id. at 894-95.
169. Id. at 896.
170. In the ordinary promissory estoppel case, A makes a promise to B, on which B
relies; here the situation is a promise made by A [the Bank] to B [East Plaza], on which C
[Russell/ KRGS] has relied. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 90 ("a promise
which... induce[s] action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person ... is
binding if .... ") (emphasis added). The express recognition of third party reliance in the
Restatement (Second) is a change from the original Restatement. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text. In the Restatement (Second)'s analysis, whether a promisor has reason
to expect that a third party will rely upon a promise made to another bears some relation to
whether the third party is a beneficiary of the promise. Id. § 90 comment c (observing that,
while a promisor may be expected to foresee that a beneficiary will rely on the promise,
"U ]ustifiable reliance by third persons who are not beneficiaries is less likely, but may
sometimes reinforce the claim of the promisee or beneficiary").
171. See, Russell, 386 N.W.2d at 896 (citing Farmers' State Bank of Gladstone v. Anton,
199 N.W. 582 (N.D. 1924)) for the proposition that estoppel may extend in favor of a third
party "occupying a relation to the subject matter of the representation similar to that of
whom they were made," (emphasis added) but holding that Russell's relationship to the
East PlazaKirkland Bank loan commitment was "not sufficiently similar to that of [East
Plaza] to put him in the same position as [it is]"). The italicized word in the language
quoted by the Russell court, together with the fact that the court proceeded, in the
immediately following paragraph, to say that "Russell also asserts that he should be entitled
to recovery under the doctrine of promissory estoppel," indicates that the court considered
Anton to be an equitable estoppel case, rather than a promissory estoppel case and
indicates that the court considered Russell to have presented an equitable estoppel claim as
well as a promissory estoppel claim. Id.
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isor should reasonably expect will cause the promisee to
change his position, (2) a substantial change of the prom-
isee's position through action or forbearance, (3) justifi-
able reliance on the promise, and (4) injustice which can
only be avoided by enforcing the promise. 7 2
Expressly assuming, for purposes of argument, that there was
an allegation of a promise sufficient to meet the first element,17 3
(and implicitly assuming that there could be a promissory estoppel
in favor of a third party in precisely the same circumstances in
which it had just held that there could not be an equitable estop-
pel), 7 4 the court concluded that neither the second nor third enu-
merated elements essential to a promissory estoppel recovery
were present. 175  The court determined that Russell did not
change his position in reliance upon any promise made by the
Bank in its loan commitment.' 76 Further, the court determined
that even if Russell had relied on the loan commitment, it would
not have been "justifiable" reliance.177
If it did nothing else, Russell demonstrates the thin line that
172. Id. (citing O'Connell v. Entertainment Enterprises, 317 N.W.2d 385, 390 (N.D.
1982)). See supra notes 135-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of O'Connell.
173. Russell, 386 N.W.2d at 896. The court does not describe the promise, and the
attempt to do so seems to present a dilemma. If the promise is the one given by the bank to
East Plaza, then Russell is relying as a third party to that promise, which either contradicts
what the court earlier said about third party reliance in estoppel cases or requires a further
assumption. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text. If the promise is one given by
the bank to Russell, then the court appears to be accepting, for purposes of argument, the
same sort of promise it earlier rejected as involving "tortuous reasoning" when Russell had
argued that he was a direct promisee/beneficiary of promise made to him by Kirkwood
Bank. Russell, 386 N.W.2d at 894.
The easiest, if not the only, way to deal with this dilemma is to avoid it altogether,
which can be done by taking the court strictly at its word, and by understanding that the
court has assumed the promise only for purposes of argument, and by further
understanding that the court has assumed the possibility of third party reliance likewise
only for purposes of argument. It is clear, therefore, that the court deliberately intends to
base the holding in this case on the failure of Russell to change position as a result of the
promise, and on the failure of Russell to show that any change in position constituted
"justifiable" reliance. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (no "[equitable] estoppel" in favor of
this third party). See also supra note 170 and accompanying text (under the rule of the
Restatement (Second), there may be a "promissory estoppel" in favor of a third party in
certain circumstances).
175. Russell, 386 N.W.2d at 896.
176. Id. The loan commitment between the bank and the East Plaza partnership was,
it is true, conditioned upon the KRGS partnership's obtaining a bank loan (see supra note
163 and accompanying text), but the court observed that KRGS needed to obtain a loan for
its own purposes, independently of the Kirkwood BankEast Plaza loan commitment, and,
moreover, that KRGS was not relying upon the East Plaza loan commitment when it made
its own loan application to another bank. Russell, 386 N.W.2d at 896.
177. Id. at 896-97. This was because the reliance of KRGS/Russell consisted in KRGS'
obtaining a loan commitment, thereby coming close to satisfying one of the 23 conditions to
Kirkwood Bank's obligation to fund the loan to Plaza West, but there was nothing that
KRGS could do about the other 22 conditions. Id. at 897. Thus, the court held, even if
KRGS/Russell had relied upon its satisfaction of that one condition out of 23 conditions as
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might separate recovery from non-recovery in a promissory estop-
pel case."' Russell may, in addition, demonstrate the inadvisabil-
ity of adding elements to promissory estoppel beyond those
included in the Restatement of Contracts.
1 7 9
Russell creates some doctrinal confusion between competing
formulations of the promissory estoppel rule. This confusion exists
because the court gave two different versions of promissory estop-
pel: the court first set forth the elements that it will require to be
established before promissory estoppel may be invoked, 80 but it
then discussed § 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts with
approval, saying that it "sets forth the doctrine of promissory
"the sole predicate to successful completion of the loan" to Plaza West, "it was not a
justifiable reliance." Id.
178. As has been observed, the court, on the premise that Russell/KRGS was relying
upon East Plaza to satisfy some twentytwo additional conditions to Kirkwood Bank's
obligation to fund the loan, was able to conclude that it was not "justifiable" for Russell so to
rely. See supra notes 176 and 177 and accompanying text. But, under the assumption, also
consistent with the facts, that Russell was simply relying upon Kirkwood Bank not to breach
the loan commitment by anticipatory repudiation, Russell's reliance would seem to be
"justifiable." After all, it was Kirkwood Bank's promise embodied in the loan commitment,
not East Plaza's efforts to satisfy the conditions to funding, on which Russell was relying.
Indeed, where East Plaza has already recovered against the Bank for breach of the loan
agreement in question without having satisfied all of the conditions to the Bank's obligation
to lend, the line that separates East Plaza's recovery from Russell's nonrecovery has to be
understood as simply a variation of the question of legal foreseeability of damages for
breach of promise. See generally Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854).
The court probably reached the correct result in Russell, but it might have reinforced its
holding by basing its result on the first element of promissory estoppel, and so concluding
that there was no promise made by Kirkwood Bank on which it had reason to expect
reliance by Russell/KRGS. This would have had the collateral advantage of unifying the
third party beneficiary and promissory estoppel analyses.
179. Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts does not include "justifiable reliance"
as an element. See RESTATEMENT SECOND supra note 3 and accompanying text. One of
the few places in which the expression occurs anywhere in the Restatement (Second) is in
comment c to § 90. See supra note 170.
Even if it were not settled that the text of § 90 governs in the event of inconsistency
between it and its commentary (treating the Restatement as if it were a statute
accompanied by drafter's notes), the context of comment c makes it clear that "justifiable
reliance," far from constituting a new or additional element, is simply a shorthand
expression meant to stand for the circumstances in which a promisor may be expected to
foresee that the promisee or a third party will rely upon the promise. Id. It should be
apparent that if, but only if, the promisor should foresee that a third party will rely upon the
promise, then that third party's reliance is "justifiable." Id. Conversely, it should be
apparent that a third party's reliance is "justifiable" if, and only if, its reliance is something
which the promisor should have foreseen. Id. Comment c to section 90 means that a
promisor may often foresee that a beneficiary of a promise will rely upon it, and that
reliance by such a third party is, therefore, "justifiable." Id. The comment raises the
possibility of "justifiable" reliance by third persons who are not beneficiaries, and can only
be understood to do so in terms of whether the promisor could have foreseen reliance by a
third party so situated. Id.
On a Restatement analysis, the relevant question is not whether the reliance by Russell
was justifiable, but whether it was foreseeable by Kirkwood Bank. Id. Because the court
had already held that Russell was not a beneficiary of the Bank's promise, it would have
been easy to hold, on the same operative facts, that Russell's reliance was not reasonably to
be expected by the Bank (thus, unifying its promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, and
third party beneficiary analyses, instead of separating them).
180. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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estoppel, which we have determined is inapplicable in this
case."'' The problem is that the court's formulation is not the
same as that of section 90 of the Restatement (Second). Section 90
differs from the court's formulation in these respects: (a) the sec-
ond element of court's formulation requires that there be a sub-
stantial change of position, but section 90 of the Restatement
(Second) dispenses with the requirement that the action or for-
bearance be "substantial," instead allowing the court to fix a lower
recovery in the event of insubstantial reliance; and (b) the second
and third elements of the court's formulation represent a subtle,
but material shift in emphasis away from the Restatement's focus
upon the expected character of the promisee's action or forbear-
ance and in the direction of emphasis on the unhelpful factors,
'change' and 'justifiable reliance."i8 2 It would be much more help-
ful if the court would either drop its own formulation in favor of
the Restatement's, or drop the Restatement's formulation in favor
of its own. The differences between the two formulations ought to
prevent the use of both at the same time, at least without further
explanation.
181. Russell, 386 N.W.2d at 897.
182. Compare the Court's elements with the gloss earlier developed on the
Restatement (see supra notes 10814 and accompanying text for the gloss on the
Restatement):
The Court's Elements:
(1) a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect will cause the promisee to
change his position, (2) a substantial change of the promisee's position through action or
for bearance, (3) justifiable reliance on the promise, and (4) injustice which can only be
avoided by enforcing the promise.
Gloss on the Restatement (Second):
(1) there must be a promise, (2) the promisor must reasonably expect that the promise will
induce action or forbearance, (3) the promise must have induced the expected action or
forbearance, and (4) injustice must result if the promise is not enforced. The remedy
may be limited as justice requires.
Elements 2 and 3 of the gloss on section 90 tie the cause to the effect. Per element 2,
the promisor must reasonably expect that the promise will induce action or forbearance,
and per element 3, the promise must have, in fact, induced just that action or forbearance
which was expected (and no other).
Elements 2 and 3 of the court's version could disconnect cause from effect. So long as
the promisor can expect that promisee might "change" position somehow (element 2), it
may be enough that the promisee have "justifiably relied" upon the promise by doing or
refraining from doing something (element 3) - there seems to be no longer any require-
ment that the promisee change position in the way that the promisor could have reason-
ably expected, just so long as the change is "justifiable."
The Restatement does not use the expression "justifiable reliance." If that expression
were inserted into the gloss on the Restatement, the insertion would either be redundant (if
it means that reliance is justifiable only if it is precisely the reliance which the promisor had
reason to expect - which is already covered by element 3 of the gloss) or wrong (if it means
either that reliance might be justifiable even if not what the promisor had reason to expect,
or might be be unjustifiable even if exactly what the promisor had reason to expect; and
both of these results are contrary to the Restatement). It might, of course, still be good law;
and no worse than the Restatement. My point is merely that it is not the Restatement.
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2. Family Promises, Charitable Subscriptions, Gratuitous
Bailments, Land Promises, Marriage Settlements
The Restatement. Neither Section 90 of the original Restate-
ment, nor section 90 of the Restatement Second sprung full grown
from the brow of any of the drafters. 1 1 3 The original section 90 is a
generalized statement of a rule of law thought to be expressive of
five particular, enumerated, and recurring transaction types in
which promises had frequently been enforced in the absence of
consideration.
Since, as observed earlier in this article, it is commonly taught
that reliance on a gratuitous promise came to be recognized as a
basis for recovery in a few categories of cases,'8 4 it must be pre-
sumed that some or all of these promises: gratuitous promises
made within the family; promises to make gifts to charitable insti-
tutions; gratuitous promises made by a bailee in possession; and
promises relating to the conveyance of land which were followed
by entry and improvements upon the land, are eligible for section
90 treatment, provided the other elements to a section 90 recov-
ery are present.' 8 5
North Dakota Annotations. There are no retrievable opinions
of the North Dakota Supreme Court involving family promises,
charitable subscriptions, gratuitous bailments, land promises or
marriage settlements in any context relating to promissory estop-
pel. Thus, the approach of the North Dakota Supreme Court to
gratuitous promises such as these has not been established.
3. Modification, Waiver and Discharge
The Restatement. As observed earlier in this article, 86 it is
commonly understood that the drafters of the original Restate-
183. The image of Pallas Athena springing from the forehead of Zeus is one that has
inspired poets and legal scholars alike. Compare, G. GORDON, LORD BYRON, Childe
Harolde's Pilgrimage, Canto IV, Verse XCVI ("Can tyrants but by tyrants conquered be, /
And freedom find no champion and no child / Such as Columbia saw arise when she /
Sprung forth a Pallas, armed and undefiled?") with L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (2nd ed. 1988) ("The Securities Act of 1933 did not spring full
grown from the brow of any New Deal Zeus").
184. See supra notes 6164 and accompanying text.
185. The elements of a section 90 recovery are these: (1) there must be a promise, (2)
the promisor must reasonably expect that the promise will induce action or forbearance, (3)
the promise must have induced the expected action or forbearance, and (4) injustice must
result if the promise is not enforced. Then, if the court can fashion a flexible remedy and
adheres to the Restatement Second, it need insist on nothing more, and in particular, it
need not insist that the expected action or forbearance be definite and substantial. On the
other hand, if the court is not free to fashion a flexible remedy, or if it adheres to the original
restatement, then there must be a showing that the expected action or forbearance was
definite and substantial. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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ment believed that, in addition to the categories of promises
already enumerated, many promissory modifications of contrac-
tual duties, waivers of conditions, and discharges of contractual
duties were enforced in the absence of consideration.
Therefore it can be assumed that section 90, in both its origi-
nal form and in the modified form of the Restatement (Second), is
applicable to the class of promises which consist of modifications of
existing duties, waiver of conditions, and discharge of duties. In
addition, the Restatement (Second) spells out the specific adapta-
tions of section 90 to each of these particular kinds of promises.
These specialized formulations relate to modifications,18 7 waiv-
ers,18 8 and discharges. 18 9
Modifications
Modifications: Promissory Estoppel in the Restatement. Sec-
tion 89 of the Restatement (Second) concerns modifications to con-
tractual relationships. Under the presumptive rule, a promise
modifying a duty under an existing contract is not enforceable in
the absence of consideration. ° Section 89, however, provides
that such promises may be enforceable in three circumstances,
one of which is based upon reliance. Section 89 provides that:
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully
performed on either side is binding
(a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view of cir-
cumstances not anticipated by the parties when the
contract was made; or
(b) to the extent provided by statute; or
(c) to the extent that justice requires enforcement in
view of material change of position in reliance on the
promise.19'
Section 89(c) is an application of reliance-based recovery to the cir-
cumstances of modifications of contractual relations. Upon analy-
sis, a section 89(c) promissory estoppel recovery requires these
elements: (1) there must be a promise, (2) the promise must modify
a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side, (3)
187. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 89.
188. Id. § 84.
189. Id. § 273.
190. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 17. Section 17 is set forth supra at note 4.
See also Id. § 73 ("Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful
nor the subject of an honest dispute is not consideration; but a similar performance is
consideration if it differs from what was required by the duty in a way which reflects more
than a pretense of bargain.")
191. Id. § 89.
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there must be a material change of position in reliance on the
promise, and (4) justice must require enforcement.' 912 Section 89 is
new.'1 3 The language of section 89(c) is "adapted" from section 2-
209 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 19 4 Under section 89(c), as
in section 2-209 of the U.C.C., the original terms "can be rein-
stated for the future by reasonable notification received by the
promisee unless reinstatement would be unjust in view of a
change of position" on her part.'9 5
Modifications: Responses Outside of Promissory Estoppel. It is
not always necessary to find a promissory estoppel basis of recov-
ery of the sort typified by § 89(c) of the Restatement (Second) in
order to fashion a recovery for the promisee. Of the nonpromis-
sory estoppel responses to the problem of promises modifying con-
tractual duties, the response which overthrows the presumptive
rule more nearly distinguishes this class of promises from the other
classes of promises.196
Section 89(b) of the Restatement (Second) recognized that
many states have simply done away with the requirement that
there be any consideration to reach a binding modification, so long
as the statutory substitute for consideration (usually a writing) is
present.'9 7 North Dakota is such a state. The North Dakota Cen-
tury Code provides separately for the modification of oral and
written contracts.' Under the Century Code, if the original con-
192. Id. (extracting pertinent language from the initial clause and clause (c) of § 89).
193. Id. § 89, Reporter's Note.
194. Id. § 89, Comment (d). That the language is adapted, rather than simply
borrowed is plain. The approach, and language, of Section 2209 of the Uniform
Commercial Code differs fundamentally from section 89 of the Restatement. Section 2209
eliminates the requirement of consideration altogether in the case of a modification, stating
that "[an agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be
binding." U.C.C. § 2-209 (1988). The translation to Restatement terms is by way of
adaptation - the Restatement does not eliminate the requirement of consideration
altogether, but only if the modification is "fair and equitable" in light of unanticipated
circumstances, or if there is a statute (such as § 2209 of the UCC) that dispenses with the
requirement, or if there has been material reliance. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3,
§ 89(a), (b) & (c).
195. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 89 comment d. Compare U.C.C.
§ 2209(5).
196. The three nonpromissory estoppel responses which protect the reliance interest
are (a) recharacterization (of the facts), or (b) reanalysis (of the law) so as to permit recovery
within the presumptive rule, and (c) overthrow of the presumptive rule (in this case, the
requirement of consideration) so as to permit recovery. See supra notes 5356 and
accompanying text. In the context of the promise modifying a preexisting duty, the
recharacterization approach is typified by the search for something which "differs from
what was required by the [preexisting] duty in a way which reflects more than a pretense of
bargain," Restatement (Second) § 73, or - by what amounts to practically the same thing -
the presence of an additional something of substantial value, such as a "hawk, a robe, or a
horse." Compare RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 73 (more than a pretense) with
Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (1602) (hawk, horse or robe).
197. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 89.
198. The term "Century Code" is used here to contrast it to the Field Code. The
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tract is oral, then a written modification is binding without a new
consideration.' 99 Moreover, under the Century Code, if the origi-
nal contract is in writing, then it may be modified "by a contract in
writing or by an executed oral agreement and not otherwise. 200
Any recovery on the basis of such statutes as these is a recovery
which is not based upon promissory estoppel. Instead, these stat-
utes represent a direct overthrow of the presumptive rule that
relevant Century Code provisions were introduced into the 1877 version of the North
Dakota code, and they are contrary to the corresponding elements in the Field Code.
Compare FIELD CODE §§ 842, 846 with N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-09-05, 9-09-06 (1987):
Field Code:
§ 842. A contract not under seal may be altered in any respect by consent
of the parties, upon a sufficient consideration; and is extinguished thereby to the
extent of the alteration.
§ 843. A contract under seal may be altered by an agreement under seal,
or by an executed agreement without seal; and not otherwise, except as to the
time of performance, which may be extended by any form of agreement.
Century Code:
§ 9-09-05. A contract not in writing may be altered in any respect by
consent of the parties in writing without a new consideration, and is
extinguished thereby to the extent of the alteration.
§ 9-09-06. A contract in writing may be altered by a contract in writing or
by an executed oral agreement and not otherwise. An oral agreement is
executed within the meaning of this section whenever the party performing has
incurred a detriment which he was not obligated by the original contract to
incur.
(emphasis added).
199. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-05 (1987). The statute seems to provide that it is the
exclusive method by which promises of modification, unaccompanied by new consideration,
can be enforced. That is, the statute provides that the parties' written consent is binding
without consideration; but the modification of an oral contract by the parties' oral consent
would appear to be binding only "with a new consideration." Id.
200. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-06 (1987). Section 9-09-06's meaning is not entirely
clear. If § 9-09-06 is read with an emphasis on the modification's being "a contract in
writing," then, since an agreement is not a contract unless there is consideration (see N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-01-02(4)), this means that a modification of a written agreement is not
binding unless the modification is both written and supported by new consideration. If the
intent of § 9-09-06 is understood in this manner, following as it does, § 9-09-05, then § 9-09-
06 would provide that the rule of § 9-09-05 is limited to modifications of oral contracts and
is inapplicable to modifications of written agreements.
But if § 9-09-06 is read with an eye towards the preceding section, § 9-09-05, which
provides that oral contracts can be modified either in writing without consideration or
orally with new consideration, then a strong argument can be made that the focus of § 9-09-
06 (and the only part in which it was intended to differ from § 9-09-05) is the effective
moment of the oral modification to the written agreement - the oral agreement (which,
presumably, must be accompanied by new consideration, following the apparent rationale
of § 9-09-05) is only enforceable if executed "and not otherwise." N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-
06. Hence, an analogy, admittedly imperfect, could be made to accord and satisfaction: the
new promise (the executory accord) is, though made with new consideration, not
enforceable until performed (that is, until the satisfaction has occurred). Or, the statute
might mean that the new, oral promise (the executory accord) does not require new
consideration, but still isn't enforceable until performed. In either event, it could be argued
that the action in § 9-09-06 is concentrated in the last clause, so that the reference in the
first clause to a "contract in writing" might be understood to mean simply a written
agreement which, following § 9-09-05, no more requires a new consideration than did the
written modification of the oral agreement as set forth in § 9-09-05.
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would have required consideration before enforcing a promise to
modify a contractual duty.
Perhaps there are some states that have, as suggested by sec-
tion 89(a) of the Restatement (Second), also done away with the
requirement of consideration if the modification is "fair and equi-
table in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when
the contract was made. '20 1  Indeed, the Uniform Commercial
Code can be understood to take a similar approach,2 °2 and there
may be states which have extended the principle beyond the
UCC.
Only if there is neither consideration, nor compliance with
the requisites of any statutory20 3 or other 20 4 provisions that would
support a promise of modification in the absence of consideration,
is promissory estoppel needed as a possible basis for recovery.
North Dakota has had at least one such case, and it, and other cases
not quite so clearly on point, are discussed below.
Modifications: Promissory Estoppel in North Dakota. The
clearest case on point is Farmer's Bank of Gladstone v. Anton,20 5
which was decided in 1924 predating the Restatement of Con-
tracts.20 6 The more recent cases, Mitchell v. Barnes, 20 7 decided in
1984, and Thiele v. Security State Bank of New Salem,20 ' decided
in 1986, are both sympathetic to the theory of promissory estoppel
but do not constitute square holdings for the plaintiff promisee on
the basis of section 89(c), or section 90 reliance. 0 9
201. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 89(a).
202. The Uniform Commercial Code is similar, but not identical. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1)
(1988) ("an agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be
binding"), and Id., § 2-103 ("every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement"). The two provisions of the UCC, when read
together may have the effect of enforcing those promises if the modification is fair and
equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was
made, if for "good faith" can be read "fair and equitable, etc." However, even if the
standard is the same, the burdens of persuasion are reversed between the Restatement
§ 89(a) (the promisor will not have to perform unless the promisee can show that the
promise is "fair and equitable, etc.") and the UCC § 2-209(1) (the promisor will have to
perform unless the promisor can show that the promise was extracted in a manner other
than by "good faith").
203. A statutory overthrow of the consideration requirement. RESTATEMENT SECOND,
supra note 3, § 89(b).
204. Some rule of law which permits "fair and equitable modifications in view of
circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made." RESTATEMENT
SECOND, supra note 3, § 89(a),
205. Farmer's Bank of Gladstone v. Anton, 199 N.W. 582 (N.D. 1924).
206. See RESTATEMENT supra note 1 and accompanying text.
207. Mitchell v. Barnes, 354 N.W.2d 680 (N.D. 1984).
208. Thiele v. Security State Bank of New Salem, 396 N.W.2d 295 (N.D. 1986).
209. In Mitchell, the promisee recovered because of a statute. Mitchell, 354 N.W.2d
680. In Thiele, the putative promisee did not recover at all since it was held that there was
no promise. Thiele, 396 N.W.2d 295. In addition, there is a suggestion of a native,
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Anton. Farmer's Bank of Gladstone v. Anton involved a modi-
fication to a loan agreement. 210 Anton's land was encumbered by
three mortgages.21 ' Anton had defaulted on the second mortgage
and a foreclosure sale had occurred, but the redemption period
had not yet expired.212 The Farmer's Bank, which had no security
interest in the real property, but was a preexisting creditor of
Anton, promised Anton that it would redeem the premises on
Anton's behalf if Anton would execute a mortgage granting it a
security interest in the premises to secure the payment of $1,320,
the amount of the preexisting debt.213 Anton executed a mort-
gage in favor of Farmer's Bank; Farmer's Bank procured an assign-
ment to it of the sheriff's certificate of sale, but, when the period of
redemption had passed, it procured a sheriff's deed in its own
name, and subsequently sold the property to a third party.21 4 In a
quiet title action, Anton asserted that he was ready, willing, and
able to redeem the property from Farmer's Bank, and was entitled
to do so on the strength of the Bank's promise to him.21 5 The Bank
demurred, urging that its promise was not supported by
consideration.21 6
The court first held for Anton on the basis of promissory estop-
pel (without using the word "promissory"), and then held for
Anton on the alternative ground that there was consideration.21
As to estoppel, the court said simply:
Under the facts as alleged in the answer, it is clear that a
promise was made by plaintiff, before the period of
redemption had expired, which was relied on by the
defendants Anton and wife, with the result that they took
no steps to redeem within the statutory period, and the
plaintiff is estopped from denying the right to redeem.
preRestatement reliancebased response in the Kenmare Coal case, but it is by way of dicta.
See supra note 128.
210. Anton, 199 N.W. at 58283. The suit was a quiet title action brought by the bank
after foreclosure. Id. Mr. Anton's claim to the land was based upon a promise the bank
made to him in connection with a loan agreement. Id.
211. Id. at 582.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 58283. Farmer's Bank had a chattel mortgage on Anton's farm stock and
machinery. Id. at 583.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. The promise at issue was a lender's promise to allow the borrower to redeem
the land from it "at such time as [the borrower] might elect upon payment of the sums paid
by [the bank] for such redemption with interest at 8 per cent" and in return for the
borrower's promise to grant a mortgage on the land to secure payment of the preexisting
debt. Id. at 582.
217. Id. at 58384.
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For aught that appears in the pleadings, the defendants,
after entering into this agreement with the plaintiff and
performing their part thereof fully, may, in reliance on
that agreement, have ceased to endeavor to raise the
money necessary to redeem. The representation and the
reliance on thereon are clearly alleged; and surely it
would be a fraud on defendants to permit plaintiff now to
assert anything to the contrary.21 8
Anton's impact as a pre-section 90 harbinger of promissory estop-
pel is, however, considerably lessened by the court's immediate
observation that there was, in fact, consideration for the prom-
ise.21 9 The court stated that Anton suffered a detriment by grant-
ing an additional encumbrance in favor of Farmer's Bank which
he was not legally bound to suffer and that the bank received an
advantage from the additional security. 220 Thus, there was consid-
eration for the promise, and the court held in Anton's favor on that
basis.22 1
Mitchell. Mitchell v. Barnes involved a modification to a lease
agreement covering 1,840 acres of farmland.222 The promise at
issue was the landlord's promise permitting the tenants to violate
certain provisions of the lease, raised as a defense by the tenants in
a suit brought by the landlord against them after the lease term
had concluded. The landlord alleged that at the expiration of the
lease the tenants were to return the land with 355 acres summer-
fallowed, 355 acres dug once, and 1,065 acres fall-plowed and dug;
but that the tenants did none of the digging and fall plowing
required, and left only 152 acres unplanted.2 23 The tenants
defended on the basis of a promise they asserted the landlord had
made modifying the agreement by eliminating the summer-fallow
and fallwork requirements.224 Once the tenants' version of the
facts was accepted, the promise was held to be enforceable
because of a statutory provision applicable to modifications with-
218. Anton, 199 N.W. at 583, 584.
219. Id. at 584.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 584-85.
222. Mitchell, 354 N.W.2d at 681.
223. Id. The landlord sought total damages in the amount of $32,536.28: $13,367.50 as
the cost of summerfallowing, digging and fall plowing; $1,337.78 as the tenants' share of
rock burial; $3,459 because the landlord leased the land to another tenant on a crop share
basis and the yield on the 203 acres that should have been summerfallowed was reduced
since barley had to be planted instead of wheat; and $14,372 by which the tenants were
enriched by seeding 203 acres more than they were entitled to seed. Id. at 68182.
224. Id. at 682.
[Vol. 66:317
1990] PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN NORTH DAKOTA
out consideration. 225 The statute, however, was interpreted as sat-
isfied by detrimental reliance, which was defined in a jury
instruction as follows:
If you find that [the landlord].., made statements to the
defendants which statements would cause the defendants
not to fulfill the contract in question as written, and if you
further find that the plaintiffs relied upon the statements
of [the landlord], and if you further find that the defend-
ants either acted or did not act based upon such state-
ments and that said action was of such a character as to
change the position or status of the defendants, [the land-
lord] cannot enforce that portion of the contract which
[the landlord] told the defendants not to perform.226
The jury instruction was not before the North Dakota Supreme
Court on appeal, and thus lacks authority as a statement of the law
in North Dakota.227 The Court took pains to point out that the
landlord did "not assert that the instruction incorrectly stated the
law," but that the landlord only claimed, instead, that the defend-
ant tenants had not properly pleaded estoppel as an affirmative
defense and so had waived it.228
Thiele. Thiele v. Security State Bank of New Salem 229 can be
read as a modification to a bank checking account agreement. The
Bank had honored overdrafts on the customer's account over a
period of years, treating them, in effect as unsecured loans; but this
practice was something the Bank had never promised to do, and
225. Id. The provision, of course, was § 9-09-06. The case was complicated because
the agreement sought to be modified was in writing, and the modification itself was oral.
Relying upon the last sentence of § 9-09-06, the court held, in effect, that the statute
created a residual promissory estoppel recovery for promisees who, in reliance upon a
promise in modification, incurred some detrimental reliance. The statute required that any
oral agreement modifying a written agreement be executed, and went on to provide that
an oral agreement is "executed" within the meaning of the statute if the party performing
has incurred a detriment "which he was not obligated by the original contract to incur."
Mitchell, 354 N.W.2d at 682. It might have been supposed that this detriment would have
been something in the way of performance, but the statute is at least susceptible of the
meaning that the detriment could be mere forbearance to act in reliance on the promise.
The court, in taking the latter interpretation, thereby turned 9-09-06 into a promissory
estoppel rule, equating any sort of detrimental reliance to the performance of "a detriment
which [the party performing] was not obligated by the original contract to incur" so as to
constitute an "executed" oral agreement within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 683.
Hence, the tenants' failure to abide by the provisions of the lease was held to be a detriment
sufficient to bind the landlord to the promise not to enforce those provisions. Id. At this
point, § 9-09-06 might as well be § 89(c) of the Restatement.
226. Mitchell, 354 N.W.2d at 683.
227. See generally id. at 68384.
228. Id. On this issue, the court held that, while it did not use the word "estoppel," the
answer did give the Landlord fair notice of the nature of the defense, and that was all that it
was required to do. Id.
229. 396 N.W.2d 295 (1986).
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the written account agreement governing the relation between it
and the customer expressly provided that the Bank need not, and
would not do so.230 When the Bank stopped honoring overdrafts,
and began returning checks for insufficient funds, the customer
tried to enforce an alleged promise by the bank.23 1 The customer
asserted that the Bank's prior conduct was, in effect, a promise to
treat the customer's checking account as an unsecured, revolving
line of credit.2 32 The customer lost. The court ruled that the prior
course of conduct did not constitute a promise.2 3 Thus, promis-
sory estoppel did not bind the bank-no promise, no estoppel. The
Court opined that:
. . . before the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be
invoked, the promise or agreement must be clear, defi-
nite, and unambiguous as to its essential terms. That fea-
ture is lacking in the instant case.234
Summary of the Modification Cases. The three cases, in two
of which there was a recovery for the relying promisee, and in one
of which there was no recovery, will be considered together to
determine whether they establish a promissory estoppel doctrine
in North Dakota.
Cases in Which there Was a Recovery.
In Anton, 35 the alternative promissory estoppel holding is
based upon (1) a promise, (2) and substantial forbearance in reli-
ance upon it; together with the fact that both the promise and the
reliance were clearly alleged. 36 it predated the original Restate-
ment, and therefore stands as authority prior to any formulation of
§ 90. And yet, the strength of the holding is undercut by the fact
that the court also held that there was consideration.
In Mitchell,2 37 the North Dakota Supreme Court did not for-
mulate a rule for promissory estoppel.238 The statement of the
rule took the form of a jury instruction to which the landlord did
not object.239 The instruction is not, strictly speaking, in the lan-
230. Thiele v. Security State Bank of New Salem, 396 N.W.2d at 296.
231. Id.
232. Id. Apparently, the imputed line of credit would have had a limit of at least
$510,693.33, the amount of insufficient fund checks drawn by the customer and dishonored
by the bank. Id.
233. Id. at 300-301.
234. Id. at 301 (citing Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 389 N.W.2d 352 (N.D. 1986)).
Lohse is discussed infra at notes 33146.
235. Farmer's Bank of Gladstone v. Anton, 199 N.W. 582 (N.D. 1924).
236. Id. at 584.
237. Mitchell v. Barnes, 354 N.W.2d 680 (N.D. 1984).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 683.
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guage of the Restatement for it omits entirely the promisor orien-
tation, by which the Restatement inquires whether the promisor
could reasonably have expected the promisee to rely, and it omits
the inquiry whether "injustice can be avoided" only by enforcing
the promise. 24 0 But there is no reason to assume that the North
Dakota Supreme Court thereby intended to adopt the trial court's
variation on the Restatement; rather, it appears that the issue was
not before the Supreme Court.24 '
Cases in Which there Was No Recovery.
In Thiele,242 there was no promise made at all. Thus, the case
gave the North Dakota Court no occasion to state a rule other than
the threshold observation that before promissory estoppel can be
invoked, there must be a promise which is "clear, definite, and
unambiguous as to its essential terms. '2 43 As innocuous as this
threshold issue may appear, it is at odds with some courts' more
aggressive reading of the Restatement, requiring a more definite
promise than do they.244 Although this variation merely makes it
somewhat more diflicult for a promisee to recover in the context
here discussed, this innovation would make it impossible for the
promisee to recover in one of the upcoming categories soon to be
discussed.2 45
In conclusion, these are cases which are sympathetic to the
Restatement's formulation on promissory estoppel in the context
of modifications, but which do not embrace the Restatement.
Waivers
Waivers: Promissory Estoppel in the Restatement. Section 84
of the Restatement (Second) concerns waivers of conditions, treat-
ing them as promises to perform a duty in spite of the non-occur-
rence of a condition.246 Under the presumptive rule, such a
promise would be unenforceable in the absence of consideration.
But section 84(1) provides that, unless the occurrence of the condi-
tion was a material part of the agreed exchange 247 or was a risk
assumed by the promisor,248 "a promise to perform all or part of a
240. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 90.
241. Mitchell, 354 N.W.2d at 683.
242. Thiele v. Security State Bank of New Salem, 396 N.W.2d 295 (N.D. 1986).
243. Id. at 301.
244. Compare id. ("promise must be clear, definite and unambiguous") with
RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 90 ("[a] promise that the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action").
245. See infra notes 32576 (especially note 345) and accompanying text's discussion of
reliance in absence of assent and insufficient definiteness.
246. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 84.
247. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note, § 89(lXa).
248. Id. § 84(lXb).
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conditional duty under an antecedent contract in spite of the non-
occurrence of the condition is binding. '2 49 Thus far, the rule of
section 84, although it makes a promise enforceable in the absence
of consideration, is not directly based upon reliance on the prom-
ise - it makes the promise binding in any event, and regardless of
whether there has been any reliance. 250 But an important qualifi-
cation, set forth in section 84(2), is based upon reliance. Section
84(2) goes on to provide that the waiver (if not otherwise enforcea-
ble, apart from the operation of § 84) can be revoked, and the con-
dition reinstated, if there is timely notice, and if
(a) the notification is received while there is still a reason-
able time to cause the condition to occur under the
antecedent terms or an extension given by the prom-
isor; and
(b) reinstatement of the requirement of the condition is
not unjust because of a material change of position by
the promisee.... 251
At this point, Section 84 becomes another reliance-based recovery,
for the section can be reformulated to provide that a promise to
perform a duty in spite of the non-occurrence of a condition is
enforceable (and irrevocable) if certain requirements of promis-
sory estoppel are met. These requirements are: (1) there must be
a promise, (2) the promise must be to perform all or part of a con-
ditional duty in spite of the non-occurrence of the condition (pro-
vided that the occurrence of the condition is neither a material
part of the agreed exchange nor a risk assumed by the promisor),
(3) there must be insufficient time to cause the condition to occur
under the antecedent terms or under an extension, (4) there must
be a material change of position by the promisee, and (5) justice
must require enforcement.
Waivers: Promissory Estoppel in North Dakota. North Dakota
appears to have no retrievable case squarely on point, but there is
at least one case which approaches the issue. In Russell v. Bank of
252Kirkwood Plaza, a party interested in a loan commitment
249. Id. §84(l).
250. "... [the rule of 84(1)] can be thought of in terms of waiver of a defense not
addressed to the merits, and rests in large part on the policies against forfeiture and unjust
enrichment." Id., § 84 comment (a). However, where the waiver is made while there is still
time for the condition to occur, the waiver "may induce nonoccurrence of the condition,
and enforcement may also rest on reliance .... " Id. Likewise, the commentary to § 84
notes that when the waiver is "reinforced by reliance, enforcement is often said to rest on
,estoppel.' " Id. § 84, comment (b) (referencing §§ 89 and 90 of the Restatement).
251. Rul§ 84(2).252. Russell v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 386 N.W.2d 892 (N.D. 1986).
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alleged that the Bank had breached its promise to loan money.2 5 3
The Bank had refused to fund the loan because not all of the con-
ditions to its obligation had occurred.25 4 Had the Bank made any
promise to waive the non-occurrence of any of the conditions to its
obligation, had the putative borrower relied upon any such prom-
ise, and had the case turned on any of those events, this could have
been an instance for the court to determine whether to adopt sec-
tion 84(2) promissory estoppel. But the Bank made no such prom-
ise, the borrower relied on nothing more than the hoped-for loan
itself, and the reliance of the interested third party simply took the
form of its undertaking to cause the occurrence of some of the con-
ditions which were within its control, but which it would have
done independently of the promise.25 5 The case is, therefore, not
an example of promissory estoppel being asserted to waive the
non-occurrence of a condition.25 6
Discharges
Discharges: Promissory Estoppel in the Restatement. Consen-
sual discharges of a duty may take any number of forms. Some of
the more familiar instances (and terminology) of discharge are: dis-
charge by substituted performance, accord, agreement of rescis-
sion, release, and contract not to sue.25 7 In all these instances, and
however termed, a promise to discharge a duty is still a promise.
Whether it is presumptively enforceable depends on whether the
promise is accompanied by consideration. Section 273 of the
253. Id. at 89394. Kirkwood Bank's loan commitment was made to a partnership, East
Plaza, which had already recovered against the bank, based upon the bank's anticipatory
repudiation of the loan commitment. Glatt v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 383 N.W.2d 473,
479 (N.D. 1986). For a detailed discussion of the Russell case, see supra notes 16177 and
accompanying text.
254. Id. at 479.
255. Russell, 386 N.W.2d at 893. See supra notes 16169 and accompanying text.
256. This is, perhaps, an indication of the desirability of using, not the general
formulation of § 90, but rather the specific formulation which relates to the specific context
at issue. Had there been an attempt to enforce a promise in the face of the nonoccurrence
of a condition, it would have been important to invoke the analysis suggested by § 84(2)
instead of § 90. Section 84(2), relating to the enforceability of unbargained for promises to
waive conditions, forces the promisee to point to a promise to perform in spite of the non-
occurrence of the condition, and forces the promisee to demonstrate its reliance on that
promise. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 84(2). An unfocused section 90 analysis,
in contrast, may permit a more vacuous and nonsensical argument over the conditioned
promise itself, as if that sort of reliance-as-wistful-thinking were sufficient to deprive
another party of the condition it was entitled to rely upon. See generally, Russell, 386
N.W.2d at 897. The prior finding that the Bank had breached by anticipatory repudiation
took the failure of conditions out of the case, and the court was careful not to fall into that
trap, but its section 90 analysis, coupled with its willingness to grant plaintiff's assumption
concerning the existence of a promise (which must be the promise, irrelevant in this
context, to fund the loan) apart from a repudiation and apart from a promise waiving a
condition could, if not carefully understood, lead to disastrous results in less sure hands. Id.
257. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, ch. 12, Topic 1, Introductory note.
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Restatement (Second) both states the presumptive rule, and pro-
vides a particular adaptation of the reliance basis for enforcement.
Section 273 provides that:
... an obligee's manifestation of assent to a discharge is
not effective unless
(a) it is made for consideration,
(b) it is made in circumstances in which a promise would
be enforceable without consideration, or
(c) it has induced such action or forbearance as would
make a promise enforceable.25 8
Here is yet another application of the reliance basis for enforcing a
promise.
Discharges: Responses Outside of Promissory Estoppel. It is
not necessary to find a promissory estoppel basis of recovery of the
sort exemplified by § 273(c) of the Restatement (Second) in order
to fashion a recovery for the promisee. As in the case of promises
modifying a preexisting duty, the presumptive rule itself fre-
quently has been rejected.25 9
The North Dakota Century Code does away with the require-
ment of consideration in the case of promises discharging existing
duties, so long as the promise is in writing. 26 °
Discharges: Promissory Estoppel in North Dakota. There are
no retrievable opinions of the North Dakota Supreme Court
involving discharges in the context of promissory estoppel.
Observations Concerning Modifications, Waivers and Discharges
All of these circumstances, modifications, waivers, and dis-
charges of all kinds, have conspired together to create a bewilder-
ing array of rule and counter rule in their relationship to the
presumptive rule that promises made in the absence of considera-
258. Id. § 273.
259. The other responses are those of recharacterization (of fact) or reanalysis (of law).
See supra notes 5356 and accompanying text. In the context of the promise discharging a
preexisting duty, the recharacterization approach is typified by the search for some basis for
finding that the duty is either unliquidated or disputed (and so may be the subject of a
compromise) or for some way of finding something, however slight, that might constitute a
bargain for the release. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 273.
260. Again, the term "Century Code" is used to contrast it to the Field Code. The
relevant Century Code provision was introduced into the 1877 version of the North Dakota
statutes, and it is contrary to the corresponding provision in the Field Code. Compare,
§ 741 of the Field Code with § 9-13-01 of the Century Code:
(Field Code) § 741. An obligation is extinguished by a release therefrom
given to the debtor by the creditor, upon a new consideration, or under seal.
(Century Code) § 9-13-01. An obligation is extinguished by a release
therefrom given to the debtor by the creditor upon a new consideration, or if the
release is in writing, with or without a new consideration (emphasis added).
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tion are unenforceable. Indeed, the multiplication of names alone
gives evidence of the fecundity with which problems are deliv-
ered in these contexts. As if it would be too easy simply to ask,
'where is the consideration?' the issue is framed in terms of a 'pre-
existing legal duty rule' when the promise in question is a promise
to modify a duty, and in terms of a 'waiver' of a 'right,' when the
issue is actually the enforceability of a promise to excuse the non-
occurrence of a condition. Moreover, the issue is framed in terms
of 'executory accord,' when the issue is actually the enforceability
of a promise to accept a different performance in discharge of an
existing duty. In a certain sense, it would have been, indeed, too
easy simply to ask 'where is the consideration,' for at least some
promises of the sort described here have long been en forced with-
out consideration. Further, these promises have been enforced
without bargained-for consideration long before there was a sec-
tion 90 explanation for enforcement. Thus, asking the question
might have risked upsetting the attempts to explain the result, for
it would force attention upon the answer 'there isn't any bar-
gained-for consideration.'
These cases are generally difficult to reconcile. In order both
to hold that a particular promise was enforceable and, at the same
time, to hold, in general, that a promise requires consideration,
some of the older (pre-restatement) cases in which the promise
was enforced frequently seemed to stretch both fact and law (or,
perhaps, the older definitions of consideration did not require
quite the same bargain element as the modern ones do, and so did
not require stretching); other cases represented fairly straight-for-
ward and orthodox interpretations of fact and law where the
promise is not enforced; and other cases simply seemed to assume
away the general problem by declaring special rules applicable to
particular kinds of promises.
Thus, the school cases seem to stand for the propositions that
modifications are frequently not enforced, but may be, and, when
such promises are enforced, it is sometimes by an unexpected
interpretation of the facts that permits a conclusion that there
actually was consideration. In cases involving waivers, it seemed
as though the solution sometimes was simply to refuse to conceive
of the problem as being one that involved the absence of consider-
ation, but rather to assume there was a separate legal compart-
ment for 'waivers.' 26 ' Likewise, discharges created further
261. This is hard to do, however, in light of J. EWART, Waiver Distributed Among the
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opportunities to elect to treat the several problems as though
inhabiting several separate departments, in none of which the
ordinary rules seemed to apply in quite the same way. Moreover,
these cases are generally not related to one another when studied,
and the court decisions generally manifest the same lack of
relationship.
The Restatement can provide a unifying approach to the real-
ity of these cases. The reality, of course, is that many promissory
modifications, waivers and discharges were enforced in the
absence of consideration, and were so enforced prior to the pro-
mulgation of section 90 of the original Restatement. The original
section 90 was intended to apply to such promises, and it is clear
that several sections of the Restatement (Second) apply specifically
to those promises.
B. RELIANCE IN THE ABSENCE OF ASSENT
General. Three subcategories of reliance in the absence of
assent are anticipated by the Restatement (Second). The first two
categories relate to instances in which assent is lacking for want of
acceptance. The third category has to do with circumstances in
which assent is lacking due to the failure of negotiations or to
insufficient definiteness in the promise. The subcategories are as
follows: (1) reliance, prior to acceptance, on a promise taking the
form of an offer that seeks acceptance by performance, (2) reli-
ance, prior to acceptance, on a promise taking the form of an offer
that seeks acceptance by promise, and (3) reliance, prior to com-
pletion of negotiations, upon a promise not yet made; or reliance
upon a promise too indefinite for intelligible enforcement. 262
There is no case in which the North Dakota Supreme Court
has awarded a recovery because of reliance upon a promise in any
of these categories. There have been no cases of the first category
in North Dakota. However, in one case arguably within the sec-
ond category, and in at least three cases in the third category, the
North Dakota Supreme Court has denied recovery, though assum-
ing the existence of a reliance-based rule. Because many of the
cases of denied recovery in the third category arose on fact pat-
Departments Election, Estoppel, Contract, Release (1917), cited in E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS, 561 n.3 (1982).
262. See supra notes 44 and 70 and accompanying text. The relevant Restatement's
provisions are §§ 45 (creation of an option contract by beginning performance), 87(2)
(reliance on an offer prior to acceptance) and 90 (as applied to reliance on negotiations or on
promises too indefinite to be intelligible). RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, §§ 45, 87(2)
and illustrations 8 and 10 to § 90.
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terns that would appear to be at least as compelling as any which
the Restatement ever contemplated, it is hard to resist the conclu-
sion that the court has, in fact, consistently and decisively rejected
the application of promissory estoppel to (at least) the third cate-
gory of "reliance in the absence of assent" cases - the ones in
which negotiations fail or in which the promise is insufficiently
definite.
Before discussing reliance in the absence of assent, it would be
helpful to review briefly the implications of the Restatement's
position that assent must be manifested before a bargain will be
enforced.
Formulation of the Rule (Assent). The Restatement provides,
subject to special rules, including the rule set forth in section 90,
that the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there
is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange; manifestation
of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each party either
make a promise or begin or render a performance; and the mani-
festation of mutual assent ordinarily takes the form of an offer or
proposal by one party followed by acceptance by the other
party. 263 In addition, the Restatement recognizes the difference
between an intent to enter into a contract and the intention to
begin negotiations, and it also recognizes the need for some
degree of certainty. 26 4
Observations and School Cases (Mutual Assent). In order bet-
ter to understand the reliance issues in the context of mutual
assent, Professor Wormser's famous Brooklyn Bridge hypotheti-
cal265 and three illustrations based on well known cases will be dis-
cussed next. The illustrations are based upon Drennan v. Star
263. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, §§ 17(1), 17(2), 18, 22.
264. The Restatement provides that, "[e]ven though a manifestation of intention is
intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless
the terms of the contract are reasonably certain." Id. § 33(1). This rule reflects the
fundamental principle, expressed in § 1 of the Restatement, that a contract is a promise or
set of promises for breach of which there is a remedy, or which the law will recognize in
some way. Thus, "[i]f the essential terms are so uncertain that there is no basis for deciding
whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no contract." Id. § 33, comment
a.
This rule of certainty, coupled with the distinction between contract and precontract
negotiations, also reflects the fact that the omission of essential terms is often no accident,
but might, in a particular case "show that a manifestation of intention is not to be
understood as an offer or acceptance." Id. § 33(3). And this last observation is explained as
a particular example of the rule stated in § 26 of the Restatement concerning preliminary
negotiations ("a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the
person to whom it is addressed knows . . . that the person making it does not intend to
conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent") - and so, "the
more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a
binding agreement." Id. § 33, comment c.
265. Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136 (1916).
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Paving,266 decided by Justice Traynor, and the enigmatic impact
cases, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,267 and Goodman v.
Dicker.268
First, the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical will be discussed. Pro-
fessor Wormser put the hypothetical this way:
Suppose A says to B, "I will give you $100 if you walk
across the Brooklyn Bridge," and B walks - is there a
contract? It is clear that A is not asking B for B's promise
to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge. What A wants from B
is the act of walking across the bridge. When B has
walked across the bridge there is a contract, and A is then
bound to pay B $100... A has bartered away his volition
for B's act of walking across the Brooklyn Bridge.26 9
So far, so good, but the matter can become difficult for B. If A
is not asking for B's promise, but is asking for her performance,
then A is making an offer that seeks acceptance by performance.
In circumstances like the one given, performance cannot be
accomplished instantly, but must extend over time. Therefore,
and in the nature of the transaction, B must, in some sense, rely
upon the offer even as she begins the act which, when completed,
will constitute the acceptance. She cannot avoid relying upon the
offer prior to having accepted it. What if A should revoke the
offer, after B has relied by beginning the walk, but before B has
accepted by completing the walk? 27 °
Next is an illustration taken from the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, based upon the well known case, Drennan v. Star Pav-
ing.27' The illustration is as follows:
A submits a written offer for paving work to be used by B
as a partial basis for B's bid as general contractor on a
large building. As A knows, B is required to name his sub-
contractors in his general bid. B uses A's offer and B's bid
is accepted. 2
266. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
267. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wisc. 1965).
268. Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
269. Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 136
(1916).
270. This is the standard problem which illustrates the first subcategory of reliance in
the absence of mutual assent. The Restatement's solution, providing for a recovery based
on recharacterization of the facts and reanalysis of the law, is discussed infra at notes 289-93
and accompanying text.
271. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
272. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 87, illustration 6.
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The question is whether A is bound. The difficulty in answering
the question can be better understood by making explicit those
additional hypothetical facts assumed by the illustration. To make
the illustration meaningful, it must be assumed that A's promise to
B (a promise in the form of an offer, as "I will do the paving work
for $10,000") is an offer that sought acceptance by a promise - as
by understanding that A must be taken to have manifested an
intention to this effect: "I will do the paving work for $10,000 if
you will award me the sub-contract'; and understanding further
that the expression 'if you will award me the sub-contract" means
that A insists that B must promise to award the sub-contract to A.
On such assumptions as these, B's difficulty becomes apparent.
B has relied upon A's promise by incorporating A's bid into B's
own, but A's promise is an offer seeking acceptance by return
promise, and B has not, on the face of it, given any sort of return
promise. Therefore, like the promisee in the Brooklyn Bridge
hypothetical, B has relied upon an offer prior to having accepted
it. But, unlike the promisee in the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical,
who had to walk across the bridge in order to accept the promise
there, and so faced an unavoidable risk, B could, conceivably, have
accepted instantly and so avoided any risk of reliance prior to
acceptance.2 7 3 The Restatement's response to this problem is to
273. Unlike the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical, there is nothing built into this situation
which makes it impossible for B to be immediately protected. The mailbox rule is adopted
to the purpose of establishing in the offeree a power immediately to conclude a contract
simply by dispatching an acceptance prior to relying upon the offer. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT SECOND supra note 3, § 63. There may, however, be pragmatic reasons that
militate against B's taking advantage of the protection which is available: If B is rushing to
evaluate many subbidders on any one subcontract, several of whom may have offered
variations on the specifications, or may have combined jobs so as to make direct price
comparisons difficult, multiplied over many subcontracts, then B may be fortunate simply
to put a general bid together in time to submit it - B might assume that the time necessary
to forward acceptances to each of the subbidders is time B doesn't have. B then has the
argument that, in some circumstances at least, B stands, as a practical matter, on the same
footing as the Brooklyn Bridge offeree, as one who must rely prior to acceptance.
There may be other practical reasons that militate against B's taking advantage of the
protection that is available: if B does accept, without condition, then, B runs the risk of
having bound itself to the subs even if B's bid is not accepted by the owner; but if B accepts,
subject to the condition that the owner award the project to B, and that condition were not
part of the offer, then, B runs the risk of having made a purported acceptance which varies
the offer made by the subs, and risks the possibility that B has rejected the subs' offers - B
might suppose that the care necessary on the part of B's lawyer (B, is, after all, the one who
is soliciting the subs' offers and could, therefore, have a hand in determining what those
offers will look like), or the expense involved in retaining a lawyer, to design the transaction
such that the subs will submit offers conditional upon the award of the job is so difficult as to
put B, again, on the same practical footing as the Brooklyn Bridge walker.
There may be yet other reasons, based upon B's calculation of B's own advantage, for B
to purposely decline to accept the bids. See, E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 184 n. 34 (1982)
(discussing, Schulz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construction
Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 237, 256-82, and p. 285 n. 3 (1952) (to the effect that general
contractors prefer not to be bound themselves, and so prefer not to bind the subs, because
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suggest that promissory estoppel is available to B.274
Finally, the problem of reliance on promises that were never
made, or were not made with sufficient clarity is set forth in two
illustrations to the Restatement (Second), one of which is based
upon the notorious case, Goodman v. Dicker,275 and the other of
which is based upon Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.2 7 6
Here is the illustration based upon Goodman:
A applies to B, a distributor of radios manufactured by C,
for a "dealer franchise" to sell C's products. Such
franchises are revocable at will. B erroneously informs A
that C has accepted the application and will soon award
the franchise, that A can proceed to employ sales[persons]
and solicit orders, and that A will receive an initial deliv-
ery of 30 radios. 7
A expends $1,150 in preparing to do business, but does not receive
the franchise or any radios. A's recovery against B is a problem,
for A has acted in reliance upon B's statement concerning a prom-
ise that C never made. A's difficulty is compounded by the fact
that, even had C made the promise, the promise's value is indefi-
nite and problematic, since the franchise purports to be revocable
at will. In addition, A's difficulty is redoubled because B (not C,
from whom the franchise would be granted) is the one with whom
A had dealt, and because B's misrepresentation is presumed to be
an innocent one.2 7 8
they would rather be in a position to reshop the subbids after having been awarded the
main contract, and suggesting, further, that the law's efforts to create an option contract in
favor of the general contractor only reinforces the existing imbalance in favor of the
general contractor, and that it would be better for the law to leave the situation alone by
leaving the bids as revocable offers).
274. This is the standard problem which illustrates the second subcategory of reliance
in the absence of mutual assent. The Restatement's solution, providing for a promissory
estoppel response, is discussed infra at notes 295-305 and accompanying text.
275. Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
276. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wisc. 1965).
277. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 90, illustration 8.
278. It might be conjectured that A could assert against B (a) some action sounding in
misrepresentation, or (b) some action based upon an equitable estoppel.
Some difficulties that stand in the way of those actions are these: actionable fraudulent
misrepresentation, as traditionally given, requires that there be some showing of "fraud"
(scienter). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977). Negligent
misrepresentation requires that there be some showing that the maker of the statement did
so in the course of his business, or in some other transaction in which he had a pecuniary
interest. See id. § 552. Innocent misrepresentation is confined to certain narrow categories
of cases involving sales, rentals or exchanges. Id. § 552C. While it is true that an innocent
misrepresentation of a material fact is sufficient to rescind a contract, see RESTATEMENT
SECOND, supra note 3, § 164, it is clear that A is seeking to enforce, not to rescind, a
promise, and so would take no comfort from rescission.
As to equitable estoppel, it is sometimes said that it "can block, but it cannot create. It
is a barricade.., not a bulldozer." Madgett v. Monroe County Mutual Tornado Ins. Co.,
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Here is the illustration based upon Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc.:
A, who owns and operates a bakery, desires to go into the
grocery business. He approaches B, a franchisor of super-
markets. B states to A that for $18,000 B will establish A
in a store. B also advises A to move to another town and
buy a small grocery to gain experience. A does so. Later
B advises A to sell the grocery, which A does, taking a
capital loss and foregoing expected profits from the sum-
mer tourist trade. B also advises A to sell his bakery to
raise capital for the supermarket franchise, saying "every-
thing is ready to go. Get your money together and we are
set." A sells the bakery taking a capital loss on this sale as
well. Still later, B tells A that considerably more than an
$18,000 investment will be needed, and the negotiations
between the parties collapse. At the point of collapse
many details of the proposed agreement between the
parties are unresolved ......7
The problem of fashioning a recovery for A is made clear
when we examine the "many details" unresolved at the point of
collapse. Assume, for example, that the A and B of the illustration
were contemplating the same sort of details that Hoffman and Red
Owl Stores, Inc. had actually contemplated. Accordingly, assume
A and B contemplated that A (Hoffman) would find some third
party to purchase land, build a supermarket on it, and lease the
building to A on a 10-year lease, with an option in A to renew the
lease or purchase the building at the conclusion of the term; and
that the terms of that sale and lease back were far from final-
ized.28° Thus, it can be assumed that A has relied upon a promise
relating to a franchised supermarket in the absence of such terms
as the size, cost, design and layout of the supermarket building;
and the absence of leasehold terms (by which A would lease the as
yet unspecified and unbuilt supermarket building) such as rent,
maintenance, renewal and purchase options.28 1 All this is in addi-
tion to any unresolved matters between A and B relating to the
terms of the franchise agreement under which A would operate
176 N.W.2d 314 (Wisc. 1970), cited in E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS, 784 (4th ed. 1988). Thus, according to this view, equitable
estoppel would help A, if B were suing A, but would not be of any use in the case given. See
infra note 354 and accompanying text.
279. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 90, illustration 10.
280. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Wisc. 1965).
281. Id.
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the, as yet, nonexistent supermarket. Moreover, all this is in addi-
tion to the problem of identifying a promise which B actually
made to A in a form that invited acceptance.28 2
The Restatement solutions to three types of reliance in the
absence of assent, and a discussion of the North Dakota cases
which address those problems, follows.
1. Offeror Wanted Acceptance by Performance; Offeree
Relied Without Accepting (the Brooklyn Bridge
Problem)
In the Brooklyn Bridge problem, B, the walker, relied upon a
promise which took the form of an offer and acted to her detri-
ment prior to accepting the offer.2 83 It is reliance, therefore, in
the absence of assent, and in violation of the presumptive rule
which requires that there be a manifestation of mutual assent
before a promise will be enforced. There is a promissory estoppel
solution, but it is one which is frequently invoked too soon.284 The
promissory estoppel solution consists in section 90 itself (which, in
its generality, nowhere says that it applies only to promises unen-
forceable because lacking consideration), and in a specialized
estoppel provision, section 87(2) of the Restatement (Second). But
since the real development in this area of contract law has been
outside of promissory estoppel, following the responses of
recharacterization and reanalysis,285 those responses will be dis-
cussed first. It will be seen that there is very little, if anything, left
to be done by way of promissory estoppel.
No Acceptance (Offeror Wanted a Performance): Responses
Outside of Promissory Estoppel. Professor Wormser's further
elaboration 28 6 of the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical developed this
way:
Let us suppose that B starts to walk across the Brooklyn
282. Can it be that B promises A "I will give you a franchise, if you produce $18,000,
even if you have no supermarket in which to run the franchised operation?" Goodman v.
Dicker and Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. are the standard problem cases which illustrate
the third subcategory of reliance in the absence of mutual assent. The Restatement's
promissory estoppel solution to Goodman and Red Owl is discussed infra in notes 319-24
and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
284. Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90, illustration 3 (a promissory estoppel
solution to this kind of problem) with RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 45 (a
reanalysis approach).
285. Recharacterization and reanalysis are among the classic responses to the reliance
problem. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text, which set out the Brooklyn Bridge
problem.
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Bridge and has gone about one-half of the way across. At
that moment A overtakes B and says to [her], "I withdraw
my offer." Has B any rights against A?
What A wanted from B, what A asked for, was the act of
walking across the bridge. Until that was done, B had not
given to A what A had requested. The acceptance by B of
A's offer could be nothing but the act on B's part of cross-
ing the bridge. It is elementary that an offeror may with-
draw his offer until it has been accepted. It follows
logically that A is perfectly within his rights in withdraw-
ing his offer before B has accepted it by walking across
the bridge - the act contemplated by the offeror and the
offeree as the acceptance of the offer. A did not want B to
walk halfway across or three-quarters of the way across
the bridge. What A wanted from B, and what A asked for
from B, was a certain and entire act. B understood this.
It was for the act that A was willing to barter his volition
with regard to $100. B understood this also. Until this act
is done, therefore, A is not bound, since no contract arises
until the completion of the act called for.287
This is an "either/or" response, rejecting promissory estoppel, and
reinforcing the presumptive rule.288 It is possible, however, that B
might win either by recharacterization of the facts or by reanalysis
of the law. Foreshadowing the sections which are relevant in the
Restatement (Second), the recharacterization approach turns upon
sections 30 and 32, and the reanalysis approach turns upon section
45(2).
B can win through recharacterization by our tampering with
the hypothetical just enough so as to be able to deny the premise
that A was seeking the act. If we can replace that premise with
the premise that A was, after all, 'really' seeking B's promise to
walk across the bridge or, at the least, was unclear about whether
it was the act or the promise which A sought, thereby giving B the
choice of taking it either way, and then imply from the circum-
287. Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE LJ. 136, 137
(1916) (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
288. Although Professor Wormser was subsequently to embrace the position of the
Restatement (Second) and so came to repent "clad in sackcloth" the views here expressed,
he did here advance the classic (and, on its terms, unanswerable) general articulation and
defense of the "either/or" response. It is, he said, accompanied by "no injustice
whatsoever," and is "logical in theory, simple in application, and just in result. " Id. at 142
(emphasis in original). For the repentance see supra note 273.
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stances that B 'really' made a promise to cross the bridge by begin-
ning the walk with knowledge of the offer; then, on the strength of
those 'interpretations,' we have solved the problem by assuming it
out of existence - we have recharacterized the given offer into a
different one. While sections 30 and 32 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) clearly provide the tools which can, in the appropriate case,
accomplish a recharacterization 219 in which at least some person
such as 'B' might win by recharacterization of the problem, this is
a limited solution because it is ultimately fact based and thus, ulti-
mately, constrained by the facts.
If all or substantially all of the relying promisees in the posi-
tion of the Brooklyn Bridge walker are to recover, a more impor-
tant tool will be that of reanalysis, which the Restatement
provides by way of section 45. Section 45 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts provides that:
289. It should be observed that there is, of course, a difference between hypotheticals
and real cases. The usefulness of hypotheticals consists precisely in their determination (it is
simply given that A seeks a performance; having so determined, and thus fixed, an
otherwise slippery matter of fact, we can now concentrate on what consequences follow
from it) and in their malleability (having exhausted the possible consequences from having
taken one premise, we are now completely free to take another). As Williston proposed, "I
will give you any circumstances that you want." Debate on Section 90, supra note 64, at
223). The exercise of shifting from one hypothetical premise to another has the collateral
benefit of suggesting how slight the factual distinctions between the two premises might be,
and suggesting how just the slightest difference in an actual set of facts might permit that
shift of premises. Actual cases, of course, are constrained by their facts. But, if there is a fair
reading of the facts which would support a recharacterization of the problem, the
Restatement certainly provides the means to this sort of solution.
Under the methodology of the Restatement (Second), the path proceeds, in two steps:
(a) does the offer really seek acceptance by performance, or is it, instead, either an offer
which seeks acceptance by a promise or one that is unclear as to the mode of acceptance -
thus, instead of saying that A insisted upon the crossing of the bridge, can we say that A
might have been satisfied with a promise to cross? See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note
3, § 30(2) ("[u]nless otherwise indicated by language or the circumstances, an offer invites
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances");
RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 32 ("[iun case of doubt an offer is interpreted as
inviting the offeree to accept either by promising to perform what the offer requests or by
rendering the performance, as the offeree chooses"), and (b) if the offer does permit
acceptance by either a promise or performance, what is the effect of part performance -
can the beginning of a performance constitute a promise? See RESTATEMENT SECOND,
supra note 3, § 62 ("[w]here an offer invites an offeree to choose between acceptance by
promise and acceptance by performance, the tender or beginning of the invited
performance or a tender of the beginning of it is an acceptance by performance .... Such
an acceptance operates as a promise to render complete performance.") If it should be that
the offer permitted acceptance only by a promise, then § 62 of the Restatement is
unavailable, but § 19 is available. Section 19 provides that conduct may be taken as a
manifestation of assent, and so provides the authority, if any be needed, from which to infer
from the commencement of B's walk a promise to cross over, which is the promise that
serves as acceptance of the offer.
If it should be determined after all reasonable efforts have been made to interpret the
offer, that the offer permitted acceptance only by the performance, then we have
exhausted the possibilities of relief to B under the recharacterization approach. In such an
event, B's non-promissory estoppel recovery will be under the reanalysis approach (§ 45 of
the Restatement), if at all.
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(1) Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by render-
ing a performance and does not invite a promissory
acceptance, an option contract is created when the
offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or
tenders a beginning of it.
(2) The offeror's duty of performance under an option
contract so created is conditional on completion or
tender of the invited performance in accordance with
the terms of the offer.2 90
There are three things to be noticed about this formulation.
First, it is fashioned so as to be applicable only to the 'hard'
Brooklyn Bridge type of case, the case in which it is finally, and
inescapably determined that the offer sought acceptance by per-
formance, and in no other way.29 '
Second, this formulation is not, strictly speaking, a reliance
based recovery at all for it is not a recovery predicated directly
upon the promisee's reliance on the offer in the absence of accept-
ance. Instead, though there is recovery, the formulation is by way
of three steps: [1] construction of language and other circum-
stances, leading to the conclusion that there is [2] an option con-
tract, which [3] can be accepted, and is accepted, by the beginning
of performance. Such precision in analysis avoids the difficult
question of why any person, though reasonably expecting another
to rely upon a promise (that is, the promise taking the form of an
offer seeking performance), can nevertheless be bound in spite of
the qualification, known to both parties, that the promise is not
binding unless accepted.292 But, such precision aside, the impres-
sion remains that the effect of these pyrotechnics is a promise
which certainly looks as if it were enforced because, if only in the
290. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 45.
291. The other, "easier" Brooklyn Bridge type of cases - the ones that can be disposed
of by recharacterization of the offer as seeking either promissory acceptance or only
promissory acceptance, and recharacterizing the commencement of performance as
constituting a promise - might be disposed of without recourse to § 45 analysis. See supra
note 289.
292. This is the question that a promissory estoppel recovery would, presumably, be
required to answer, insofar as it would permit a recovery only where the promisor could
reasonably expect reliance, which seems clearly to be the case, and then only if injustice
would otherwise result, which is not so clearly the case. The unrepentant views of Professor
Wormser, before he recanted, and as expressed in his 1916 article, argue forcefully for the
conclusion that there is no injustice in denying a recovery. See supra note 269. He
repented "in sackcloth," but still based upon a § 45-style reanalysis, in 1950. Wormser,
Book Review, 3 J. LEGAL ED. 145, 146 (1950). The comments to § 45 of the original
Restatement make it clear that the recovery need not be based on promissory estoppel, but
can be based upon the "subsidiary promise, necessarily implied" in respect of which part
performance or tender may furnish consideration. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3,
§ 45 comment b.
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sense of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, of the reliance on it. There-
fore, the discussion properly belongs here, since it is, at least, a
doctrine which is closely related to, yet outside of, the promissory
estoppel doctrines that we are exploring.
Finally, section 45 only reaches the case where there has been
some beginning of the requested performance. It does not apply
where there has been nothing other than a preparation to per-
form, and so does not cover the case of the promisee who has not
yet commenced or tendered the commencement of actual per-
formance. In the Brooklyn Bridge case, some of the relevant
stages in the promisee's acts are (a) the stage at which B has com-
pleted the crossing and reaches the other side (which is accept-
ance of the offer under any view), (b) any intervening stage,
beginning after B takes the first step onto the bridge, and short of
completion of the crossing (which is commencement of the per-
formance, and grounds for a certain type of relief under the
approach of section 45), and (c) any preliminary stage short of tak-
ing the first step, such as getting to the bridge, or buying a pair of
sturdy walking shoes (which is only a preparation to perform, not
performance itself nor a commencement of performance).
Accordingly, the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical where A says
to B, "I will give you $100 if you walk across the Brooklyn Bridge,"
is solved under section 45 as follows: (1) A is properly understood
to have made two, several, promises to B. Of the two promises,
one, the 'main' promise, 'I will give you $100 if you walk across the
Brooklyn Bridge,' was expressed in so many words, and the other,
a 'subsidiary' promise, 'If you seasonably begin and diligently con-
tinue the walk, I will leave the main promise open for a reasonable
period of time in order that you might complete the walk and so
be able to accept the main promise,' was implicit in the facts and
circumstances. (2) The subsidiary promise is an option promise,
since it is one which promises to leave an offer (the main promise)
open. If, as is the case here, the option promise is one that seeks
acceptance by bargained for performance, it is an option promise
supported by consideration, and is one that will be binding upon
acceptance. (3) The subsidiary, option promise can be, and is,
accepted when B takes the first step which begins the walk, since
that is precisely the action bargained for. As a result, there is a
binding option (an option contract) to keep the main offer open. B
has, to be sure, not yet accepted the main offer because the com-
pletion of performance is still that which was bargained for under
the main offer; but B does now have a reasonable period of time to
390 [Vol. 66:317
1990] PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN NORTH DAKOTA 391
complete that performance, and A is no longer privileged to
revoke the main offer while B is half-way across the bridge.
B is thereby protected, without doing violence to any of the
presumptive rules, and without recourse to promissory estoppel.
Further, it certainly seems that, in the great run of the cases,293
neither A nor B would disagree with the result. If there should be
any such instance where A should disagree, there appears to be no
reason why A should be disabled, as a matter of law, from making
it clear to B when making the offer that there is, in fact, no option
contract being offered here. By switching the burden to A to dis-
claim the existence of the subsidiary option promise, and by imply-
ing such a promise in all other cases, it would seem that substantial
justice is done, and is done in accordance with the intentions of the
parties.
No Acceptance (Offeror Wanted a Performance): Promissory
Estoppel in the Restatement. Had B not taken the first step across
the bridge, but had merely incurred costs in preparation to do so,
as by buying a plane ticket from Bismark, North Dakota, to New
York, then the case becomes one which cannot be solved in B's
favor outside of promissory estoppel by section 45 alone. In this
event, the question becomes whether a reliance based rule, like
that of section 90, can provide the basis of a recovery. The
Restatement contemplates an affirmative answer, and puts it in a
separate section, section 87(2), which provides that:
(2) An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a substantial character
on the part of the offeree before acceptance and
which does induce such action or forbearance is bind-
ing as an option contract to the extent necessary to
avoid injustice.294
Only at this point, and for the residuum of cases, if any, that
remain unsolved after having first exhausted the methods of
recharacterization per sections 30 and 32, and of building an
option contract by reanalysis per section 45, does a reliance-based
rule relevant to reliance upon an offer that sought acceptance by
293. It is, in fact, hard to imagine that there is any "great run" of cases of this type -
which paucity of cases may, have accounted for the longevity of Professor Wormser's
hypothetical. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 3.24, at 181 (1982).
294. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 87(2). The commentary observes that this
subsection "states that application of § 90 to reliance on an unaccepted offer, with
qualifications which would not be appropriate in some other types of cases covered by § 90.
It is important chiefly in cases of reliance that is not part performance." Id. § 87 comment
e.
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performance need to be considered. Upon analysis, the elements
to a section 87(2) recovery are these: (1) there must be a promise
which takes the form of an offer, (2) the offeror must reasonably
expect action or forbearance before acceptance, (3) the action or
forbearance must be of a substantial character, (4) the offer must
induce the expected action or forbearance, (5) justice must require
enforcement of some option contract, with the scope to vary as
justice requires.
Under the reliance based rule of section 87(2), persons in the
position of the Brooklyn Bridge pre-walker, the one who buys the
walking shoes, but does not take a step prior to revocation of the
offer, might win in some cases, and might lose in other cases under
an analysis whose application would turn, in light of the particular
facts in every case, upon whether there was a 'reasonable expecta-
tion' that offeror would have expected the pre-walker to rely on
the offer in that way, whether the reliance was 'definite or substan-
tial,' and whether 'injustice would result' if the offer were not
enforced, at least to some extent.
No Acceptance (Offeror Wanted a Performance): Promissory
Estoppel in North Dakota. There are no retrievable opinions of
the North Dakota Supreme Court involving a promissory estoppel
response to this sort of reliance.
2. Offeror Wanted Acceptance by Promise; Offeree Relied
Without Accepting (the Drennan Problem)
The reliance in Drennan 295 is the type that occurs in relying
upon a promise which takes the form of an offer, by acting to one's
detriment prior to accepting the offer. It is reliance, therefore, in
the absence of assent, and in violation of the presumptive rule
which requires that there be a manifestation of mutual assent
before a promise will be enforced. The difference between this
case and the Brooklyn Bridge case is that, here, the prom-
isor/offeror wanted acceptance by return promise; and a return
promise is something that, it would seem, the promisee/offeree is
perfectly able to give prior to relying on the promise/ offer. 296 As
in the Brooklyn Bridge situation, which is somewhat analogous, a
295. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
296. If the Brooklyn Bridge walker's situation is viewed in the light of necessity, it is
apparent that, where the acceptance is a completed action, and the action must extend
over time, the walker must, in the nature of things expose herself to the vulnerability of
reliance prior to acceptance. From this vantage, the Drennan offeree might seem much
less subject to necessity, and so, to a corresponding extent, much less in need of the law's
special solicitude on his behalf. See supra note 266.
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promissory estoppel solution is frequently introduced into discus-
sion too soon.297 Again, the promissory estoppel solution consists
in section 90 itself, which, in its generality, does not explicitly state
that it applies only to promises unenforceable because lacking con-
sideration, and in a specialized estoppel provision, section 87(2) of
the Restatement (Second).
Since the real development of the law in this context could
have, and should have, been done outside of promissory estoppel,
following the response of recharacterization and reanalysis,298
those responses will be discussed first. It will be seen that there
should be very little, if anything, left to be done by way of promis-
sory estoppel. However, Drennan itself was decided on the basis
of promissory estoppel, instead of on principles like those of sec-
tion 45 of the Restatement in which there is implied a subsidiary
promise of an option that can be accepted by performance.2 9
Indeed, it is likely that section 87(2), the specialized promissory
estoppel provision applicable to offers, owes its existence, in no
small measure, to Drennan.
No Acceptance (Offeror Wanted a Promise): Responses
Outside of Promissory Estoppel. To revert to the case that the
illustration is based upon, the Restatement's illustration will be
referred to as 'the Drennan hypothetical,' designating B, the gen-
eral contractor and promisee in the illustration, as 'Drennan,' and
designating A, the paving company and promisor in the illustra-
tion, as 'Star Paving.' To parallel the situation in the Brooklyn
Bridge hypothetical, and with apologies to Professor Wormser,
whose Brooklyn Bridge analysis is paraphrased here, it may be
truly said in this hypothetical version of Drennan that
What Star Paving wanted from Drennan, what Star Pav-
ing asked for, was the promise that Drennan would award
the job to Star. Until that was done, Drennan had not
given to Star Paving what Star had requested. The
acceptance by Drennan of Star's offer could be nothing
but the promise on Drennan's part that it would award
the job to Star. It is elementary that an offeror may with-
297. Cf. Bishop, The Subcontractor's Bid: An Option Contract Arising Through
Promissory Estoppel, 34 EMORY LAw J. 421 (1985) (pointing out the implied option
promise, but, insofar as it suggests that the option promise must be enforced because of
estoppel rather than the consideration which attaches upon the commencement of
performance, seeming to introduce estoppel where it may not be necessary).
298. Recharacterization and reanalysis are among the classic responses to the reliance
problem. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
299. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759-60 (Cal. 1958).
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draw its offer until it has been accepted. It follows logi-
cally that Star is perfectly within its rights in withdrawing
its offer before Drennan has accepted it by making a
promise to Star - the promise contemplated by the
offeror and the offeree as the acceptance of the offer. Star
did not [merely] want Drennan to use Star's bid, or to
incorporate it in Drennan's own bid. What Star wanted
from Drennan, and what Star asked for from Drennan,
was a definite and specific promise. Drennan understood
this. It was for this promise that Star was willing to barter
its volition with regard to promising to do the paving
work. Drennan understood this. Until Drennan's prom-
ise is given to Star, therefore, Star is not bound, since no
contract arises until the promise is given.
Like the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical, it is possible that Drennan,
the relying promisee in this hypothetical, might win either by
recharacterization of the facts or by reanalysis of the law.
Drennan can win through recharacterization by our tamper-
ing with the hypothetical just enough so as to be able to deny the
premise that Star Paving was seeking Drennan's return promise.
If we can replace that with the premise that Star was, after all,
'really' seeking Drennan's performance, either Drennan's act of
using Star's sub-bid in Drennan's own bid, or Drennan's act of
naming Star in Drennan's own bid or, at the least, if we can say
that Star was unclear about whether it was the promise or the act
which it sought, thereby giving Drennan the choice of taking it
either way; then, on the strength of this interpretation, it follows
that Drennan has rendered the performance sought by Star, and
has accepted the offer.
In the alternative, and still as a matter of recharacterization,
Drennan can win in a slightly different fashion. Holding on to so
much of the hypothetical as was premised on the assumption that
Star insisted upon a promise, we might tamper with the hypotheti-
cal just enough to imply from the circumstances that Drennan
'really' made the requested promise. If we can say that Drennan's
actions of using Star Paving's sub-bid in its own bid and naming
Star as the paving bidder might be fairly taken as implying a prom-
ise to award the subcontract to Star, then, on the strength of this
'interpretation,' we have solved the problem by assuming it out of
existence - we have recharacterized Drennan's response so as to
make it into a different one.
While providing the same tools that were available in solution
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to the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical, and which can, in the appro-
priate case, accomplish the same sort of recharacterization,300 the
Restatement's approach to the Drennan hypothetical differs from
its approach to the Brooklyn Bridge in that it does not here
reanalyze the situation.3 0 1 Instead, the Restatement recognizes
that at least one court has applied a promissory estoppel solution,
300. See supra note 289 and accompanying text, both for the application of this
method to a Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical, and for a discussion of the limits of the method,
which is ultimately constrained by the facts.
Under the methodology of the Restatement (Second), the Drennan path proceeds in
either of two ways: (a) assuming that the offer really seeks acceptance by promise, is there
any basis for saying that there was a return promise - that is, can Drennan's actions be
recharacterized so as to constitute a return promise? Section 19 provides that conduct may
be taken as a manifestation of assent, and so provides the authority, if any be needed, from
which to infer (if the inference can be made) from Drennan's use of Star's subbid a promise
on Drennan's part to award the subcontract to Star. Of course, if Drennan's action should
be found to constitute a promise, it will be necessary that Drennan communicate it to Star;
but the Restatement treats such notice, not as essential to acceptance, but as an event
which, should it fail to occur, will discharge the offeror's duty of performance. Id. § 56 ("it is
essential to an acceptance by promise.., that the offeree exercise reasonable diligence to
notify the offeror of acceptance..."). Id. § 56 comment a.
(b) On the assumption that Star's offer can be recharacterized as one which is either an
offer that seeks acceptance by a performance or one that is unclear as to the mode of
acceptance - on the assumption, that is, that instead of Star's insisting upon Drennan's
promise that it would award it the job, Star might have been satisfied with Drennan's mere
use of Star's subbid, coupled with designation of Star as the subbidder - hasn't there been
an acceptance by completion of the act? See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 30(2)
("[u]nless otherwise indicated by language or the circumstances, an offer invites acceptance
in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.") Id. § 32 ("[i]n case of
doubt an offer is interpreted as inviting the offeree to accept either by promising to
perform what the offer requests or by rendering the performance, as the offeree chooses").
If it should be determined after all reasonable efforts have been made to interpret the
manifestations of assent, that Drennan made no promise, and that Star did not bargain for
Drennan's use of Star's offer, then we have exhausted the possibilities of relief to Drennan
under these recharacterization approaches. In such an event, Drennan's recovery will be
under the promissory estoppel approach, if at all. As a matter of fact, the actual case
included explicit findings that there was no promise, and that Star didn't bargain for
Drennan's use of Star's offer; and in the actual case, Drennan did recover under the
approach now embodied in § 87(2) (which did not exist at the time), but which Drennan
articulated as an application of the general reliance recovery of § 90. Drennan, 333 P.2d at
760.
301. There should be, but is not yet, an express Restatement solution that corresponds
to § 45 (discussed supra at notes 290-92 and accompanying text). Such a solution would,
where the main promise ("I promise to do the paving work.., if you will promise the job to
me") is one that cannot be accepted immediately, imply a subsidiary promise ("and, if you
use my promise in preparing your own bid, I will leave my promise open for a reasonable
period of time for you to accept it"). This is a better solution than § 90, because it
concentrates on the cutting issues: (a) is the main promise, in fact, one that cannot be
accepted immediately so that it must necessarily be thought to include a subsidiary option
promise, and (b) did the relying promisee, in fact, accept the subsidiary promise in a
reasonably prompt manner (rather than reject it by engaging in bid shaving or like
conduct)? While § 90, or § 87(2), can get to the same place (by a finding that the only offer
upon which it is reasonable to rely is the offer which cannot be accepted immediately; and
by finding that justice only requires enforcement where the offeree attempted to accept
promptly), it seems less calculated to do so. Section 45 itself is, by its terms, limited to
Brooklyn Bridge-walker cases (by providing, as it does, only for circumstances where an
"offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance and does not invite a
promissory acceptance..." it excludes the Drennan type of case, in which the offer does
invite a promissory acceptance).
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and so invites consideration of a reliance-based alternative, set
forth in section 87(2).
No Acceptance (Offeror Wanted a Promise): Promissory Estop-
pel in the Restatement. The way the Drennan hypothetical is
resolved as an illustration under § 87(2) of the Restatement is by
making Star's offer irrevocable until Drennan has had a reasonable
opportunity to notify Star of the award and Drennan's acceptance
of Star's offer.10 2 Section 87(2) provides that:
(2) An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a substantial character
on the part of the offeree before acceptance and
which does induce such action or forbearance is bind-
ing as an option contract to the extent necessary to
avoid injustice."' 3
Upon analysis, the elements to a section 87(2) recovery are
these: (1) there must be a promise which takes the form of an offer,
(2) the offeror must reasonably expect action or forbearance before
acceptance, (3) the action or forbearance must be of a substantial
character, (4) the offer must induce the expected action or forbear-
ance, (5) justice must require enforcement of some option con-
tract, with the scope to vary as justice requires.30 4
In fact, the real Drennan did recover.3 0° Under the reliance
based rule of section 87(2), persons in the position of Drennan
might win in some cases, and might lose in other cases under an
analysis whose application would turn, in light of the particular
facts in every case, upon whether there was a 'reasonable expecta-
tion' that the offeree would rely on the offer, whether the reliance
was definite or substantial, and whether injustice would result if
the offer were not enforced, at least to some extent.
No Acceptance (Offeror Wanted a Promise): Promissory Estop-
pel in North Dakota. Except, perhaps, in cases like Union National
Bank in Minot v. Schimke, 30 6 which might be considered to reject
promissory estoppel, at least by implication, there are no retrieva-
ble opinions of the North Dakota Supreme Court involving a
promissory estoppel response to this sort of reliance.
302. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 87(2), illustration 6.
303. Id. § 87(2). The commentary observes that this subsection "states the application
of § 90 to reliance on an unaccepted offer, with qualifications which would not be
appropriate in some other types of cases covered by § 90. It is important chiefly in cases of
reliance that is not part performance." Id. § 87 comment e.
304. Id. at § 87(2).
305. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 761.
306. Union Nat'l Bank in Minot v. Schimke, 210 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1973).
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Schimke involved a wife's promise to a bank that she would
pay her husband's debts if he didn't.3 0 7 This case may be relevant
for two reasons. First, the court did not enforce the promise, even
though there was testimony that the bank relied upon it.30 Sec-
ond, the court took the occasion to set forth the elements of
estoppel.30 9
Schimke involved a promise that Fern Schimke made on May
28, 1971. Her husband had signed two promissory notes, dated
September 18, 1970 and March 10, 1971, and Mrs. Schimke guar-
anteed payment. The bank was unable to enforce her promise for
two reasons: one was the absence of consideration for her prom-
ise,310 and the other was an absence of notice of acceptance.3 11
This later reason might have been determinative of the case, for it
followed from a series of provisions in the Field Code, as enacted
in North Dakota, which create special rules applicable to guaran-
tees.312 If so, this would have been a case involving the absence of
assent, for failure of notice of acceptance, and would have been
quite close to the Drennan type.
Instead, the court seemed to glance off the assent problem
and bounce back to the consideration problem, in a way which
almost suggests that the court, although citing the statute which
requires communication of notice of acceptance, as well as cases
applying it, saw but a single problem, and that a consideration
problem. The case takes on an even more baffling dimension, at
307. Id. at 177.
308. There was testimony by a Bank officer that "the Bank would have called the notes
unless the guaranty was signed." Id. at 179. As a result, the case can also be considered as
one which disapproves of the rule given in § 88(c) of the Restatement Second, which
provides a specialized adaptation of promissory estoppel to the circumstances of
guarantees. It is significant, perhaps, that § 88(c) is one of the few promissory estoppel
provisions in the Restatement which does not limit enforceability to circumstances where
"justice requires." RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 88(c); id. comment d ("if the
reliance is foreseeable and substantial, no further inquiry is necessary as to whether justice
requires enforcement").
309. Schimke, 210 N.W.2d at 181.
310. The court observed that "[T]he testimony of the Bank's officer that the Bank
would have called the notes unless the guaranty was signed is obviously no forbearance at
all unless it is a binding promise made to the guarantor, Fern Schimke, in return for the
guaranty." Id. at 179. The next passage in the opinion made it clear that the court meant a
promisee's forbearance for an indefinite time is not consideration: "As matters stood in this
case, the Bank was in no different position after the guaranty was signed than it was before
the guaranty instrument was signed. The Bank could have called the notes at any time it
deemed itself insecure, and, therefore, the Bank made no promise to Fern Schimke in
return for her signing the guaranty." Id. at 179-80.
311. Id. at 178.
312. Guaranty is one of the particular transactions provided for in Part IV of Division
Third of the Field Code. FIELD CODE, supra note 13, §§ 1534-57. Section 1539 provides
that a "mere offer to guaranty is not binding, until notice of its acceptance is communicated
by the guarantee to the guarantor .... The provision is presently codified at N.D. CENT.
CODE § 22-01-06 (1986).
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least for purposes of understanding promissory estoppel in North
Dakota, when, after having determined that there was no consid-
eration to support the promise,313 the court rather summarily
rejected the Bank's estoppel argument. The court gave two rea-
sons for this rejection. First, the court stated that "Fern Schimke
may have made a promise when she signed the guaranty, but she
did not know what the the guaranty contract was nor the reason
why the Bank wanted it."' 314 Secondly, and "[m]ore importantly,"
said the court, the Bank "did not change its position to its irrepara-
ble detriment. As previously discussed, the Bank lost none of its
rights as a result of the guaranty contract and therefore suffered
no detriment at all."'3 15 The first reason may be adequate. If the
promisor didn't know what the promise meant, and didn't know
why the promisee wanted it, then it might be said that this is a
promisor who has no reasonable expectation that the promisee will
rely upon her promise.3 16 The second reason, however, seems to
miss the mark completely. The court seems to have said that the
promisee didn't rely upon the promise because it was free to
change its mind, and that it wasn't bound to give up any of its
rights. If that is what the court meant, then it seems to have read
promissory estoppel out of the law - by the nature of the case,
had the Bank given a promise by which it limited its freedom of
action, there would have been bargained-for detriment on the
part of the Bank, there would have been consideration, and there
would be no need to consider whether there had been some sort of
detrimental reliance in the absence of consideration. If this is a
fair reading of the case, then Schimke is a fairly decisive rejection
of promissory estoppel in North Dakota. The best can be made of
the case is that it is doubtful as to its application of facts to the law
relating to promissory estoppel, and is, at least to that extent, of
questionable validity.
But, as to the law, Schimke does contain a statement of the
elements of promissory estoppel in North Dakota. Indeed, it is the
fountainhead of promissory estoppel in North Dakota. Citing to a
case decided by the Supreme Court of Washington in 1969, the
North Dakota Supreme Court stated that "we find the elements of
promissory estoppel set out" as follows:
313. Schimke, 210 N.W.2d at 179-80.
314. Id. at 181.
315. Id.
316. This is, of course, an intriguingly subjective gloss on what the promisor has
"reason to expect."
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The requisites of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise,
(2) which the promisor should reasonably expect will
cause the promisee to change his position, (3) which does
cause a substantial change of position, action or forbear-
ance by the promisee, (4) acting in justifiable reliance on
the promise, and (5) injustice which can only be avoided
by enforcing the promise. 7
Embroidering the handiwork of the Washington Court by refer-
ence to a digest, the North Dakota Supreme Court observed that it
found "further explanation" as follows:
... Also, justifiable reliance and irreparable detriment to
the promisee are necessary factors to enable him to
invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel.3 1 8
Until Schimke is distinguished, limited or explained by the North
Dakota Supreme Court, it may have to be considered as having
317. Schimake, 210 N.W.2d at 181. It appears that the Washington Court is trying to
adhere to § 90 of the original Restatement, but has added an extra element (the item
numbered four in the list: "acting in justifiable reliance"). This is an element that recurs in
other North Dakota cases. For a discussion of the reasons why it is wrong to say that § 90 of
the Restatement requires "justifiable reliance," see supra note 182.
The Washington case cited in Schimke is Northern State Construction Co. v. Robbins,
457 P.2d 187, 190 (Wash. 1969) (giving the five elements quoted by the North Dakota
Court). The authority relied upon by the Washington court in Northern State Construction
is Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 443 P.2d 544,548 (Wash. 1968) (giving the five
elements), which, in turn, relies upon Corbit v. J.I. Case Co., 424 P.2d 290, 300 (Wash.
1967). Corbit, finally, purports to be based upon § 90 of the Restatement of Contracts. In
Corbit, after quoting § 90 of the original Restatement, the court observed both that "[w]e
have previously cited the Restatement's formulation as being a useful guideline" and that
"[iun effect, § 90... sets out five prerequisites for a recovery in promissory estoppel." Id.
The court then proceeded, apparently unintentionally, to recast § 90 into the form
subsequently quoted by itself, and ultimately by the North Dakota court.
There is no evidence that the Washington court intended to deviate from the language
of § 90, nor is there any indication that it even realized it was doing so. As a result, it must
be said that the rule currently being articulated in North Dakota owes its genesis to the
Washington Supreme Court's apparently accidental editing of § 90 of the original
Restatement of Contracts. Cf. generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 726 (2d ed. 1988) (speaking of Rule 10b-5, Loss observed that "[w]hat is more
remarkable is that the whole development was unplanned. Like the British Empire, which
Eamon de Valera called 'A domain created in a moment of world absentmindedness,' it just
happened") (citation omitted). Or, paraphrasing Maitland on the forms of action, it might
be said that: "Our typographical errors we have buried, but they still rule us from their
graves." Cf MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 1 reprinted in
Cambridge 1971 ("The forms of action we have buried, but...").
318. Schimke, 210 N.W.2d at 181 (emphasis added). Now it appears that we are on the
threshold of conflating the elements necessary to issue a preliminary injunction with the
elements necessary to invoke promissory estoppel. It seems a mistake to think that
irreparable detriment is part of the Restatement's § 90 promissory estoppel analysis. Of
course, the court may quite deliberately be giving a clear sign that it does not intend to
follow § 90, but rather, some other version of promissory estoppel which makes it more
difficult for the relying promisee to recover - and that might serve to explain the otherwise
inexplicable fact that Schimke cites almost anything but § 90 in a promissory estoppel case.
Or Schimke may just be one of those "widows and orphans" cases, one that is best taken to
mean only that "the widow wins," and otherwise ignored.
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something to say about promissory estoppel; and it may have
something to say both in the type of case which involves the
absence of consideration, and in the type of case which the
involves the absence of assent. If it does have a promissory estop-
pel message, it is a negative one. Though discussing promissory
estoppel in the context of lack of consideration, Schimke refused to
enforce the promise. Further, it failed even to mention anything
like the possibility of a Drennan-type estoppel argument in the
context of lack of assent.
3. No Agreement, or Insufficient Definiteness
No Assent (No Promise - Failed Negotiations; or Promise Not
Sufficiently Definite): Promissory Etoppel in the Restatement (the
Goodman and Red Owl Problems). Because these two classes of
promises frequently overlap, they will be treated together here.
The problems raised are those generally typified by the cases of
Goodman v. Dicker319 and Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.32 °
These cases display two variations on the promissory estoppel
theme, still under the heading of reliance in the absence of assent.
The first variation is the instance of reliance on a promise that was
never made. The second variation is the instance of reliance on a
promise that is indefinite by omission of essential terms.
There is no new formulation for either Goodman v. Dicker
(the radios) or Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. (the supermarket).
Each of those cases is illustrated in the Restatement as an example
of the general section 90 rule. It may be recalled that § 90 which,
in its generality, does not explicitly say that it applies only to
promises unenforceable because lacking consideration, provides
for a recovery if these conditions are met: (1) there must be a
promise, (2) the promisor must reasonably expect that the promise
will induce action or forbearance, (3) the promise must have
induced the expected action or forbearance, and (4) injustice must
result if the promise is not enforced. Then, if the court can fashion
a flexible remedy and adheres to the Restatement Second, it need
insist on nothing more, and in particular, it need not insist that the
expected action or forbearance be definite and substantial. On the
other hand, if the court is not free to fashion a flexible remedy, or
if it adheres to the original restatement, then there must be a
319. 169 F.2d 684 (D.C.Cir. 1948).
320. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wisc. 1965).
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showing that the expected action or forbearance was definite and
substantial.
The Restatement's solution, under section 90, to Goodman v.
Dicker is as follows: "B is liable to A for the $1,150, but not for the
lost profit on 30 radios. "321
The Restatement's solution, under section 90, to Hoffman v.
Red Owl Stores, Inc. is as follows:
The assurances from B to A are promises on which B rea-
sonably should have expected A to rely, and A is entitled
to his actual losses on the sales of the bakery and grocery
and for his moving and temporary living expenses. Since
the proposed agreement was never made, however, A is
not entitled to lost profits from the sale of the grocery or
to his expectation interest in the proposed franchise from
B 322
Although neither Goodman nor Red Owl Stores, Inc. resulted
in a new formulation, it should be noted that there is a Restate-
ment (Second) formulation which is related. Section 34 of the
Restatement, treating the effect of choice of terms, provides that
an agreement will not fail for uncertainty even if it empowers one
or both the parties to make a selection of terms in the course of
performance. 323 Section 34(3) goes on to provide that "[a]ction in
reliance upon an agreement may make a contractual remedy
appropriate even though uncertainty is not removed. 324
No Assent, No Promise - Failed Negotiations; or Promise Not
Sufficiently Definite: Responses Outside of Promissory Estoppel.
These problems can be addressed by a reanalysis response outside
of promissory estoppel. For example, the problems could be
addressed in terms of fraudulent deceit.3 25 These problems can
also be recharacterized, if the facts permit, in terms of a subsidiary
promise to negotiate in good faith, where "good faith" in this con-
text is understood to mean only a minimal level of honesty in fact
321. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 90, illustration 8.
322. Id. § 90, illustration 10.
323. Id. § 34.
324. Id. § 34(3).
325. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. Such an approach may require a
recharacterization of the facts so as to fit within the framework of fraudulent deceit. Should
the facts simply not fit within that framework, perhaps that is as good a way as any of
determining that the plaintiff has no case, and ought not to prevail. Indeed, transferring
the matter back to the promissory estoppel response, it would seem that "justice requires"
enforcement of a promise in this context if, and only if, the promisor acted with such
scienter as would have constituted fraudulent deceit. Cf. supra note 132 (promissory
fraud).
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- without any affirmative duty to disclose, and without any affirm-
ative duty to make 'reasonable' concessions in order to reach an
agreement, but only to refrain from injuring the other party by
deceit.3 26 The subsidiary promise to negotiate in good faith is one
which may, itself, be breached, and, if so, there would be a recov-
ery within the presumptive rules.3 27
No Assent, No Promise - Failed Negotiations; or Promise Not
Sufficiently Definite: Promissory Estoppel in North Dakota. The
North Dakota Supreme Court has consistently rejected the appli-
cation of promissory estoppel in this context. Among the repre-
sentative cases are Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Company,328
Firefighters Local 642 v. City of Fargo,3 29 and Cooke v. Blood Sys-
tems, Inc. 
3 30
Lohse. Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield involved an asserted oral
mineral lease agreement covering approximately 4,000 acres
owned by Lohse.3 31  Negotiations between Lohse and Kathy
Schroeder and Greg Yates, landmen for Atlantic Richfield Com-
pany (ARCO), led to a rapid agreement on the leasehold bonus
rental, primary term, and landowner's royalty. 2  Lohse then
326. The meaning of "good faith" in this context is so formulated as to avoid the twin
perils of leaving the expression completely undefined, and of defining it so expansively as to
create, in effect, a duty to agree. This formulation seeks to set a subsidiary promise that no
one would care to deny. Cf. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 205 ("Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement"). If a court were to go beyond § 205 and extend the duty of good faith to the
precontractual relationship, it would follow that the level of performance demanded
thereby must be carefully limited. Though this extension of the duty would be a serious
step, it would seem to be preferable to the backdoor approach of imposing substantially the
same duty under the rubric of a vaguely articulated estoppel. If directly extended as an
implied promise to negotiate in good faith, the contents of the duty could at least be
determined when the implied promise is articulated, and it seems more likely that the
implied promise would bear some recognizable relation to what the parties might have
expected than would be the case under an estoppel.
327. This assumes that the other conditions to enforceability are present. The promise
should be taken as one which is exchanged for the other party's implied promise likewise to
negotiate in good faith, and thus is supported by consideration. Damages for breach of the
subsidiary promise to negotiate in good faith should be kept distinct from any question of
damages for breach of the main promise to consummate the transaction which is the
subject matter of the negotiations, since the main promise, per hypothesis, was never
assented to by the parties. A reliance measure of damages in respect of the subsidiary
promise, perhaps limited to out of pocket costs incurred during negotiations, would seem to
be indicated.
328. Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 389 N.W.2d 352 (N.D. 1986).
329. Firefighters Local 642 v. City of Fargo, 321 N.W.2d 473 (N.D. 1982).
330. Cooke v. Blood Systems, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1982).
331. Lohse, 389 N.W.2d at 353.
332. The crucial negotiations, with Yates during November 1982, took "not over ten
minutes." Id. at 353. According to Lohse, Yates said "We are paying $200 an acre, three-
year lease, three-sixteenths royalty," to which Lohse responded "That's a hell of a good
lease, I'll take it." Id. Lohse described the land to Yates, and asked how long it would take
to draw up a contract, and whether he could get the checks before the end of the year
("The reason being," Mr. Lohse testified, "we were talking about approximately $800,000 in
lease money.") Id. at 353-54.
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waited for ARCO to draft a lease. 33 Several weeks passed, during
which Lohse turned down other offers, 3 4 while making several
phone calls to Yates in ARCO's Denver offices.3 3 5 Yates gave reas-
surances that the leases were either drafted or were in the mail. 3 6
Finally, in March 1983, Lohse visited Denver, and called upon
Yates only to find out that Yates was no longer employed by ARCO
and that ARCO was not interested in leasing anything from
Lohse. 3 7 In the meantime, "the demand for oil and gas leases in
the area had declined," and Lohse was unable to lease his mineral
rights to anyone. 3 8
Lohse sued to enforce the promise made to him, but lost.3 3 9 It
appears that the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the assent-
based promissory estoppel doctrines that might enforce a promise
in the absence of sufficient definiteness. The North Dakota
Supreme Court considered ARCO's statute of frauds defense, and
rapidly reached the question whether promissory estoppel might
bar the assertion of that defense.3 4° Assuming "for purposes of
argument" that promissory estoppel "may" do so, the Court then
vaulted into the Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. and Goodman v.
Dicker problems, stating that
The elements which must be established before the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel can be invoked are: (1) a
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
will cause the promisee to change his position; (2) a sub-
stantial change of the promisee's position through action
or forbearance; (3) justifiable reliance on the promise; and
(4) injustice which can only be avoided by enforcing the
promise,341
333. Id. at 354.
334. Id.
335. The other offers ranged from $100 to $175 per acre. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 353.
340. Before doing so, the court considered whether fraud on the part of ARCO might
have prevented it from asserting the statute of frauds defense pursuant to N.D. CENT.
CODE § 9-06-03, which provides that a party's fraudulent failure to provide a writing
prevents that party from using the lack of a writing as a defense. Id. at 354-56 (see supra
note 132 and accompanying text for a discussion of the related North Dakota promissory
fraud statutes). The court decided that, since there was no .oral contract to begin with
(because ARCO's promises were not sufficiently definite and certain), there could be no
issue of fraudulent failure to put it into writing. Id. at 356.
341. Id. at 357. The court did not mention the Restatement, but cited Russell v. Bank
of Kirkwood Plaza, 386 N.W.2d 892, 896 (N.D. 1986). See supra note 182 (discussing the
difference between this formulation of promissory estoppel and that contained in the
Restatement of Contracts).
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the court observed that "the promise ... must be clear, definite,
and unambiguous as to essential terms before the doctrine of
promissory estoppel may be invoked to enforce an agreement or
to award damages for the breach thereof. ' 342 Because the parties
"failed to agree to or even discuss" many of the essential terms,
the court concluded that there was not a certain or definite prom-
ise. 343 In deciding as it did, the court pointed to the evident reluc-
tance of many courts to enforce incomplete agreements "based
upon preliminary negotiations and discussions or upon an agree-
ment to negotiate the remaining terms of a contract in the
future. '344 In addition, the court cited, and expressly joined the
ranks of, those courts that disagree with Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores.345 Absent from the opinion is any analysis of potential lia-
bility based upon equitable estoppel or misrepresentation.3 46
Firefighters Local 642. In Firefighters Local 642 v. City of
Fargo,347 the North Dakota Supreme Court, at least by negative
implication, refused to embrace the Hoffman v. Red Owl kind of
promissory estoppel.348 The Firefighters union and the City of
Fargo were renegotiating a labor contract in May and June, 1979,
and entered into a labor contract for the fiscal year 1979-80.349
During the course of negotiations, there had been talk of a pay
increase for the fiscal year 1980-81, a period not covered in the
contract, and, when that increase was not forthcoming, the union
brought suit.35 0 After deciding that the city's negotiator lacked
the authority to bind the city, and that the city itself had never
entered into any contract covering the second fiscal year,35 1 the
court considered the union's estoppel arguments.
The union alleged that it never would have accepted the
terms for one year had there not been a promise of increased
352 Te "wages in the subsequent year. The union argued "that [it]
342. Id. at 357.
343. Id. The court had earlier catalogued ARCO's list of missing .'essential" terms as
including: deferred bonus payments, Pugh clause, pooling and unitization powers, surface
damage, and delay rentals. Id. at 355.
344. Id. at 357.
345. Id. at 357.
346. Lohse's affidavit had stated that the defendant's landman had made the false
statement that leases were drafted or were in the mail. Id. at 354.
347. 321 N.W.2d 473 (N.D. 1982).
348. It was not until Lohse that the court explicitly rejected Red Owl. See supra note
345.
349. Firefighters, 321 N.W.2d at 475
350. Id. at 475.
351. Id. at 475-77
352. Id. at 477.
[Vol. 66:317404
1990] PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN NORTH DAKOTA 405
changed [its] position in reliance on the city's alleged promise. 35 3
The court, however, after having set up what appeared to be a
promissory estoppel problem, said no more about promissory
estoppel, but discussed equitable estoppel instead.35 4 The court
353. Id.
354. One of the classic, and basic, distinctions between equitable estoppel and
promissory estoppel is that the former deals with statements of facts, the later with
promises. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Entertainment Enterprises, Inc., 317 N.W.2d 385, 389
(N.D. 1982) and cases collected there. It is generally believed that equitable estoppel (or
"estoppel in pais") both predated promissory estoppel, and may have been one of the
materials from which promissory estoppel was ultimately fashioned. If a particular
jurisdiction has already embraced promissory estoppel, there would seem to be no purpose
served in using equitable estoppel instead of promissory estoppel to enlarge the scope of
enforceable promises. But if a particular jurisdiction has not embraced promissory
estoppel, then equitable estoppel, extended beyond its generally understood purpose, has
sometimes served as an awkward (if not illicit) means to accomplish the same end.
Equitable estoppel is codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-06. The statute provides
that:
[w]hen a party, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately has led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon
such belief, he shall not be permitted to falsify it in any litigation arising out of
such declaration, act, or omission.
The equitable estoppel provision was adopted in 1897 and it is not contained in the
Field Code. Since the Field Code already makes "promissory fraud" (a promise made with-
out intent to perform it) actionable as an independent basis for liability, it would seem to
have provided its own tool for covering intentional and deliberate false promising. See
supra note 132 and accompanying text (promissory fraud).
Beyond the words of the equitable estoppel statutory provision, the North Dakota
Supreme Court, in O'Connell, and in other cases, has added a gloss (derived from 56
A.L.R.3d 1041, see Farmers Cooperative Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808, 813 (N.D. 1976))
which consists of a two step, three factor test. One step turns upon the conduct of the
speaker, the person who makes the statement; the other step turns upon the conduct of the
recipient, the person to whom the statement is made.
The speaker's behavior must include these three factors: (1) conduct which amounts to
a false representation of, or concealment of, a material fact, or "is calculated to convey the
impression" that the [material] facts are otherwise than "those which the [speaker] subse-
quently attempts to assert," (2) the intention, or expectation that the recipient will be influ-
enced by the speaker's conduct, and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, by the speaker of
the true facts. O'Connell, 317 N.W.2d at 389.
In addition, the recipient's conduct must include these three factors: (1) lack of knowl-
edge of the true facts, coupled with the lack of means of discovery of the true facts, (2) good
faith reliance upon the speaker's conduct, and (3) action or inaction caused by the speaker's
conduct, resulting in a change of the recipient's position to the recipient's "injury, detri-
ment, or prejudice." Id.
The court's gloss on equitable estoppel does not turn it into something like promissory
estoppel, but rather into something like fraud, insofar as the third factor relating to the
speaker's behavior adds scienter to the elements of equitable estoppel, and thus is a step
away from promissory estoppel, rather than a step towards it. Furthermore, the gloss seems
to add at least one element to the fraud equation which tips the balance in favor of the
speaker beyond where the "ordinary" fraud equation is balanced. The first factor relating
to the recipient seems to reopen the old style of fraud actions, whereby the speaker is able,
in effect, to put the recipient on trial, by showing that the recipient failed to exercise affirm-
ative due diligence to find out the facts, and, at the least, serves to create confusion over
why, since there are already at least three kinds of statutory fraud in the Century Code,
there is any need to transform equitable estoppel into yet another statutory fraud provision.
See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-03-08 (contracts; actual fraud), 9-03-09 (contracts; constructive
fraud), and 9-10-02 (obligations imposed by law; deceit). See also L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 712-23 (2nd ed. 1988) (on the hornbook "elements" of com-
mon law deceit and their permutations); id. at 874 n. 129 (on the proper treatment of the
recipient's "justifiable reliance" in terms of the recipient's due diligence, or contributory
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concluded that (a) there had been no evidence that the city or its
negotiator intentionally and deliberately led the union to believe
that a pay raise for the subsequent year had been approved, (b) the
union's attorney knew that there was a need to comply with statu-
tory requirements in order to bind the city, and (c) the city's nego-
tiator did not possess the power to bind the city, and, even if he
did, no contract concerning the subsequent year was ever
formed.35
Since Firefighters was, conceivably, a case in which a Red
Owl type of promissory estoppel might have been asserted, it may
be significant that the court failed to embrace any such application
of the doctrine.35 6
Cooke. In Cooke v. Blood Systems,357 Cooke, a landlord, was
negotiating with John Anthonisen, president of Blood Systems,
Inc., a prospective new tenant.358 Between May 1, 1979 and May
14, Cooke and Anthonisen agreed on rent, Anthonisen sent Cooke
a proposed lease form (not signed by Blood Systems), and
Anthonisen turned over his part of the negotiations to Bill Burt,
director of property management for Blood Systems. 359 Discus-
sions and correspondence, including the exchange of draft leases,
continued through about August 10, on which date Blood Systems
told Cooke that it had decided not to lease the premises.36 °
Cooke sued to enforce a leasehold agreement against Blood
Systems, but lost.361 Once again, the North Dakota Supreme
Court rejected the assent-based promissory estoppel doctrines that
might enforce a promise in the absence of sufficient definiteness.
The court began by determining whether there was mutual assent
to the proposed agreement.3 62 The court decided that the last
form of lease sent by Cooke to Blood Systems, was an offer, but
Blood Systems never accepted it, either orally or in writing.363
negligence, or some lower standard). 'Fraud' is treated, as a species of misrepresentation
making a contract voidable, in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 159-73.
"Fraud" is treated, as a species of misrepresentation giving rise to tort liability, in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts at §§ 525-49.
355, Firefighters, 321 N.W.2d at 477.
356. Any doubt on that score was removed by the court's subsequent decision in Lohse,
in which North Dakota rejected Red Owl. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
357. Cooke, 320 N.W.2d 124.
358. Id. at 126.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 127.
361. Id. at 130.
362. Id. at 128.
363. Id. Burt, the property manager for Blood Systems, testified that Cooke called and
asked about the lease, but that he (Burt) told Cooke that the decision to lease was one Burt
was not authorized to make. Id. at 127. Within a day or two later, an officer of Blood
Systems called Mr. Cooke and advised him that Blood Systems had decided not to lease the
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Accordingly, the court held that there was no assent.364 The court
then turned to Cooke's alternate argument, a claim based on
promissory estoppel.365 Quoting section 90 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 366 and citing to Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores,367 the court held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
"inapplicable because it requires there be a promise or agree-
ment. '368 Since there was no such promise, the court found it
unnecessary to determine "whether or not promissory estoppel
constitutes an independent cause of action. "369
Cooke contained more language which may be of importance
to understanding the doctrine of promissory estoppel in North
Dakota. After determining that there was no contract because
there was no assent, and that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
was inapplicable (without having determined whether, if applica-
ble, it would have made any difference, since the court reserved
the question whether promissory estoppel would constitute a
cause of action), the court considered it necessary to deal with the
statute of frauds.370 At this point, the court entertained Cooke's
argument that the doctrine of promissory estoppel might bar
Blood System's assertion of the statute of frauds. Stating that
The elements necessary to establish recovery under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel are as follows: (1) a prom-
ise which the promisor should reasonably expect will
premises. Id. The court concluded that nothing prior to sending the lease form constituted
a mutual assent to the transaction, and that nothing after the receipt of the lease form
constituted an acceptance. Id. at 128-29.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 129. "The next issue raised by Cooke is that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel constitutes a separate cause of action through which relief may be granted to him,
and that the facts of this case establish that he was entitled to recover under that doctrine."
Id.
366. Id. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (quoting § 90 of the Restatement).
367. Cooke, 320 N.W.2d at 129. See supra notes 279-81 and accompanying text
(discussing Red Owl). See also supra note 345 (subsequent rejection of Red Owl by North
Dakota Supreme Court).
368. Cooke, 320 N.W.2d at 129. The court apparently cited Red Owl for the
proposition that some courts "recognize as a separate cause of action the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90." It did not
address the fact that Red Owl also seems to stand for the further proposition that the
doctrine does not require that there be a definite promise or agreement, and so stands for a
holding precisely the opposite of that reached by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Any
doubts about the status of Hoffman in North Dakota were removed a few years subsequent
to this case when, in Lohse, the North Dakota Supreme Court joined with those jurisdictions
which disagree with Red Owl, and require that a promise must be "clear, definite and
unambiguous" before promissory estoppel will be appropriate. See supra notes 34245.
369. Cooke, 320 N.W.2d at 129.
370. Cooke raised the issue that "the doctrine of part performance bars Blood Systems'
assertion of the statute of frauds." Id. at 129. It might be assumed that since there was no
agreement at all, the failure to reduce it to writing would be the least of the plaintiff's
problems, and would have been rendered moot by the holdings already reached.
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cause the promisee to change his position; (2) a substantial
change of the promisee's position through action or for-
bearance; (3) justifiable reliance on the promise; and (4)
injustice which can only be avoided by enforcing the
promise,3 7 1
the court observed that the facts and circumstances did not estab-
lish that there was a promise, and therefore held that promissory
estoppel would not prevent Blood Systems from raising the statute
of frauds as a defense. 2
Summary of the Reliance in the Absence of Assent Cases. In
the series of cases beginning with Cooke,373 through Firefighters
Local 642y and culminating in Lohse,37  the North Dakota
Supreme Court has seen a fair assortment of the Hoffman v. Red
Owl 37 6 type of reliance cases. These cases, in which there is no
promise because of failed negotiations, are ones in which the court
is, for good reason, reluctant to embrace the extreme reach of § 90
which might form contracts even in these situations. Finally, in
Lohse, the court has expressly rejected the premise necessary to a
Hoffman v. Red Owl recovery, namely, the premise that a recov-
ery in promissory estoppel may be had in cases where the promise
would have been fatally defective under ordinary principles.
Since the North Dakota Supreme Court requires that the promise
be clear, definite and unambiguous, one of the few conclusions
that seems safe to draw from the North Dakota reliance cases is
that there is no recovery for reliance in the absence of assent
371. Id. at 130 (citing to O'Connell v. Entertainment Enterprises, Inc., 317 N.W.2d
385, 390 (N.D. 1982)), the court did not mention the Restatement, which it had just quoted
one page earlier. Id. In addition, the court did not explain why, one page earlier, it seemed
to embrace § 90 of the Restatement (Second) exactly as written, but now, one page later, it
reverted to language suggested by the Restatement (First); nor did it explain why it added
language that is foreign to either version of § 90. Compare id. at 129 with id. at 130.
O'Connell is discussed beginning at note 136, supra, and the difference between
O'Connell's formulation of promissory estoppel and that contained in the Restatement of
Contracts is discussed at note 182, supra. For the derivation of the O'Connell formulation,
which traces its origin to an earlier formulation given by the Washington Supreme Court,
see supra note 317. The derivation is set out in full in Chart 2, pp. A-2 to A-4.
372. Cooke, 320 N.W.2d at 130. The wheels seem to spin here, but, perhaps, if there is
no promise, then there is no promissory estoppel, and so Blood Systems can raise the statute
of frauds as a defense against the enforceability of the promise it made; but it made no
promise, so there is no promissory estoppel, and so Blood Systems can raise the statute of
frauds as a defense. See C. Stein, As FINE As MELANCTHA ("[Civilization begins with a
rose.] A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose") reprinted in 4 THE YALE EDITION OF THE
WRITINGS OF GERTRUDE STEIN 262 (1954).
373. Cooke, 320 N.W.2d at 124.
374. Firefighters Local 642 v. City of Fargo, 321 N.W.2d 473 (N.D. 1982).
375. Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 389 N.W.2d 352 (N.D. 1986).
376. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wisc. 1965).
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where the defect in assent is caused by failed negotiations or insuf-
ficient definiteness.
C. RELIANCE IN THE ABSENCE OF A WRITING
General. There are three subcategories of reliance in the
absence of a required writing. The first two categories relate to
writings required by the statute of frauds. The third category
deals with writings required by other statutes. The categories are
as follows: (1) reliance, in the absence of a required writing, on a
promise within the statute of frauds where the promisor has made
a promise to supply the writing, 7 7 (2) reliance, in the absence of a
required writing, on a promise within the statute of frauds and in
the absence of any promise to supply the writing,378 and (3) reli-
ance, in the absence of a writing, on a promise which lacks consid-
eration but is enforceable without consideration if in writing. 9
North Dakota has had no cases of the first category. North
Dakota has had several cases of the second and third categories,
and in some of, them the North Dakota Supreme Court has
awarded a recovery, while it has declined to do so in other cases.
Even where a recovery is awarded, the grounds seem so broad
that it is hard to say that recovery was awarded because of reliance
upon a promise. Indeed, the court can almost be understood to
have held that, so long as a promise can be clearly established,
there will be a recovery. If so, this is, in effect, an overthrow of the
rules which require a writing.
Before discussing reliance in the absence of compliance with
the Statute of Frauds, it would be well briefly to review the typical
implications of the usual sort of statute.
The Presumptive Rule: Satisfaction of the Statute of Frauds.
The original English Statute of Frauds became effective in 1677,
after going through four years in which it suffered "numerous
drastic revisions, and accumulated new clauses suggested by a
variety of legal experts of the time. '38 0 It provided, in relevant
377. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 139 comment b.
378. Id.
379. These are the socalled formality statutes which dispense with the requirement of
consideration, provided that there be a writing. See infra notes 459-61 and accompanying
text for examples of North Dakota statutes so providing.
380. J. DAWSON, W. BURNETT & S. HENDERSON, CASES AND COMMENTS ON
CONTRACTS 941 (5th ed. 1987). See also C. Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of
Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3) and Their Authors, 61 U.PA.L.REv. 283 (1913) (reprinting the
original 1673 draft, documenting the successive revisions, and attributing authorship based
on handwriting samples and other extrinsic and intrinsic evidence); 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 379-84 (1924) (discussing the enactment and authorship of the
statute of frauds).
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part, as follows:
An act for the prevention of Frauds and Perjuries
29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677)
For prevention of many fraudulent practices, which are
commonly endeavored to be upheld by perjury or subor-
nation of perjury...
Section 4. And be it further enacted by the authority
aforesaid, that from and after the said four and twentieth
day of June no action shall be brought (1) whereby to
charge any executor or administrator upon any special
promise, to answer damages out of his own estate; (2) or
whereby to charge the defendant upon any special prom-
ise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriages of
another person; (3) or to charge any person upon any
agreement made upon consideration of marriage; (4) or
upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements, or heredit-
aments, or any interest in or concerning them; (5) or upon
any agreement that is not to be performed within the
space of one year from the making thereof; (6) unless the
agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or
some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing,
and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some
other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized...
Section 17. And be it further enacted by the authority
aforesaid, that from and after the said four and twentieth
day of June no contract for the sale of any goods, wares
and merchandizes, for the price of £10 sterling or
upwards, shall be allowed to be good, except the buyer
shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually receive
the same, or give something in earnest to bind the bar-
gain, or in part payment, or that some note or memoran-
dum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by
the parties to be charged by such contract, or their agents
thereunto lawfully authorized.381
The several clauses of Section 4 of the English statute contain the
familiar set of provisions: the executor/administrator provision
(clause 1); the suretyship provision (clause 2); the marriage provi-
381. Dawson, supra note 380, at 942.
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sion (clause 3); the land contract provision (clause 4); and the one-
year provision (clause 5). In each case, if the promise is "within"
the Statute of Frauds, then the Statute must be satisfied. As to the
original section 4 promises, the statute is satisfied if there is a writ-
ing setting forth the agreement and signed by the party to be
charged. Section 4 of the English statute was generally copied in
the United States, though some provisions were omitted by a few
states.382
The subject matter of section 17 of the English statute, the
sale of goods provision, is now covered by section 2-201 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.38 3 Section 2-201 is satisfied if there is a
writing containing at least a quantity term which is signed by the
party to be charged, and may also be satisfied in other ways.38 4
Observations and School Cases. It is generally, though not
universally, assumed that the statute of frauds is an irrational, if
not wicked, thing; a trap for the unwary and a trick to be practiced
upon the innocent. Three hundred years of judicial hostility
makes for good sport, and any commonly used casebook will illus-
trate that the leading principle throughout the cases is to find
some way, if at all possible, to enforce the promise presumptively
barred by the statute of frauds. This is done by diminishing the
range of the promises within the statute, while at the same time
enlarging the domain of the writing and signature sufficient to sat-
isfy the statute.
382. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, ch. 5, Statutory Note. Maryland and New
Mexico have adopted the English statute by judicial decision; all of the other states, except
Louisiana, have statutes similar to the English statute. Id.
Louisiana's law did not derive from the English. Article 2277 of the Louisiana Code,
for example, provides that all agreements relative to movable property, and all contracts for
the payment of money, where the value exceeds $500 must, if not reduced to writing, be
proved by "at least one credible witness, and other corroborating circumstances."
Louisiana Compiled Code, Art. 2277 (1972). Article 2277 relaxes the requirements of
Article 1341 of the Napoleonic Code from which it was derived, for the provision of the
1804 Napoleonic Code required "an act before a notary or under private signature" and set
the threshold at 150 francs. Id.
In England, meanwhile, all but the suretyship provision and the land contract provision
were repealed in 1954. 2 and 3 Eliz. II, c. 34. In recommending repeal, the Law Reform
Committee said of those sections whose repeal it urged:
that they had outlived the conditions which generated and, in some degree,
justified them; that they operate in an illogical and often one-sided and
haphazard fashion over a field arbitrarily chosen; and that on the whole they
promote rather than restrain dishonesty.
Law Reform Committee, First Report, CMD, No. 8809, at 3 (1953) quoted in Recent Statute
- Statute of Frauds - Part of English Act Repealed, 68 HARV. LAW REV. 383 (1954).
383. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1987) (contracts for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or
more).
384. See id. § 2-201(2) (1987) (between merchants, failure to object to a written
confirmation signed by and sufficient against the sender); § 2-201(3X1) (1987) (specially
manufactured goods); § 2-201(3X2) (1987) (admission in court); § 2-201(3X3) (1987) (part
performance).
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However, a point exists at which the creativity of even those
legal minds most hostile to the statute must stop - after all this
work to avoid the application of the statute, there remains a resid-
uum of cases which are, after all, governed by the statute. No mat-
ter, for example, how narrowly a "suretyship" promise is defined,
and no matter how generously a "writing" is defined, there will be
some instance in which A will make a promise to B which, being a
suretyship promise, is within the statute of frauds, and in which A
will not have signed a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds. Even here, some avenue of relief may be available to B
under general principles of law: perhaps there is another statutory
provision which affords full or partial relief to B, perhaps A has
committed an independent tort, such as fraud, elsewhere in the
transaction. But, finally, even such avenues as those may be closed
by the facts of a particular case.
In that event, we may be, and in the 'hard' cases certainly will
be, faced with a promise which has every substantive element nec-
essary to enforceability: there will be bargained for consideration
(or some reliance-based substitute), and there will be a manifesta-
tion of mutual assent to the bargain (or some reliance-based substi-
tute), but the formality of a writing will be lacking. This is a case in
which the statute says that B loses. If, at the time A refuses to
perform, B has done nothing, B loses her expectation interest. But
if B has incurred costs in reliance on the promise, B stands to lose
so much of those costs as have conferred no benefit upon A (assum-
ing that B is entitled to the reasonable value of any benefit that B
did confer upon A, on a restitutionary basis, and without regard to
the enforceability of any promise made by A).
In some cases, this loss suffered by B might be egregious.
Here is a hypothetical, based upon a well known case: Christie,
the son of Carmen and step-son of Nate, moved to California with
Carmen and Nate, who purchased a farm. Seven years later,
Christie, then 18 years old, determined to leave home and seek an
independent living. Nate and Carmen wanted him to stay with
them and participate in the family venture. They made an oral
promise to him that if he stayed home and worked, they would
convey the farm to him at their death. In performance of the
agreement, Christie remained home and worked diligently in the
family venture, devoting his life to making the family farm a suc-
cess. He gave up any opportunity for further education or any
chance to accumulate property of his own, receiving only room
and board and some spending money. He forbore from demand-
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ing any present interest in the farm in reliance upon Nate and
Carmen's repeated assurances that, in exchange for his labors,
their interest in the farm would pass to him on their death. Upon
Nate's death, and after Christie had worked on the farm for some
20 years, it was learned that Nate had left his interest in the farm
to Nate, junior, his grand child, and the son of his deceased daugh-
ter by his former marriage.385
Christie relied upon a promise presumptively unenforceable
because it is within the statute of frauds, and there is no writing
sufficient to satisfy the statute. There are two solutions to Chris-
tie's dilemma: (1) Christie loses, with an offset in restitution for the
reasonable value of the labor he provided, or (2) Christie wins,
because of his reliance on the promise.
1. Statute of Frauds; Reliance Without a Writing Where
the Promisor Promised One
Reliance Against a Promise to Provide a Writing: Promissory
Estoppel in the Restatement. Take the basic fact pattern sug-
gested by the case of Christie Lo Greco,3 s6 but simplify it by
assuming that the promise Christie sought to enforce was this: "if
you stay and work on the farm for 20 years, I will convey the farm
to you." And then add a slight variant. Assume that there is an
additional promise made by the promisor, which is expressed:
"and I promise that I will reduce this agreement to writing in a
form sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds." The new hypotheti-
cal now has two separate promises with which to work: (1) the
"main" promise, the promise to convey the farm in exchange for
Christie's staying and working for 20 years, and (2) a "collateral"
promise, the promise to reduce the main promise to writing.
As to the enforceability of the main promise, if it can be
assumed that Christie did stay and work for 20 years,38 7 the main
385. Based upon Monarco v. Lo Greco, 220 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1950). The California Civil
Code includes within its statute of frauds those promises which, by their terms, are not to be
performed within the life of the promisor. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(6) (1985).
386. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
387. Other assumptions may need to be made (assume, as well, that "the farm" is
described with sufficient particularity, assume that any other "essential terms" are included,
and so on). In order to simplify, assume that the bare hypothetical is embellished with
whatever facts are necessary to present a clean example of a promise enforceable in every
other respect, but for the lack of a writing.
Of course, it does not take much imagination to see the sort of complex, or composite,
promissory estoppel case into which this might transform itself. Suppose that, after Christie
had worked for 17 years, the promisor revoked the offer; Christie may have to stretch just a
little bit to establish that he had accepted the offer. For the "reliance in the absence of
assent" analysis, see supra notes 283-305 and accompanying text. Suppose, if you will, that
we don't know what is meant by "the farm;" Christie may have to stretch to establish an
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promise is presumptively enforceable in two of three respects. It
is a promise that is made in exchange for bargained-for considera-
tion and it is a promise involving a manifestation of mutual assent.
But it is a promise within the statute of frauds for it involves an
interest in land, and it is also one which cannot be performed
within one year of the time it is made. In the absence of the collat-
eral promise here assumed, the main promise, if enforced at all by
way of promissory estoppel, would have to be enforced directly
because of reliance upon it, the very promise that the statute of
frauds was enacted to render unenforceable.38 8
The enforceability of the collateral promise is another matter.
A promise to reduce an agreement to writing is not a promise that
is within the statute of frauds. Thus, the collateral promise does
not fail for lack of a writing, since no writing is required for its
enforceability. The inquiry ends if the collateral promise is bar-
gained for. It is enforceable, and a remedy lies for any breach of
that promise. If the collateral promise is not bargained for, then
this is merely a garden variety generalized section 90 promissory
estoppel case. Although this sort of promise could have been dis-
cussed elsewhere, it is included here under the statute of frauds
rubric since it is somewhat related to the statute of frauds, and
because the Restatement's references to reliance on this sort of
promise occur as part of its broader treatment of reliance on
promises unenforceable because of the statute of frauds. That is,
the Restatement treats reliance on the collateral promise almost as
a subset of reliance on the main promise, characterizing this as a
more limited approach, taken by courts that would be unwilling to
enforce the main promise absent a collateral one.
The Restatement's formulation of a reliance rule applicable in
the face of a failure to satisfy the statute of frauds is contained in
section 139.389 Section 139 is in two parts. The first part is as
follows:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of
offer of sufficient definiteness that it could be accepted. For the 'reliance in the absence of a
definite promise' analysis, see supra notes 320-27 and accompanying text. Again, it is
possible so to structure Christie's arrangements such that the promise he relied upon is
presumptively unenforceable under all three presumptive rules, and perhaps for more than
one defect under each, so that promissory estoppel would have to do at least triple duty if
Christie is to recover. The actual Lo Greco case presents many of these issues, as, indeed,
do many of the well-known cases. For now, however, merely assume the simple case.
388. This sort of reliance against the statute of frauds is discussed in the next section of
this article.
389. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 139.
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the promisee or a third person and which does induce
the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstand-
ing the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach is to be limited as justice
390requires.
Upon analysis, it can be seen that this is a fairly close adaptation of
section 90, and the elements necessary to support a recovery
under section 139(1) are substantially the same as those required
under section 90 generally: (1) there must be a promise, (2) the
promisor must reasonably expect that the promise will induce
action or forbearance, (3) the promise must have induced the
expected action or forbearance, and (4) injustice must result if the
promise is not enforced. The court is explicitly directed here to
fashion a limited remedy, and to extend relief no further than jus-
tice requires.3 01
The second part of section 139 adds to the analysis several
additional factors, all of which, together, will help to determine
whether the fourth element (the avoidance of injustice) is met.
Part two of section 139 provides that:
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise, the following circum-
stances are significant:
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies,
particularly cancellation and restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action
or forbearance in relation to the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance cor-
roborates evidence of the making and terms of the
promise, or the making and terms are otherwise
established by clear and convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was
foreseeable by the promisor.392
The commentary makes clear that the enumeration of additional
factors in section 139(2) beyond any contained in section 90 itself is
intended to make recovery in the face of the statute of frauds
more difficult than recovery in the more commonplace case of lack
390. Id. § 139(l).
391. See id. § 90.
392. Id. § 139(2).
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of bargained for consideration.9 3 In addition, the force of the sev-
eral factors varies in different types of cases.3 94
The Reporter's Note to section 139 of the Restatement begins
by acknowledging that section 139 is "new," and goes on to say
that courts "have shown varying degrees of willingness to set aside
the Statute of Frauds to avoid injustice. '39 The Reporter goes on
to observe that, of the courts that have been willing to set aside the
Statute of Frauds, some have not gone so far as indicated by the
full extent of section 139, but "have permitted reliance to displace
the requirement of a writing only in narrowly circumscribed situa-
tions, refusing to act unless there has been.., a failure to carry out
a promise to make a memorandum of an oral agreement.
3 96
These cases referred to by the Reporter can be said to turn,
therefore, not directly on the promise unenforceable because of
the absence of a writing, but, instead, on the subsidiary or collat-
eral promise to make a writing. Thus, it can be said that the prom-
ise relied upon is the promise to supply the writing, rather than
the original promise itself.
Reliance Against a Promise to Provide a Writing: Responses
Not Requiring that Promissory Estoppel be Applied Directly
Against the Statute of Frauds. Since the promise relied upon is
the promise to supply a writing, this is a collateral promise, not
itself within the statute of frauds. Like any other promise, such a
collateral one presumptively requires consideration and mutual
assent. Should either of those elements be lacking, the responses
(both by promissory estoppel, and by other doctrines outside of
,promissory estoppel) are the same as those otherwise available to
promises in general.397
Reliance Against a Promise to Provide a Writing: Promissory
Estoppel in North Dakota. There are no retrievable opinions of
the North Dakota Supreme Court involving a promissory estoppel
393. "Like § 90 this Section states a flexible principle, but the requirement of
consideration is more easily displaced than the requirement of a writing." RESTATEMENT
SECOND, supra note 3, § 139 comment b. The difference, presumably, results from the fact
that in most states, but not in all, consideration is a judicially created requirement, and
therefore, one which can be judicially recreated or uncreated, while the requirement of a
writing is a creature of statute, subject, indeed, to judicial interpretation, but not subject to
wholesale judicial nullification. In North Dakota, however, consideration, too, is a statutory
requirement. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-01-02.
394. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 139 comment c.
395. Id. § 139, Reporter's Note "this section is new"; § 139 comment b Reporters Note
('courts have shown varying degrees of willingness...' and citing cases).
396. Id. § 139 Reporter's Note.
397. See supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text for responses to promises lacking
consideration, and notes 283-305; 320-27 and accompanying text for responses to promises
lacking mutual assent.
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response to reliance on a subsidiary or collateral promise to reduce
an oral agreement to writing.
2. Statute of Frauds; Reliance Without a Writing Where
the Promisor Promised None
Reliance Against the Statute of Frauds: Promissory Estoppel
in the Restatement. The applicable Restatement provision is sec-
tion 139. But the acceptance of section 139 in this context is more
difficult. These are, by far the 'hardest' of the statute of frauds
cases, since they approach judicial nullification of a statute. The
Reporter's Note to section 139 reflects this fact, noting, not only
cases that adopt or discuss the then - tentative draft of section
139, but also those that (1) emphasize that enforceability of the
oral promise actually turns upon "broken promises to make subse-
quent writings, ' or (2) emphasize that an oral agreement within
the statute of frauds will not be enforced in the absence of "egre-
gious situations, ' 3 11 or (3) emphasize that there is a "heavy factual
burden" in the way of a successful estoppel argument,40 0 or go so
far as to (4) express "hostility" towards any weakening of the stat-
ute of frauds at all.4 °1
Those cases which enforce a promise in the absence of a
required writing, and in the absence of a promise to supply the
writing, form the next to last of the many promissory estoppel
transaction types.
Reliance Against the Statute of Frauds. Responses Outside of
Promissory Estoppel. In addition to standard recharacterization
responses which recharacterize a promise as one which is not
within the statute of frauds at all, the Field Code, as adopted by
North Dakota, contains a specialized version of its "promissory
fraud" provision,40' adapted particularly to the statute of frauds.
The relevant statute provides as follows:
When a contract which is required by law to be in writ-
ing, is prevented from being put into writing by the fraud
of a party thereto, any other party who by such frauds led
398. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 139, Reporter's Note.
399. Id. Indeed, Monarco v. Lo Greco, 220 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1950), in which Christie, the
relying promisee did recover is often so read and hence, is cited as a limiting (rather than as
an expansive) reading of promissory estoppel in the context of the statute of frauds. See,
e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 437 (1982).
400. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 3, § 139, Reporter's Note.
401. Id.
402. The promissory fraud provisions are discussed supra at note 132 and
accompanying text.
1990] 417
418 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:317
to believe that it is in writing and acts upon such belief to
his prejudice may enforce it against the fraudulent
party.4
0 3
In addition, North Dakota case law contains the part performance
exceptions to the statute of frauds, even though a corresponding
provision was deleted from the statute.40 4
Reliance Against the Statute of Frauds: Promissory Estoppel
in North Dakota. There are many sorts of statutes which require a
promise to be in writing as a condition to enforceability. The stat-
utory writings can be divided into two broad types: one kind
which is an aid to enforceability of promises not otherwise
enforceable,40 5 and a second kind which is a bar to enforceability
of promises that otherwise would have been enforceable. I
reserve the appellation "statute of frauds" for those statutes of the
second kind.
There are three important statutes of fraud in North Dakota,
two of them in the Uniform Commercial Code (carrying forward
the old article 17 provisions of the original statute of frauds, as
modified),406 and one derived from the Field Code (carrying for-
ward the old article 4 provisions of the original statute of frauds, as
modified).40 7
403. FIELD CODE, supra note 13, § 793; N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-03.
404. For the part performance exception, see, e.g., Keen v. Larson, 132 N.W.2d 350
(N.D. 1964). See supra note 388 for a comparison of the Field Code provision (which
included the part performance exception as part of the "real property" clause) to the
Century Code provision (which does not include the exception).
405. There are many statutes, for instance, which dispense with the substantive
requirement of consideration if there is a writing. Among those in force in North Dakota is:
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-09-05 (a writing, without new consideration, sufficient to modify an
existing contract). Such statutes provide the kind of formal substitute for consideration as
previously was provided by a seal.
406. See supra note 333 and accompanying text for article 17 of the original statute of
frauds. The two UCC provisions most relevant here are U.C.C. § 2-201 (1987) codified at
N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-08 (1983) (applies to contracts for the sale of goods for the price
of $500 or more) and U.C.C. § 1-206 (1987) codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-16 (1983)
(a gap-filler, which applies to sales of personal property beyond $5,000 in amount; an
important kind of personal property which does not constitute "goods" within the meaning
of the UCC, and so is covered by the gap-filler provision, is "general intangibles," including
bilateral contract rights and royalty rights).
407. See supra note 362 and accompanying text for article 4 of the original statute of
frauds. The most relevant provision of the North Dakota Code provides that
The following contracts are invalid, unless the same or some note or
memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged, or
by his agent:
1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof.
2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another,
except in the cases provided for in section 22-01-05.
3. An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale,
of real property, or of an interest therein...
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There has been a lively debate in the North Dakota cases over
whether, when, and how the doctrine of promissory estoppel may
serve to render enforceable a promise that otherwise would have
been unenforceable for lack of a sufficient writing. In the discus-
sion that follows, some of the leading non-UCC cases will be ana-
lyzed, and then some of the UCC cases will be examined.
Gulden. James Gulden had a lease with an option to purchase
a home owned by Walter Krueger.4 °8 Gulden's option exercise
price was $62,400.409 Gary Sloan, an acquaintance of Gulden,
owned a mobile home and was prepared to pay $68,400 for the
Krueger house.4 10 Gulden asserted that he and Sloan came to an
agreement involving the mobile home and the Krueger house,
orally agreeing, in effect, to exchange Gulden's option for Sloan's
mobile home. 41 ' The transaction was expressed as an agreement
by which Gulden would forbear exercising the option, Sloan would
buy the home from Krueger for $62,400, and Sloan would transfer
his mobile home (apparently valued at $6,000) to Gulden.412
Accordingly, Sloan purchased the Krueger home, and then
exchanged residences with Gulden - Sloan and his wife moved
out of their mobile home and into the Krueger house; Gulden and
his wife moved out of the Krueger house and into the mobile
home vacated by the Sloans.4 3 However, Sloan refused to give
the Guldens title to the mobile home, and eventually transferred it
4. An agreement or promise for the lending of money or the extension of credit
in an aggregate amount of twenty-five thousand dollars or greater.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-04 (1987).
The North Dakota Century Code provisions differ in several material respects from
Field Code. For example, the Field Code version of the "one year provision" omitted the
words "from the making thereof," because, in the words of the commissioners, "The com-
missioners think ... that the strictness of this provision has worked injustice. Few yearly
contracts go into effect instantly." FIELD CODE, supra note 13, § 794 comment 6.
In addition, the Field Code version of the "real property" provision added the words
or unless the contract has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and
such part performance has been accepted by the other," in order to retain the equitable
doctrines of part performance. Id. § 867 comment 3. In retaining the equitable doctrine,
the commissioners of the code broadened it by removing the equitable requirement that
the party seeking to enforce the contract show that he cannot otherwise be restored to his
former position, because they supposed that courts of equity had been reluctant to go so far
as the code now went because of the chancellors' consciousness that "the equitable doctrine
of part performance was always in contradiction of the letter of the statute," a concern that
evaporated with the codification of equitable doctrine. Id. § 867 comment 3.
408. Gulden v. Sloan, 311 N.W.2d 568 (N.D. 1981).
409. Id. at 569.
410. Id. at 570.
411. Id. Sloan admitted that there had been discussion of terms, but contended that
"no formal agreement" was ever reached. Id. The trial judge's finding of fact was that the
parties had come to an agreement. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. The couples "helped each other move and exchanged keys." Id.
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to a third party.414 At trial, Sloan disputed Gulden's version of the
facts, but the trial judge made findings in Gulden's favor, including
findings that there was an oral agreement supported by considera-
tion, and that there had been part performance sufficient to satisfy
the statute of frauds.4 15 These findings were affirmed on appeal.41 6
As to part performance and the statute of frauds, the North
Dakota Supreme Court noted that neither party had specified
which of the three possible statute of frauds provisions might have
been applicable.4 17 Since the parties had not chosen among the
414191land sale provision,41 8 the UCC gap-filler provision, or the UCC
sale of goods over $500 provision, 42 the supreme court did not
address the issue of which of the three statutes of frauds is applica-
ble.42 1 The court assumed that at least one of the provisions was
applicable, and held that part performance was sufficient against
any of the three provisions so as either to satisfy the statute of
frauds, or to exempt the transaction from the operation of the stat-
ute of frauds.422 Finding that there had been part performance,
the court concluded that the oral agreement was enforceable
notwithstanding the statute of frauds.4 23
Part performance cases are somewhat difficult to analyze in
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 571-72.
417. Id. at 573.
418. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-04(3) (1988), applicable if the transaction be considered a
sale of some interest in real property. If the option to purchase be deemed an interest in
real property, or if the mobile home had involved an interest in real property, the
transaction would be eligible for coverage by this statute of frauds provision. Id.
419. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-16 (1986) (UCC § 1-206), which is applicable if the
transaction involves the sale of a general intangible beyond $5,000 in value and is not
otherwise covered by the UCC sale of goods provision. Id. If the option to purchase be
deemed a general intangible sold for $6,000, the transaction would be eligible for coverage
by this statute of frauds provision. Id.
420. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-08 (1986) (UCC § 2-201), applicable to the extent that
the transaction involves the sale of goods in excess of $500. Id. If the mobile home be
deemed "goods," the transaction would be eligible for coverage by this statute of frauds
provision. Id.
421. Gulden, 311 N.W.2d at 573.
422. As to the land sale statute of frauds, The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that
it had previously held that part performance "in the form of improvements to property"
was sufficient to "take the oral contract for the sale of land out of the statute of frauds."
Gulden, 311 N.W.2d at 573 (citing Vasichek v. Thorsen, 271 N.W.2d 555, 560-61 (N.D.
1978)).
As to the UCC sale of goods provision, § 2-201, it should be noted that it contains its
own performance exception. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1987). This section is § 2-201(3Xc), which
provides for goods with respect to which "payment has been made and accepted or which
have been received and accepted" would seem to cover Gulden's transaction. See U.C.C.
§ 2-201(3Xc) (1987).
As to the UCC gap-filler provision, § 1-206 has no statutory performance exception, and
there had, apparently, been no judicially developed performance exception. See U.C.C.
§ 1-206 (1987).
423. Gulden, 311 N.W.2d at 574.
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terms of the reliance interest, or in terms of promissory estoppel.
Indeed, there are at least three variations on part performance,
ranging more or less close to promissory estoppel: (1) From one
point of view, performance certainly is one of the things that a
promisee does in reliance on a promise; and so part performance
might be expected to lead into a promissory estoppel analysis
(could the promisor reasonably have expected that the promisee
would act or forbear from acting, and so on). (2) From another
perspective, performance is evidence of the existence of the
agreement; and if the statute of frauds is conceived of as insisting,
not necessarily that there be a writing, but simply that there be
trustworthy evidence of the agreement itself, then unequivocal
part performance might satisfy the statute by reinforcing the oral
testimony as to the existence and terms of the agreement. (3)
From yet another vantage, part performance is either based upon
specific statutes,424 or is a narrow exception of some antiquity,
developed by courts of equity in matters concerning land and his-
torically applied only to that species of "performance" which con-
sists in entry and improvement on real property and is not, strictly
speaking, "part performance" at all,425 at least not performance of
the land purchase agreement sought to be enforced thereby; so
understood, part performance has little or no extension beyond
the specific reach of the statutes which permit it, or the 'entry and
improvement upon land' cases which authorized it.
Gulden is important because it shows definite movement
away from the last of the three enumerated positions.426 Gulden
embraces the second position, focusing as it does upon a rule of
part performance which emphasizes that the test for such per-
formance is to be "precisely directed toward" the "quantum of
proof certain enough to remove doubts as to the parties' oral
agreement, ' 427 and holding that there was no explanation for the
424. E.g., the original article 17 Statute of Frauds, sale of goods provisions, carried
forward, with modifications into the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1986).
425. On this basis, the action of making valuable improvements, though called "part
performance," can be thought of as simply an action in reliance on the promise to convey
the land. It is, perhaps, on this basis that the drafters of the original Restatement counted
many of the entry-and-improvement-on-real-estate cases as precursors to their § 90.
426. While part performance was the basis of its holding, the court did not ground the
result on any improvements on land, nor did it rest its holding upon the statutory part
performance exception in the UCC. See Gulden, 311 N.W.2d at 573-74.
427. Id. at 573 (citing Buettner v. Nostdahl, 204 N.W.2d 187, 195 (N.D. 1973)) (quoting
Miller v. McCamish, 479 P.2d 919, 923-24 (Wash. 1971)) (noting that the "first requirement
of the doctrine [of part performance] is that the contract be proven with clear and
unequivocal evidence," and that another requirement is that the "acts relied upon as
constituting part performance must unmistakably point to the existence of the claimed
agreement.")
421
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actions of the Guldens and the Sloans that was more likely than the
explanation of Gulden's.42 s And the case may be a more signifi-
cant landmark still if it be understood to have deliberately avoided
the more narrow holding that might have been equally possible.a29
Jamestown Elevator or Farmer's Cooperative? Jamestown Ele-
vator v. Hieb 430 and Farmer's Cooperative v. Cole 43' are two cases
that were decided within nine months432 of one another: they
presented similar facts, but they seem to have resulted in opposite
holdings. In the second of the two cases, Jamestown Elevator,
there was a recovery in favor of the relying promisee; but in the
first of the two, Farmer's Coop, there was not. Since the cases
were decided in the same year, and since the second cites the first,
not only without overruling it, but approving it, the cases must
stand for the proposition that at least some promises within the
statute of frauds will be enforced even if not accompanied by a
writing sufficient to satisfy the statute.
In Jamestown Elevator, Archie Hieb, a farmer, orally agreed
to sell his crop to a grain elevator; and the elevator immediately
agreed to resell the same crop.433 When the farmer refused to
perform, the elevator waited, covered, and sued.434 The elevator
won at the trial court level, and the judgment was affirmed on
appeal.435  The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that North
428. Id. at 574. "Although," the court observed, "it is undisputed that James Gulden
and Gary Sloan had known each other for 30 years, it doesn't appear that their friendship
was so strong and long lasting that it explains [the] Sloans letting [the] Guldens live rent free
in their mobile home." Id. The court went on to say
The simple explanation that the exchange was made out of friendship does not,
in view of the testimony, provide an acceptable explanation of the exchange.
We therefore hold that the oral contract . . . was excepted from the statute of
frauds because of the part performance.
Id. (emphasis added).
429. Instead of taking any of the three statutes of frauds as being potentially applicable,
and, thus, holding that all three are satisfied by the evidentiary sort of part performance
present in this case, the court might have elected to use the UCC sale of goods provision. If
there had been a record sufficient to establish the movability of the mobile home, then the
mobile home constitutes "goods" as defined by § 2-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
See Schock v. Ronderos, 394 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1986) (risk of loss under article 2 of the
UCC, a mobile home being the subject matter of the controversy). Under the UCC sale of
goods provision, the statute of frauds is satisfied if payment has been made and accepted, or
if the goods have been delivered and accepted - both of which seem to have occurred in
Gulden.
430. Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1976).
431. Farmer's Cooperative Ass'n of Church's Ferry v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D.
1976).
432. Farmer's Cooperative was decided in February (opinion dated February 25, 1976,
rehearing denied, April 5, 1976), and Jamestown Elevator was decided in November
(opinion dated November 5, 1976).
433. Jamestown Elevator, 246 N.W.2d at 738.
434. Id. at 739. The amount claimed by the elevator was apparently $37,500. Id.
435. Id. at 742.
422
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Dakota Century Code section 41-02-08, covering the sale of goods
in excess of $500 (UCC § 2-201) is part of a statute that permits a
court to apply principles of common law, including estoppel.436
Oscillating between equitable estoppel and promissory estop-
pel,437 the court concluded that the farmer was estopped from
invoking the statute of frauds as a defense.438 The estoppel was
explained thus:
In the instant case, Hieb conveyed the implication to [the
grain elevator] that the sale was complete, knowing that
[the grain elevator] would immediately resell the durum
wheat; and [the grain elevator] had no method of ascer-
taining Hieb's true intentions at the time that [it] had to
rely upon Hieb's representation in order to insure secur-
ing the price [the grain elevator] had promised to pay
Hieb for his durum wheat.4 39
The court observed, also, that Hieb's counsel had conceded the
point.440
436. Id. at 740. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-03 (1986) (UCC § 1-103) (providing that
"unless displaced by the particular provisions of this title, the principles of law and equity,
including the law relative to estoppel shall supplement its provisions").
437. In the space of a single page, the court referred to both kinds of estoppel without
clearly differentiating the transitions from one to another. Jamestown Elevator, 246 NW.2d
at 741. As a result, the following observations can be gleaned about the two estoppels.
(a) Equitable estoppel: "[A]nother alternative to the strict application of the Statute of
Frauds is the doctrine of equitable estoppel." Id. (citation omitted, emphasis added). The
court went on to quote § 31-11-06, the statutory version of equitable estoppel. Id. See
supra note 354.
(b) Promissory estoppel: "[in a prior case], this court quoted with approval the
following statement of the elements of promissory estoppel applicable to the sale of goods."
Jamestown Elevator, 246 N.W.2d at 741 (emphasis added). At this point, instead of giving
the elements of promissory estoppel, the court quoted the gloss it had earlier given to the
equitable estoppel statute. Id.. (see supra note 354 for North Dakota's gloss on equitable
estoppel). Finally, the court noted that Hieb's counsel "conceded in oral argument before
this court that the elements necessary for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel
existed in the instant case." Id. (emphasis added).
It seems that the working rule of the case is completely based upon actual elements of
equitable estoppel, while merely carrying the label of promissory estoppel. For the
difference between promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel, see supra note 354. In a
carefully reasoned opinion issued six years after Jamestown Elevator, the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed its recognition of the difference. See O'Connell v. Entertainment
Enterprises, 317 N.W.2d 385, 389 (N.D. 1982) ("Equitable estoppel applies when a person
makes a representation as to a present or past fact .... Promissory estoppel, on the other
hand, applies when a person makes a representation as to future events.")
438. Jamestown Elevator, 246 N.W.2d at 741.
439. Id. (emphasis added).
440. Id. Unfortunately, the concession does not do much to help us determine what
the representation was or when it was made. Are we to say, simply, that every promise
within the statute of frauds imports an implied representation? If so, then we still must
determine what representation, exactly, it is that we are going to imply. Among the
representations that might be implied are: (a) "if you need a writing, I will provide one"
(being, of course, a promise, rather than a representation of fact, and being, therefore, if
implied, the predicate upon which to build a promissory estoppel recovery, based squarely
on the promise to provide the necessary writing), or (b) "don't worry, there is no writing
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In the earlier of the two cases, Farmer's Cooperative,44 1 it was
alleged that Elmer Cole, a farmer, orally agreed to sell his crop to
a grain elevator; and the elevator immediately agreed to resell the
same crop.442 When the farmer refused to perform, the elevator
waited, covered, and sued.443 The elevator lost at the trial court
level, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal.444 The North
Dakota Supreme Court noted that North Dakota Century Code
section 41-02-08, covering the sale of goods in excess of $500 (UCC
§ 2-201) is part of a statute that permits a court to apply principles
of common law, including estoppel.445 Dodging back and forth
between "yes" and "no" on the question whether estoppel can be
applied in the face of the statute of frauds,446 the court concluded,
necessary, this promise is enforceable without one" (being the kind of representation which
would raise the question of an equitable estoppel, but also being the kind of representation
which the recipient must know or have reason to know is false, and so not entitled to rely
upon). The opinion does not say what, exactly, the representation was. Neither does the
opinion say how, if it is going to create implied representations so broad as those suggested
here, and is also prepared to say that the recipient is justified in relying upon them, the
court will ever have occasion to hold any promise unenforceable for lack of a writing. Of
course, the promisor might have actually said something to this effect: "don't worry, I have
already signed a sufficient writing" (being the kind of representation which would raise the
question of an equitable estoppel, and be of the sort on which the recipient may be entitled
to rely), but this would seem to be a representation that requires proof, and which ought
not to be implied. In any event, it did not seem to be a factor in the actual case.
441. Farmer's Cooperative Ass'n of Church's Ferry v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D.
1976).
442. Id. at 810.
443. Id. at 811. The elevator claimed $122,800. Id.
444. Id. at 810.
445. Id. at 811. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-03 (the supplementary general
principles of law provision, UCC § 1-103, providing that "unless displaced by the particular
provisions of this title, the principles of law and equity, including the law relative to
estoppel shall supplement its provisions"). This is, of course, the same provision that
governed the Jamestown Elevator case. See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
446. Farmer's Cooperative, 239 N.W.2d at 812-14. The trial court set up a clean issue
for the appeal. The trial court concluded that estoppel did not apply, reasoning that
"estoppel to assert the statute of frauds does not arise merely because an oral contract
within the statute has been acted upon by the promisee and not performed by the
promisor, nor does it arise upon the mere refusal to make a writing as agreed." Id. at 812.
Indeed, the trial court, quoting Ozier v. Haines, 103 N.E. 2d 485, 488 (Ill. 1952), said:
[i]t is true that harsh results ... may occur ... but it is a result which is invited
and risked when the agreement is not reduced to writing in the manner
prescribed by law... [the promisee acts on the promisee's own judgment and at
its own risk and is] not entitled to an application of the estoppel doctrine.
Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court first acknowledged the trial court's rejection of
promissory estoppel. Id. It then gave answers that seem both to support and to reject
promissory estoppel. Id. at 812-13.
On the one hand, it observed that estoppel in North Dakota is limited "for some pur-
poses" by statute and quoted N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-06, the equitable estoppel statute
(see supra note 354 for that statute and its North Dakota gloss). Id. at 812. The court noted
that if estoppel is applied too broadly, it would accomplish a "complete derogation" of the
statute of frauds, but, if applied too narrowly, the statute of frauds might itself become a
tool to accomplish "fraud." Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court pointed out that it had,
in two recent cases, "recognized that estoppel could be a bar to the raising of the statute of
frauds." Id. at 812-13 (emphasis added) (citing Nelson v. Glasoe, 231 N.W.2d 766 (N.D.
1975)) (dicta); (citing Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1974)) (dicta). Finally,
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at the least, that estoppel did not apply in the instant case." 7 Sub-
sequently, Farmer's Cooperative has been cited for the diametri-
cally opposed propositions that the North Dakota Supreme Court
does, 4 4 and that it does not,449 recognize promissory estoppel as a
bar to the assertion of the statute of frauds.
In light of these two cases, neither of which is overruled, it
seems safe to say that there is some doubt about the state of the
law in North Dakota, but it appears North Dakota does recognize
some sort of estoppel, in some circumstances, 45 0 against the asser-
tion of the statute of frauds.
In Dangerfield v. Markel, 451 the North Dakota Supreme Court
the court gave a statement of the elements necessary for invocation of equitable estoppel.
Farmer's Cooperative, 239 N.W.2d at 813 (quoting the same A.L.R. annotation it subse-
quently relied upon in Jamestown Elevator, 246 N.W.2d at 741) (see supra note 354 for the
substance of the A.L.R. annotation, which has become the North Dakota gloss on equitable
estoppel and see supra note 437 for a discussion of equitable estoppel as applied in James-
town Elevator).
On the other hand, the North Dakota Supreme Court examined § 2-201 of the UCC
(N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-08) (1986) to determine whether it expressed a legislative intent
to permit avoidance of the statute of frauds by invocation of estoppel, and found no such
intent. Farmer's Cooperative, 239 N.W.2d at 813-14. It concluded, further, that the trial
court was "correct" in ruling that there was no evidence of fraud on the part of Elmer Cole,
and that the grain elevator "had not established the application of estoppel," and admon-
ished that each case must be evaluated "by its circumstances" when determining whether
to employ estoppel to prevent a party from applying the statute of frauds. Id. at 814.
It may be wondered whether the court means simply that equitable estoppel is avail-
able, but only when the promisor has committed fraud. See supra note 354 (suggesting that
the court may, indeed, mean to identify equitable estoppel with fraud).
447. Farmer's Cooperative, 239 N.W.2d at 813. In a sensible analysis, the court noted
that the applicable provision of the statute of frauds was the sale of goods provision of the
UCC, § 2-201, and that the statute itself stated certain limited circumstances in which an
agreement, though not in writing, might be enforced. Id. The court quoted with approval
an A.L.R. annotation which admonished that "where there exists, in statute or case law,
clearly established means under which a contract . . . may be rendered enforceable
notwithstanding the statute of frauds, the court may be hesitant to apply promissory
estoppel in such a manner as to enlarge upon those means of avoiding the statute." Id. at
813.
448. Cf. Jamestown Elevator, 246 N.W.2d at 741 (using Farmer's Cooperative in
support of its holding that estoppel does apply against the assertion of the UCC's statute of
frauds).
449. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 6.12 (1982) ("Some courts rejected the
Restatement Second rule and adhered to the traditional position that such reliance did not
make the farmers' oral promises enforceable," referring to Farmer's Cooperative and other
cases.)
450. As a matter of the facts of the two cases, it may be relevant that Mr. Hieb, on
whose promise Jamestown Elevator relied, may have admitted the existence, if not all of
the terms, of the promise, see Jamestown Elevator, 246 N.W.2d at 73839 (alternative
arguments presented by Mr. Hieb). However, Mr. Cole, on whose asserted promise
Farmer's Cooperative relied, denied that he ever made any such promise. See Farmer's
Cooperative, 239 N.W.2d at 810. If the North Dakota Supreme Court is really committed to
the view that the statute of frauds is meant as a non-exclusive method to provide
trustworthy evidence of the existence and terms of certain agreements (see supra note 427),
then there is a clear outline of a reliance based rule in North Dakota. It might be put thus:
where there is clear and convincing evidence of the terms of an agreement, and there is
reliance, then the agreement will be enforced.
451. Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1974), after remand, 252 N.W.2d
184.
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did another variation on promissory estoppel against the UCC sale
of goods statute of frauds.452 The court analyzed this in terms of
an enforceable oral modification coupled with waiver of the origi-
nal terms or an estoppel to assert them.453
Finally, in Buettner v. Nostdahl,45 4 a non-UCC case, there was
an allegation of part performance sufficient to overcome a statute
of frauds defense. 455 Buettner involved an oral undertaking
related to management of a sugar beet operation and conduct of a
cattle feeding operation; the statute of frauds provisions were
those relating to contracts not to be performed within one year,
and relating to the sale of an interest in land.45 6 Buettner stands
for the proposition that where there is part performance (reliance)
upon a promise that is within the statute of frauds, there must be
(a) proof of the agreement by clear evidence, and (b) performance
that is unmistakably in response to that agreement, and not other-
wise explainable. 4 7 Because there was no clear evidence of the
agreement, and because the part performance could as readily
been explainable as evidencing merely an employer-employee
relationship, there was no recovery.458
3. Non-Statute of Frauds Reliance Without a Writing
If, by 'statute of frauds,' is meant a statute which requires a
writing in the case of promises otherwise presumptively enforcea-
ble, then the failure to satisfy the writing requirement of such a
statute may result in the failure to enforce a promise that was
accompanied by consideration and mutual assent. This is widely
viewed as a disappointing result. Some of the attempts to avoid
452. Dangerfield, 222 N.W.2d at 377-78. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-08; (UCC § 2-
201) (1987). See note 446 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's treatment of
this same provision.
453. Dangerfield, 222 N.W.2d at 376. The matter was before the court on
interlocutory appeal of an order which granted a motion to strike portions of defendant's
counterclaim, and denying a motion for summary judgment on the same portions of the
counterclaim. Id. In remanding for further proceedings, the court gave guidance to the
trial court, including this:
Another alternative to the strict application of the Statute of Frauds in this case
is the doctrine of equitable estoppel.... Where one party, [1] in reliance on the
other's representation or conduct, [2] changes his position or otherwise suffers an
unjust or unconscionable injury or loss, or [3] where one party has accepted
performance or benefits to the detriment of the other, the doctrine may be
applied.
Id. at 378 (making a passing reference to § 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
454. Buettner v. Nostdahl, 204 N.W.2d 187 (N.D. 1973).
455. Id. at 195.
456. Id. at 188.
457. Id. at 195
458. Id.
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such results and to enforce such promises by way of promissory
estoppel were discussed in the previous sections of this article.
This leaves one more kind of statutory writing. Where a
promise, not otherwise presumptively enforceable, is made so by
the presence of a writing, there is a different policy at work. Here,
the failure to satisfy the writing requirement does not have the
immediate effect of denying validity to an otherwise enforceable
promise (as is the case with a failure to satisfy the statute of frauds),
but instead, has the effect of leaving an unenforceable promise in
precisely the same state it was in before - unenforceable. Here
are three examples of North Dakota statutes having such an effect:
promises modifying a preexisting contractual obligation,45 9
promises releasing an existing contractual obligation,46 0 and cer-
tain promises having to do with the sale of goods.461 In all of these
cases the writing serves as a substitute for consideration. If pres-
ent, the writing serves to make enforceable a promise that would
otherwise not be enforceable due to lack of consideration.
I refer to this sort of writing requirement as a "nonstatute of
frauds" writing. It might be supposed that, where the legislature
has provided a method by which a promise may be rendered
enforceable despite the lack of consideration, there may be at least
some question why it is necessary to enlarge upon those means.
The application of promissory estoppel to excuse the lack of a writ-
ing, which, in turn, would have excused the lack of consideration is
such an enlargement.
Mitchell v. Barnes,46 2 already discussed in its aspect of reli-
ance in the absence of consideration, also illustrates an instance of
reliance in the absence of a required writing.463
Summary of the Reliance in the Absence of Required Writing
Cases. The series of cases, including the statute of frauds cases
(Gulden, Jamestown Elevator, Farmer's Coop, Buettner, Danger-
field) and the non-statute of frauds case (Mitchell), in which the
459. A modification of an oral contract may be effected by the consent of the parties,
without a new consideration, if the modification is in writing. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-05
(1986). A modification of a written contract may be altered by "a contract in writing." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-09-06 (1986). See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
460. A release of an obligation may be effected, without a new consideration, if the
release is in writing. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-13-01 (1986).
461. For example, § UCC 2-205 creates binding option contracts, without
consideration, if there is a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that an offer
will be held open; and, while UCC § 2-209(1) allows for the modification of a contract
without consideration, § 2-209(2) requires a signed and written modification to modify a
contract if the original contract excludes modification except by a signed writing. N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 41-02-12 (1986) (UCC § 2-205); 41-02-16 (1986) (UCC § 2-209).
462. Mitchell v. Barnes, 354 N.W.2d 680 (N.D. 1984).
463. See supra note 225.
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court has dealt with the problem of enforceability in the absence
of a required writing resist analysis. There are difficulties in the
way of understanding these cases as examples of promissory estop-
pel, or as equitable estoppel, or as an overthrow of the writing
requirement, or as traditional part-performance. Accordingly,
instead of summarizing the cases under one or more of those head-
ings, the following summary will point to the difficulties of classify-
ing the cases under any one of them.
Promissory Estoppel.
Notwithstanding the circumstance that the court uses the
promissory estoppel label in its analysis of several of these cases,
there is at least one major difficulty, and two minor difficulties, cur-
rently in the way of an unqualified acceptance of promissory
estoppel as the holding of any of the cases. The major problem is
that the court, in fact, invariably discusses the North Dakota ver-
sion of equitable estoppel, mislabelling it as promissory estoppel.
This creates a certain ambivalence, and requires a determination
whether it is the name or the substance that governs. It is cer-
tainly true that the court has said it will consider promissory estop-
pel as a bar to the assertion by a promisor of the defense of the
statute of frauds; and yet it is also true that the court has never, in
fact, considered promissory estoppel - instead, it has always con-
sidered equitable estoppel. The minor problems are that, if it be
granted that the court is ready to apply promissory estoppel, it has
not told us what version of promissory estoppel it is applying (that
is, whether it is using the egregious and unconscionable sort typi-
fied by Monarco v. Lo Greco; or whether it is using the qualified
version typified by section 139 of the Restatement; or whether it is
using the wide open version which would tend to obliterate the
statute of frauds altogether, at least where the promisor does not
renounce the promise immediately, and prior to the promisee's
reliance). These minor problems prevent us from saying, even it
were granted that the court actually is applying promissory estop-
pel, just what that means.
Equitable Estoppel.
Notwithstanding that the court is applying some form of equi-
table estoppel in the face of the statute of frauds, there are two
difficulties, one having to do with the facts of the cases, the other
having to do with the law announced in them. Factually, the court
has not pointed to the representations on which the equitable
estoppel turns. Legally, the court has not explained why the recip-
ient of the representation is, in light of the gloss it has consistently
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applied to equitable estoppel, entitled to rely upon the representa-
tion. If it should be said that the cases support the proposition that
(a) there is a representation always implied by a promisor who
makes a promise within the statute of frauds that the promise is
enforceable even without a writing, and (b) there is a presumption
that the recipient may always rely upon such a representation,
even if not lacking the knowledge or the means of obtaining it,
then there is a further difficulty. The court has at least said that its
concern is to strike a balance, by which it neither will permit the
statute of frauds to perpetrate fraud, nor will it simply nullify the
statute. If we were to grant that the court has determined to raise
an implied representation in all cases, and to permit reliance in all
cases, we would be forced to conclude that the court did not mean
to say that it seeks to establish a balance; instead, we would be
forced to conclude that the court is prepared to nullify the statute
of frauds.
Traditional Part Performance.
If the court is simply seeking to apply traditional doctrines of
part performance, it would seem that it has gone further than the
traditional doctrine would permit.
Other Factors: Clear and Convincing Proof of the Promise.
If the court is, in fact, basing its results on observations that
the statute of frauds will not be followed when the result will be
unconscionable, or where there has been unjust enrichment, it
can, in future cases, channel its approach into one of the more
traditional ones.464 If, on the other hand, the court is basing its
results on whether the evidence is sufficiently clear to establish
that there was, in fact, a promise, the court is leaving behind
promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel and part performance. It
may well be doing so, but the difficulty in saying so is that the court
has, apparently denied that this is the case. Instead, the court has
tended to speak in terms of the more familiar doctrines, even
though it may, in fact, be conditioning their application upon its
finding that there is or is not a clear and definite promise.
464. If it were to limit the invocation of promissory estoppel to cases in which the loss
to the relying party were egregious, the court would be moving towards the Monarco v. Lo
Greco position. See supra note 399 for this interpretation of Monarco.
If it were to avoid promissory estoppel altogether, and shape recoveries on the
noncontractual, and so nonstatute of frauds limited basis, of unjust enrichment, it would be
on very traditional grounds. It may need to limit or overrule several cases in order to do so,
however.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A. SUMMARY
It is generally presumed that North Dakota is favorably
inclined towards the Restatement's view of reliance based recov-
ery under section 90 and its related provisions, 465 but there are
three problems with that general supposition. In the first place,
the cases do not support it.4 66 In the second place, the Field Code
probably prohibits it.467 In the third place, the Field Code proba-
bly renders it superfluous a.46  This article has been limited to a dis-
cussion of the first difficulty only, reserving the others for separate
treatment elsewhere.
In assessing the status of promissory estoppel in North Dakota,
I have focused on the foundations of promissory estoppel, as estab-
lished in the Restatements of Contracts. There is a single reliance
interest,469 but there are three kinds of reliance4 7 0 and five
responses that may be given to each.4 7 ' Of those five responses,
only one is promissory estoppel and it has, in the nearly 60 years
since the publication of the original Restatement of Contracts
matured into several distinct kinds of promissory estoppel.4 72
The kinds of cases that gave rise to section 90 of the Restate-
ment of Contracts do not seem to have arisen with any great fre-
quency in North Dakota. Perhaps for that reason, the court has
never had to be particularly concerned with the formulation of a
reliance rule. As a result, it has included traces of at least the fol-
lowing reliance rules in its decided cases: (1) the rule of section 90
of the original Restatement, (2) the rule of section 90 of the
Restatement (Second), (3) the "standard" North Dakota formula-
tion of section 90, based on the original Restatement, but materi-
ally different from it, and (4) one or more "nonstandard" North
Dakota formulations of some sort of nativist promissory or equita-
465. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
466. Except, perhaps, for the statute of limitations cases (see supra notes 397; 405-464
and accompanying text). There is, at most, one case of a reliance based recovery in the
absence of consideration (see supra notes 133-261 and accompanying text), and no cases of a
reliance based recovery in the absence of mutual assent (see supra notes 306-318; 328-376
and accompanying text). Chart 1 tabulates these cases.
467. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 16 and 20 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 7 and 42 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (the three major kinds of reliance:
reliance in the absence of consideration; reliance in the absence of mutual assent; and
reliance in the absence of a required writing).
471. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (the five responses to reliance:
either/or; recharacterization; reanalysis; promissory estoppel; and overthrow).
472. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
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ble estoppel.473
The reason for the development of the rule(s), if any, is like-
wise less than clear. The "rule" of promissory estoppel in North
Dakota developed, so it is said, to prevent "inequities." But, since
the case in which promissory estoppel came into being was one in
which the relying promisee did not recover, there must either
have been no inequity or only a minor inequity. 474
B. CONCLUSION
I have surveyed all of the significant promissory estoppel cases
decided by the North Dakota Supreme Court. My conclusions
must be divided by subject matter, by results, and by formulation.
By Subject Matter. As I have suggested, promissory estoppel is
not a unitary subject matter, but contains at least three different
categories and several subcategories. Accordingly, there is no sin-
gle answer to the question whether North Dakota has embraced
"promissory estoppel," but rather, a series of answers divided by
subject matter. In summary, it is fair to say that North Dakota has
(1) entertained a doctrine of promissory estoppel with apparent
approval, but not in a way to make any significant difference to the
results of any case, when promissory estoppel is asserted as a basis
for recovery in the absence of consideration, (2) repeatedly
rejected promissory estoppel as a basis for recovery in the absence
of mutual assent, and (3) repeatedly applied the label, though not
the elements, of promissory estoppel in the course of fashioning
recoveries when "promissory estoppel" is asserted as a basis for
recovery in the absence of a required writing.
Chart 1 tabulates the cases which support this conclusion.
The Chart is divided by the three categories of reliance cases, and
further subdivided by the subcategories of each. The following
discussion is tied to Chart 1. 4 11
In all of the first category, reliance in the absence of consider-
ation, and including the various subcategories in which these cases
present themselves, there have been only six cases in which some
recognizable version of promissory estoppel (either pre or post
473. See supra notes 754-64 and accompanying text. These results are summarized in
the charts appended to this article.
474. See supra notes 306-318 and accompanying text (discussing Union Nat'l Bank v.
Schimke, the first known North Dakota case to be recognizably derived from section 90 of
the Restatement).
475. The Chart, in turn, is qualified in its entirety by the text and notes in the body of
this article that it summarizes. In particular, the article (but not the chart) takes account of
hard to classify cases, and yet the chart is useful for its purpose of condensing the cases into
manageable form.
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restatement) has been asserted by a relying promisee as a basis for
recovery. Of these six cases, there were only two instances in
which relying promisee recovered. Because four of the six relying
promisees did not recover, and because the two who did recover
did so either without a direct endorsement of a promissory estop-
pel rule by the North Dakota Supreme Court,476 or would have
recovered anyway because of the presence of consideration, 477 it is
hard to say that North Dakota has embraced the doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel as a ground for recovery. Yet, because the court so
readily assumes the existence of such a ground for recovery in its
most recent decisions, it would be reckless to say that there is no
promissory estoppel rule in North Dakota. Accordingly, I con-
clude simply that the court is favorably disposed towards the use of
some formulation of promissory estoppel as a basis for enforcing
promises in the absence of consideration.
In the second category, reliance in the absence of mutual
assent, only one of the various subcategories has presented itself.
In this subcategory, involving reliance in the absence of assent -
failed negotiations or promise insufficiently definite - there have
been only four cases in which some version 478 of promissory estop-
pel has been asserted by a relying promisee as a basis for recovery.
Because every one of the relying promisees failed to recover, and
because the North Dakota Supreme Court has expressly disap-
proved the preeminent case 479 upon which much of the Restate-
ment's version of reliance in this context is based,48 0 it is hard to
resist the conclusion that the court has rejected the application of
promissory estoppel to create recoveries for relying promisees in
the absence of mutual assent, at least where the context involves
failed negotiations or insufficient definiteness. Yet, because the
four cases reviewed by the North Dakota Supreme Court all
476. The relying promisee recovered in Mitchell, but on the strength of an unusual
version of promissory estoppel given by the trial judge as a jury instruction which was not
before the Supreme Court on its review. See supra notes 222-228 and accompanying text.
477. The relying promisee recovered in Anton, but on the strength of an alternative
rationale that there was, in fact, consideration to support the promise. Indeed, it is only by
an aggressive interpretation of the case that I am able to label it as a promissory estoppel
case at all. See supra notes 210-221 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 306-18; 328-376 for a discussion of the versions used. See also
Appendix, Charts 2 and 3.
479. That case, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., was rejected by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Lohse. Its rejection is all the more significant because the North Dakota
court had in Cooke, an earlier case, both cited Red Owl with apparent approval and then
refused to apply its rationale, leaving Red Owl's status in doubt.
480. It is the subcategory of reliance in the absence of mutual assent - failed
negotiations, for which Red Owl is preeminent. Since that is only one of three
subcategories of reliance in the absence of mutual assent, but is the most notorious of them,
it is the most significant from the standpoint of the development of the law.
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involve the single subcategory of reliance in the absence of mutual
assent where the defect was the absence of any real promise on
which few if any promisees could ever reasonably rely (these are
cases either of failed negotiations, which break down prior to the
point of offer or acceptance, or of terms too indefinite for intelligi-
ble enforcement), it remains to be seen what the court might do,
were it ever to be presented with one of the less dramatic subcat-
egories involving reliance in the absence of mutual assent. All that
can be said at this point is that the court has never fashioned a
promissory estoppel recovery in favor of a relying promisee in the
absence of mutual assent, and that it has emphatically rejected the
attempt to do so by every promisee who has tried to recover on
this basis.
In the third category, reliance in the absence of a required
writing, the North Dakota cases split. I have tabulated five cases,
including three recoveries by the relying promisee in the absence
of a writing. If there is any category in which the North Dakota
Supreme Court is actually applying promissory estoppel so as to
fashion a recovery for relying promisees, it would appear to be
here, in this category. But, as has already been seen, and as I will
summarize in the next section, the reality of what the court has
done in the face of the statute of frauds does not match what it says
it has done. Accordingly, while there are some recoveries by rely-
ing promisees who have not supplied required writings, there is
substantial doubt whether the reason actually has very much to do
with any version of promissory estoppel as described either by the
North Dakota Supreme Court or as described by the Restatement
of Contracts.
Ultimately, the only conclusion that may be reached is that
there is substantial uncertainty as to the status of promissory estop-
pel in North Dakota. If asked, without appropriate qualifications,
whether there is promissory estoppel in North Dakota, it could be
answered in several ways, no one of which could be considered
completely wrong: (1) Yes or No, if the respondent is thinking of
the cases of reliance in the absence of consideration ("yes", if the
respondent concentrates upon the attitude of the court, but 'no' if
the respondent concentrates upon the holdings of the court), (2)
No or Can't Say, if the respondent is thinking of the cases of reli-
ance in the absence of mutual assent ("no", if the respondent con-
centrates upon the holdings of the court, but 'can't say' if the
respondent notices the attitude of the court and also observes that,
from the court's rejection of the most dramatic of the three subcat-
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egories of reliance in the absence of assent, it does not necessarily
follow that the court will reject both of the other subcategories),
and (3) Yes or No or Can't Say, if the respondent is thinking of the
cases of reliance in the absence of a required writing ("yes" if the
respondent happens upon the line of cases in which there is a
recovery, "no" if the respondent happens upon the line of cases in
which there is no recovery, and "can't say" if the respondent hap-
pens upon both lines or notices that neither line actually has much
to say about promissory estoppel as it is ordinarily understood).
At this point, my own hope is that everyone who contem-
plates, argues or decides the issues will do so in a way that desyno-
nomizes the term "promissory estoppel." It must be understood
that there are at least three different presumptive rules, one which
requires consideration, another that requires mutual assent, and
yet another that sometimes requires a writing. For as long as
there are different reasons, different policies, and different
degrees of flexibility related to each of the three different pre-
sumptive rules, it will never be helpful simply to talk about prom-
issory estoppel without qualification. The necessary qualification
must always include a specification of some one or more of the
three contexts: promissory estoppel in the absence of considera-
tion, promissory estoppel in the absence of mutual assent, or prom-
issory estoppel in the absence of a required writing. If the
discourse relating to promissory estoppel will come to include dis-
cussion of the context, and if, further, there is appropriate sensitiv-
ity to the additional distinctions relevant within the subcategories
of each of the three contexts, then it will be possible to be guided
by the prior cases, to find a reason for them, to be able to predict
what the next decision might be, and to be able to discuss the wis-
dom, legality or prudence of expanding or contracting the promis-
sory estoppel doctrine to any given set of facts. In short, we will be
able to practice the law of contracts as law, rather than as an exer-
cise in fortune telling or as entailing a search for judicial motiva-
tions by inspiration or revelation.
By Results. As I have suggested, the actual results in North
Dakota need to be addressed with reference to other factors,
including subject matter (as summarized in the section above) and
formulation (which will be summarized in the following section).
Depending upon how those other factors are weighted, it is easy to
make apparently contradictory statements about promissory
estoppel results in North Dakota. Here are some of the permuta-
tions: (1) taking reliance in the absence of consideration as the core
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subject matter of promissory estoppel, it can be said that, since
promissory estoppel has had no effect, or, at best, only a slight
impact on the actual decisions of such cases before the North
Dakota Supreme Court, and disregarding the rest as dicta, there is
no promissory estoppel in North Dakota, or (2) taking the same
core, and recognizing that almost all of the excitement in this area
over the last 50 years has had to do with the question whether the
subject matter of promissory estoppel can be expanded from reli-
ance in the absence of consideration to include reliance in the
absence of mutual assent, it still can be said that there is no promis-
sory estoppel in North Dakota; indeed, since the absence of
mutual assent cases in North Dakota have led to the rejection of
the doctrine in that context, it could even be said that North
Dakota is an antipromissory estoppel jurisdiction, or (3) switching
orientation completely, and conceiving the subject matter of
promissory estoppel to be neither reliance in the absence of con-
sideration nor reliance in the absence of mutual assent, but
instead, taking the subject matter to be reliance in the absence of a
writing, it could be said that there is something in the nature of a
promissory estoppel tradition in North Dakota, but (4) even under
this last shift in orientation by subject matter, if results are fac-
tored against the formulation of the rule, it might be said that,
even though there are recoveries in the face of failure to supply a
required writing, since the actual rule applied was not a recogniza-
ble promissory estoppel rule, there is, in fact, no promissory estop-
pel in North Dakota at all.
If all of the foregoing result based analysis, which tends
towards the conclusion that there is little or no promissory estop-
pel in North Dakota, is factored against the ease and facility with
which the court formulates promissory estoppel rules, it could be
that the result based conclusion must be divided: if by 'result' is
meant a holding in favor of a relying promisee accompanied by a
recognizable promissory estoppel formulation, then there is no
promissory estoppel in North Dakota; but if by 'result' is meant the
court's observable tendency, over and over again, to invoke the
doctrine of promissory estoppel as if it were a rule of law in the
state of North Dakota, then there is a very strong promissory doc-
trine in North Dakota.
At this level, my own hope is that those who discuss or analyze
the issues will do so in a way that makes it clear which results they
are noticing. It must be understood that there is much in the cases
that resembles dicta, alternative holding, or even mislabeling of
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doctrines, that there are points granted arguendo, and doctrines
applied for purposes of argument without their having been
adopted by the court, and that there are relying promisees that, in
fact, are losing rather than winning on the 'grounds' of promissory
estoppel. Against these results, it can only be an improvement to
refine the analysis of the results of North Dakota cases to look
beyond whether a 'rule' might have been stated in any one or
more of them to the further question whether the supposed rule
was essential to the holding of the case. Further, even where the
rule was necessary, it will be well to remember that the negative
application of a rule teaches very little about the positive reach of
the rule.481 If this is kept firmly in mind, we can make progress in
dealing with the past of promissory estoppel as a prelude to its
future in this state.
By Formulation. As I have suggested, promissory estoppel
must be considered by its subject matter, by results, and also by
formulation. When I speak of formulation, I mean the actual
words used, since, unfortunately, 'promissory estoppel' does not
have that sort of secondary meaning which immediately suggests
the same significance to everyone who considers the expression. A
moment's reflection will indicate the truth of the preceding state-
ment. To some, 'promissory estoppel' connotes that A promised,
therefore A is estopped. To others, 'promissory estoppel' connotes
that (1) A promised, A had reason to expect that someone else
would rely upon the promise, the other did rely in the way
expected by A, and injustice can only be avoided by enforcing the
promise, therefore A is estopped, if but only if (2) A's promise was
otherwise unenforceable for lack of consideration, and (3) A is in a
jurisdiction which has adopted a promissory estoppel rule. There
are other variations as well. But as to the problem of formulation,
the question is simply "which form of words is used to express the
promissory estoppel doctrine?"
This is, finally, an easy question to answer in North Dakota.
My conclusion is that North Dakota applies one of three sets of
formulations: (1) that of the Restatement (Second) of contracts, (2)
that which it derived from an apparent typographical or other
481. That is, if there is a case (call it case 1) in which it is "held" that promissory
estoppel may be part of the law of North Dakota, and that it would be defined in a
particular way, but that there is no promise, and hence no need to apply it in the
circumstances of case 1, then it should be noticed that case 1 is a rather weak sort of
authority for application to the next case (call it case 2). When case 2 is argued on the basis
of case 1, as if case 1 "adopted" some law of promissory estoppel, there is a danger of being
hyp notized by our own alternative arguments.
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error initially committed by the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington, and which represents a failed attempt to paraphrase
the Restatement (First) of Contracts, or (3) those unconventional
glosses or amplifications that seem to have nothing to do with any
other version of promissory estoppel and might, instead, represent
a version that the court means to create on its own.
Charts 2 and 3 tabulate the information concerning formula-
tions of promissory estoppel by the North Dakota Supreme Court.
Chart 2 collects the cases that bear a version of the rule that has a
recognizable relation to the version which appears in the Restate-
ment of Contracts (including both First and Second Restatements).
Chart 3 collects the cases that include a version not so
recognizable.
The standard formulations begin, most recently, with that set
forth in Lohse. In that case, it will be remembered, Lohse did not
recover. But, if he had, it would been presumably because he fit
within the scope of a rule that the court there enunciated. The
Lohse court cited a prior North Dakota case, Russell, as authority
for its version of a promissory estoppel rule. In that case, it will be
remembered, Russell did not recover. But, if he had, it would
have been because he fit within the scope of a rule that the court
there enunciated. The Russell court cited its prior case,
O'Connell, as authority for its version of a promissory estoppel
rule. In that case, it will be remembered, O'Connell did not
recover. But, if he had, it would have been because he fit within
the scope of a rule that the court there enunciated. The
O'Connell court cited its prior case, Schimke, as authority for its
version of a promissory estoppel rule. In that case, it will be
remembered, Schimke's promisee did not recover, but if it had, it
would have been because it fit within the scope of a rule that the
court there enunciated. The rule in Schimke comes from a Wash-
ington case, Northern State, which comes from Central Heat,
another Washington case, which comes from Corbit, another
Washington case. The rule in Corbit, finally, is derived, errone-
ously, from the Restatement (First) of Contracts.48  So, from a mis-
take, by way of dicta or negative holding multiplied by successive
482. See supra notes 182 and 317 and accompanying text. It will be remembered that
the only significance I give to the word "mistaken" is the factual one. It might be argued
that the Washington (and North Dakota) versions may be "better" law than the original
Restatement (though this is an argument neither court ever made, apparently because
neither court intended to alter the Restatement), but it cannot be argued that either of
these versions is the version of the original Restatement. It is a mistake to say that
significantly different things are the same. In this sense, the Washington court mistakenly
paraphrased the original Restatement.
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dicta or negative holdings, it can be said that there is a standard
formulation of a promissory estoppel rule in North Dakota. The
string cite, could be as follows: North Dakota has adopted the
promissory estoppel rule of the original Restatement of Contracts.
Lohse; Russell; O'Connell; Schimke. Of course, the court has not
adopted the promissory estoppel rule of the original Restatement
of Contracts. Instead, it has adopted the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington's misstatement of the Restatement rule. Further, it may be
fairly argued that the court hasn't even done so much as that.
Since the North Dakota Court has never actually applied its
announced rule in any case in which a promisee has recovered
anything, perhaps it isn't even accurate to say that it has adopted a
rule.
If the court has not adopted the rule of the Restatement
(First), neither has it adopted the rule of the Restatement (Second).
In Cooke, a case in which it cites the Restatement (Second) with
approval, the court nevertheless quotes the mistaken Washington
version of section 90 of the original Restatement instead of quot-
ing section 90 of the Restatement (Second).
Finally, though the North Dakota Court may or may not have
adopted section 90, either in the version contained in the original
Restatement as misstated by the Supreme Court of Washington, or
in the version contained in the Restatement (Second), it may or
may not have intended to add further glosses of its own. Chart 3
tabulates other amplifications or glosses that the North Dakota
Court has added from time to time, including these: the promise
must be "actually relied upon in good faith" and there must be
"clear and convincing" evidence of the promise (Kenmare, citing
no authority for the proposition); the promise must be "relied
upon" and there must be clear allegations (Anton, citing no
authority); there must be "justifiable reliance" and "irreparable
detriment" to the promisee (Schimke, citing digests); that there
may be occasion to apply the doctrine when one party "changes
his position or otherwise suffers an unjust or unconscionable injury
or loss" or where the other party has accepted benefits (Danger-
field, citing digests and the original Restatement of Contracts);
that the doctrine developed to "prevent inequities" when an
agreement is unenforceable because of "inadequate considera-
tion" or for failure to satisfy the statute of frauds (O'Connell, citing
no authority); that there must be a "statement" followed by reli-
ance (the trial court's jury instruction in Mitchell, which was not
challenged on appeal); and that the promise relied upon must be
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"clear, definite and unambiguous" (Lohse, citing cases applying
Texas, Iowa, California and Montana law; Thiele, citing Lohse).
What, then, is the formulation of promissory estoppel in North
Dakota? It is easier to say what it is not than to say what it is. It is
not the formulation of the Restatement (Second), nor is it the for-
mulation of the original Restatement. After the negatives, it may
be said that it is a formulation that seems to be close to that of the
original Restatement. There is no apparent reason why the court
has adopted the formulation it has, and it may be that the court
intended in the first instance to adopt the formulation of section
90 of the original Restatement. Whether, having not quite cap-
tured the formula of the original Restatement, the court will be
disposed to adhere to its own version, to adhere to section 90 of
the Restatement (First), or to move on to the formulation of sec-
tion 90 which appears in the Restatement (Second) is a question
for prediction, rather than summary. My own conclusion is that
the development of the law in this area ought to proceed slowly
rather than instantly. Accordingly, I would recommend that the
court reconsider the original Restatement before adding the
changes made to it by the Restatement (Second). In any event, the
court's attempts to solve the problem of formulating a rule can
only be aided by the efforts of counsel to make cogent arguments
for one form or another of the rule, based upon recognized ver-
sions and the reasons that support each.
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Chart 1: Reliance Cases in North Dakota
(classified by category and result)
[Vol. 66:317
Type of Reliance Restatement North Dakota Cases
(Category) Sections (Result)
A. No Con- 1. Generalized Section 90 §90 Recovery: none
sideraion Promises No Recovery: (2 cases) O'Connell ; Russell
2. Family, Charity, Bailees, §90 [No Cases]
Land, Marriage
3. Modification, Waiver, §§89(c), Recovery: (at most, 2 cases) Mitchell
Discharge 84(2), 273(c) (statute); Anton (alternate holding)
No Recovery: (2 cases) Thiele; Kenmare
Coal
B. No Assent 1. No Assent (no accept- §§ 87(2), 90, [No Cases]
ance, offeror wanted per- cf. § 45
formance)
2. No Assent (no accept- §§ 87(2), 90 Recovery: none
ance, offeror wanted a pro- No Recovery: Schimke
mise)
3. No Assent ( failed negoti- §90 Recovery: none
ations or promise insuffi- No Recovery: (3 cases) Lohse; Firefighters;
ciently definite) Cooke
C. No 1. No Satisfaction of the §90 [No Cases]
Writing Statute of Frauds (restricted
to the promise of a writing)
2. No Satisfaction of the §139 Recovery: (2 cases) Gulden (part perfor-
Statute of Frauds (not res- mance); Jamestown (equitable estoppel)
tricted) No Recovery: (2 cases) Farmers Coop;
Bueuner
3. Non-Statute of Frauds n/a Recovery: Mitchell (written modification
writings enforceable without consideration; no writ-
ing, modification enforced anyhow)
Chart 1 (by category & result) Page A-1
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Chart 2: Standard Elements in North Dakota Cases
(elements bearing a recognizable similarity to the standard of the Restatement)
Case Name Type Result Formulation Authority cited
Lohse (N.D. 1986) No assent (failed No recovery (1) a promise which the Russell
negotiations) (factor 1) promisor should reasonably (N.D. 1986)
(standard elements; expect will cause the promi-
see Chart 3 for the see to change his position;
non-standard ele- (2) a substantial change of
ments also men- the promisee's position
tioned in this case) through action or forebear-
ance; (3) justifiable reliance
on the promise; and (4) in-
justice which can only be
avoided by enforcing the
promise.
Russell No consideration No recovery same as above O'Connell
(N.D. 1986) (generalized §90) (factrs (N.D. 1982)
2 & 3)
Cooke No assent (failed No recovery Two formulations given:
(N.D. 1982) negotiations)
(a) No (a) same as above, and O'Connell
Recovery (N.D. 1982);
(factor 1)
(b) No (b) A promise which the Restatement (See-
Recovery promisor should reasonably ond) of Contracts,
(no promise) expect to induce action or §90; Hoffman v.
forebearance on the part of Red Owl Stores
the promisee or a third
person and which does induce
such action or forebearance is
binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement
of the promise. The remedy
granted for reach may be
limited as justice requires.
Chart 2 (standard ND elements) Page A-2
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O'Connell
(N.D. 1982)
(standard elements;
see Chart 3 for the
non-standard ele-
ments also men-
tioned in this case)
No consideration
(generalized §90)
No recovery
(fac r 1)
same as (a) above:
(I) a promise which the
promisor should reasonably
expect will cause the promi-
see to change his position;
(2) a substantial change of
the promisee's position
through action or forebear-
ance; (3) justifiable reliance
on the promise; and (4) in-
justice which can only be
avoided by enforcing the
promise-
Schimke
(N.D. 1973)
Schimke No assent/no No recovery (1) a promise, (2) which the Northern State
(N.D. 1973) communication (factors promisor should reasonably (Wash. 1969)
of acceptance 2 & 3) expect will cause the promi-
(standard elements; see to change his position,
see Chart 3 for the (3) which does cause a sub-
non-standard ele- stantial change of position,
ments also men- action or forebearance by the
tioned in this case) promisee, (4) acting in justi-
fiable reliance on the pro-
mise, and (5) injustice which
can only be avoided by enfor-
cing the promise
Northern State same as above Central Heat
(Wash. 1969) (Wash. 1968)
Central Heat same as above Corbit
(Wash. 1968) (Wash. 1967)
Chart 2 (standard ND elements)
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Corbit
(Wash. 1967)
Two formulations given:
(a) san as above, and
(b) A promise which the
promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or
forebearance of a definite and
substantial nature on the part
.of the promisee and which
does induce such action or
forebearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the
promise.
Chart 2 (standard ND elements)
atiempted para-
phrae of the
Restatement [First]
of Contracts, §90
Restatement [First]
of Contracts, §90
Page A-4
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Chart 3: Non-Standard Elements In North Dakota Cases
(including glosses and other apparatus not derived from the Restatement)
Case Name Type Result Non-Standard Formulation Authority cited
Kenmare Coal No consideration No recov- (1) a promise actually relied None
(1910) (modification) ey upon in good faith; (2) the
pronisee was influenced by
the promise; (3) the pro-
mimsee offers clear and con-
vincing evidence of the pro-
mise.
Anton (1924) No consideration Recovery (1) a promise relied upon by None
(modification) the promisee; (2) both the
representation and the re-
Alternate rationale limice were clearly alleged
in a case where
consideration was
found to be present
Schimke (1973)
(non-standard ele-
ments; see Chart 2
for the standard ele-
ments also men-
tioned in this case)
No assent/no
communication of
acceptance
No recov-
ery
The promise which is sought
to be enforced must have in-
duced action of a definite and
substantial character by the
promisee. Also, justifiable
reliance and irreparable detri-
ment to the promisee are
necessary factors to enable
him to invoke the doctrine of
promissory estoppel
It is essential that the party
invoking the doctrine of
estoppel should have been
misled by the acts or conduct
of the party against whom
the estoppel is claimed, that
he changed his position in
reliance thereon, and was jus-
tified in so doing, and that he
was prejudiced thereby, or
that a benefit resulted to the
party against whom the es-
toppi is claimed.
17 AmJur.2d,
Contracts §89, p.
432
Abbey v. State,
202 N.W.2d 844
(N.D. 1972)
(equitable estoppel)
Chart 3 (nonstandard ND elements) Page A-5
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Dangerfield (1974) No writing Remand The doctrine may be applied 37 CJ.S. Statute
where one party, [I] in re- of Frauds §246;
liance on the other's repre- [First] Restatement
sentation or conduct. [2] of Contracts §90;
changes his position or 28 Am. Jur. 2d,
otherwise suffers an unjust Estoppel and Wai-
or unconscionable injury or ver, § 25
loss, or [3] where one party
has accepted performance or
benefits to the detriment of
the other.
O'Connell (1982) No consideration No recov- The doctrine developed to None
(generalized §90) ery prevent inequities that may
(non-standard ele- result when an agreement is
ments; see Chart 2 void or unenforceable be-
for the standard ele- cause of inadequate considers-
ments also men- tion or the statute of frauds
tioned in this case) and one of the parties has
acted to his detriment be-
cause of a promise made by
the other person
Mitchell (1984) No consideration Recovery (1) a statement, (2) reliance Trial court's jury
(modification) on the statement, (3) a instructions (not
change in position because challenged on ap-
of the reliance peal)
Lohse (1986) No assent (failed No recov- The promise must be clear, Cases applying
negotiations) ery definite and unambiguous Texas, Iowa,
(non-standard ele- California and
ments; see Chart 2 Montana law and
for the standard ele- which reject the
ments also men- doctrine of Hoff-
tioned in this case) man v. Red Owl
Stores
Thiele (1986) No consideration No recov- The promise must be clear, Lohse (N.D. 1986)
(modification) ery definite and unambiguous
Chart 3 (nonstandard ND elements) Page A-6
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Table of North Dakota Cases
The following table lists the more important North Dakota cases, including the short
name by which the case is referenced in this article, the full citation, and a reference to it
(usually the initial reference, sometimes the main reference) in the body of this article.
Short Name Citation Reference
Anton Farmer's State Bank of Gladstone v. Anton, 199 N.W.2d note 210
582 (1924)
Buettner Buettner v. Nostdahl, 204 N.W.2d 187 (1973) note 454
Cooke Cooke v. Blood Systems, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 124 (1982) note 357
Dangerfield Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373 (1974) note 451
Farmers Coop Farmers Cooperative Association of Churchs Ferry v. Cole, note 441
239 N.W.2d 808 (1976)
Firefighters Firefighters Local 642 v. City of Fargo, 321 N.W.2d 473 note 347
(1982)
Funfar Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v. Funfar, 443 N.W.2d 289 note 70
(1989)
Gulden Gulden v. Sloan, 311 N.W.2d 568 (1981) note 408
Jamestown Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d note 433
736 (1976)
Kenmare Coal Kenmare Hard Coal & Brick v. Riley, 126 N.W. 241 (1910) note 128
Lohse Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 389 N.W.2d 352 (1986) note 331
Mitchell Mitchell v. Barnes, 354 N.W.2d 680 (1984) note 222
Murphy Murphy v. Hanna, 164 N.W. 32 (1917) note 116
O'Connell O'Connell v. Entertainment Enterprises, Inc., 317 N.W.2d note 135
385 (1982)
Russell Russell v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 386 N.W.2d 892 note 161;
_(1986) 252
1990] PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN NORTH DAKOTA 447
Table of Cases

